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This dissertation proposes a two-level model that explains under which external and 
domestic conditions substantive reforms take place in minority rights policies in new EU 
member and candidate countries. Due to the politicised nature of EU conditionality and 
high adoption costs of reforms for national governments, minority rights reforms are 
generally considered among the most difficult areas whereby EU’s impact tends to 
remain limited. However, as demonstrated with reference to the Bulgarian case, 
significant improvement in inter-ethnic relations can take place despite the patchy nature 
of EU conditionality and high domestic adoption costs. The analytical model sketched 
out in this study, therefore, criticises mainstream accounts of Europeanisation as they are 
inclined to conceive the domestic area as an obstacle, which impedes compliance in 
aspiring states. As such, this dissertation argues that the domestic realm can also be 
exploited as an opportunity space that empowers EU leverage, which in turn, informs 
minority-friendly policies through direct and indirect ways. Along these lines, it develops 
a more comprehensive approach that acknowledges the complex interaction of external 
and domestic parameters affecting contentious policy areas and cases. Drawing on 85 
semi-structured in-depth elite interviews and driven by a set of empirical puzzles with 
reference to Bulgaria as well as the contrasting cases of Croatia and Montenegro, this 
dissertation argues that major changes could take place in minority rights regimes when 
(a) domestic dissatisfaction leads to double moderation between majority and minority 
elites, (b) EU-level pressure remains consistent and credible, and (c) state capacity 
undergirds effective implementation in new member and candidate countries. This 
dissertation makes two important contributions to scholarship: first, it develops a novel 
theoretical framework that accounts for the dynamics of complex transformation in the 
minority rights policies that existing top-down and bottom-up approaches cannot entirely 
explain. Second, by applying the two-level model to Bulgaria, Croatia and Montenegro, it 
sheds empirical light on three understudied Balkan countries with tormented past 
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CHAPTER I. Introduction 
 
1.1. Problem statement and research question 
On 29 July 1997, the Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov, during a state visit to Turkey, 
officially denounced the wrongdoings of the former Bulgarian elites who forced the 
Turkish minority community to change their names, denied their social and political 
rights, and forcibly displaced more than 340,000 of them in 1989. Stoyanov, in his 
important speech at the Turkish Parliament, described the events as the “most 
embarrassing and unacceptable episodes of Bulgaria’s recent history.”1 The apology of 
the Bulgarian President at the time was perceived as a clear reflection of the 
transformation in Bulgaria’s minority rights regime and, partially an outcome of the 
ruling elites eagerness to develop closer relations with the EU and its neighbours. One 
decade later, in 2007, Bulgaria joined the EU along with Romania, and in January 2017, 
the country celebrated its ten years of membership. Last three decades marked the 
significant transformation of Bulgaria’s minority rights policies from systematic 
exclusion to inclusion, which helped the country to join the ranks of the EU.  
Building on comparative evidence and driven by a set of empirical puzzles, this 
dissertation aims to reveal under which external and domestic conditions substantive 
reforms take place in minority rights regimes of the new EU member and candidate 
countries. This dissertation, accordingly, sketches out a ‘two-level model’ that explains 
																																																						
1 Petar Stoyanov, “Bulgaristan Cumhurbaşkanı Petar Stayanov'un, Genel Kurula hitaben konuşması,” 




the causal dynamics of continuity and change in minority rights policies. Challenging 
mainstream analytical frameworks in Europeanisation research, which tend to consider 
the domestic area as an impediment that should be overcome toward rule adoption,2 the 
two-level model proposes that the domestic area may also act as enabler in terms of rule 
adoption and norm compliance depending on the configurations of elite coalitions 
between minority and majority leaders. As such, this dissertation focuses on the domestic 
factors as drivers of possible change along with EU-level dynamics. Two-level model, 
offering an interactive non-hierarchical framework, focuses on external and domestic 
drivers simultaneously to weight in the EU factor by placing it into its proper context to 
avoid over-determination of ‘Europeanisation’ as a possible driver of change.3 
It is true that the EU has developed its material and normative capacities over the 
last decades and, with this, it has become a central player in regional and global affairs.4 
According to some scholars, one of the distinctive features of the EU is that it has 
qualitatively changed the debate on the nature of power and influence in international 
affairs. Thanks to its ontological foundations, as Manners suggested, the EU has the 
“ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations as a ‘normative 
																																																						
2 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the 
Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (2004): 
661-679. 
3 It should be stated at the outset that Europeanisation is not considered as a phenomenon only emanating 
from the EU as a regional international organisation. Within the context of this research that focuses on 
minority rights area, Europeanisation is also framed as a set of pan-European ideas, norms, and regulations 
involving other non-EU but European regional organisations. For a critical overview, see chapter 2.  
4 Richard Whitman, “The EU: Standing Aside from the Changing Global Balance of Power,” Politics 30, 
no. S1 (2010): 24-32. 
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power.’5 As such, the EU’s international presence is linked to a values-based approach 
with an explicit emphasis on rule of law, human rights, and democracy as the main 
parameters constituting the EU’s domestic and external identity.6 The EU’s relations with 
member and candidate states are also informed by its ontological stance as these 
principles are placed “at the centre of [EU’s] relations with its Member States and the 
world.”7 The EU, therefore, has the ability to transform target states through a set of 
principles and ideas that are drawn from its normative credentials.     
The EU’s direct and indirect impact on domestic polities – i.e., Europeanisation, 
has become one of the well-established areas in the field of European studies despite “the 
precise meaning and scope of the term remain unclear.”8 The scholarly literature on the 
EU’s impact on domestic polities has advanced significantly in terms of theoretical rigour 
and empirical substance recently.9 On that note, the mechanisms of Europeanisation are 
well documented especially in established policy areas, such as environment, trade, 
agriculture, and economic policy.10  
																																																						
5 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market Studies 
40, no. 2, (2002): 239. 
6 Richard G. Whitman, “The Neo-Normative Turn in Theorising the EU’s International Presence,” 
Cooperation and Conflict 48, no. 2 (2013): 172.    
7 Ian Manners, “The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez,” Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 35, no. 1 (2006): 176.  
8 Trine Flockhart, “Europeanization or EU-ization? The Transfer of European Norms across Time and 
Space,” Journal of Common Market Studies 48, no. 4 (2010): 788. 
9 For an overview see: Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (ed.) Europeanisation: New Research 
Agendas, (Bakingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Also see: Kyriakos Moumoutzis and Sotirios 
Zartaloudis, “Europeanization Mechanisms and Process Tracing: A Template for Empirical Research,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 2 (2016): 337-352. 
10 For an overview see: Claudio M. Radaelli, “Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and 
Substantive Change.” European Integration Online Papers 4, no. 8 (2002): 1-25. Also see: Ulrich 
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The EU conditionality is assumed to be a technical set of standards applied to all 
aspiring states in a uniform way. However, as current research, whether rational-choice 
or sociological-institutionalist oriented, has already underlined conditionality is itself a 
politicised concept.11 This is partially because of the fact that political climate in which 
integration unfolds cannot anymore be considered as “a permissive consensus.”12 Stated 
differently, the integration process has become politicised over the last two decades in 
which citizens turned into more active players in informing the time, speed, and direction 
of European integration through electoral forms of political participation and 
referendums.13 Apart from that, mainstream accounts have already pointed that 
distribution of power between member and candidate states and “sense of duty” on part 
of the EU should also be taken into consideration while accounting for the dynamics, 
content, and scope of EU conditionality applied to aspiring states. Liberal 
intergovernmentalist accounts, for instance, suggest that the primary dynamics of the EU 
enlargement and political outcomes depend on inter-state bargaining and power relations 
between the EU member and candidate countries.14 As such, not only the EU’s decision 
to enlarge but also the emphasis put on the negotiation titles are in part shaped by state 
																																																																																																																																																																	
Sedelmeier, “Europeanisation in New Member and Candidate States,” Living Reviews in European 
Governance 6, no. 1 (2011): 5-52. 
11 James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire Gordon, “Conditionality and Compliance in the EU’s 
Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-national Government,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 42, no. 3 (2004): 523-551. 
12 Liesbet Hooghe, and Gary Marks. “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive 
Consensus to Constraining Dissensus.” British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 1 (2009): 1-23. 
13 Pieter de Wilde, Anna Leupold and Henning Schmidtke, “Introduction: the Differentiated Politicisation 
of European Governance,” West European Politics 39, no. 1 (2016): 3-22. 
14 Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach,” Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 4, (1993): 473-524; Andrew 
Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998).  
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preferences and bargaining capacity of actors.15 The constructivist accounts, on the other 
hand, suggest that EU’s enlargement decision is informed by dominant norms that form 
EU’s collective identity. The negotiation process, accordingly, is shaped by sense of 
responsibility on part of the EU to include the states that are normatively considered as 
part of Europe.16 In summary, whether rationalist or constructivist, main frameworks 
analysing EU’s relations with target countries highlight that conditionality is more than a 
technical exercise. This inference is more pronounced especially concerning politically 
sensitive areas – such as minority rights reforms investigated in this research.  
The Europeanisation of minority rights is a very disputed issue in both member 
and candidate countries.17 It is also one of the areas in which progress appears to be more 
problematic in comparison to more technical policy areas that entirely fall under the 
scope of the EU acquis communautaire. The study of the EU’s impact on minority rights 
policies is challenging for two particular reasons. First, the rules and regulations 
concerning minority rights are not precisely defined as part of the EU membership 
conditionality. Despite this, the EU has put increasing importance on the protection of 
minorities in the post-Cold War era especially following the development of the 
Copenhagen criteria that set the basic normative framework of the EU’s relationship with 
target states, EU-level minority rights regime has not been considered entirely efficient 
																																																						
15 Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, “National Interests, State Power, and EU 
Enlargement,” East European Politics and Societies 17, no. 1 (2003): 42-57.  
16 Helene Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement 
Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 3 (2002): 491-513; Helene Sjursen, A Certain Sense of 
Europe? Defining the EU through Enlargement,” European Societies 14, no. 4 (2012): 502-521.   
17 Bernd Rechel, “What Has Limited the EU’s Impact on Minority Rights in Accession Countries?” East 
European Politics and Societies 22, no. 1 (2008): 171–191. 
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yet.18 The EU heavily relies on other international organisations – particularly Council of 
Europe (CoE) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to 
improve the status of national minorities in member and candidate states. As such, the 
CoE and OSCE regulations, along with Copenhagen criteria, form the basis of EU’s 
conditionality on minority rights protection. However, these regulations appear to be 
relatively broad and lack specificity in terms of operationalisation. This provides ample 
leeway for national policy-makers to interpret minority regulations in different ways to 
the extent that it paves the way for notable inconsistencies and implementation gaps. For 
instance, Schwellnus, Balazs, and Mikalayeva eloquently point out diverging 
interpretation of national governments in the field of minority regulations.19 The EU is 
also criticised due to the politicised nature of minority rule adoption that diverge 
considerably between ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states. Johns, for example suggests, 
“double standard becomes apparent” regarding the treatment of national minorities across 
western and eastern European members.20 It is also likely that states in the post-
membership process may revoke minority protection and non-discrimination measures 
																																																						
18 David J. Galbreath and Joanne McEvoy, The European Minority Rights Regime: Towards a Theory of 
Regime Effectiveness (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).   
19 Guido Schwellnus, Lilla Balázs and Liudmila Mikalayeva, “It ain't over when it's over: The Adoption 
and Sustainability of Minority Protection Rules in New EU Member States,” European Integration Online 
Papers 13, no. 24 (2009).  
20 Michael Johns, “‘Do as I Say, Not as I Do’: The European Union, Eastern Europe and Minority Rights,” 
East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 17, no. 4 (2003): 682-699. Also see, Christophe Hillion, 
“Enlargement of the European Union: The Discrepancy between Membership Obligations and Accession 




due to the ambivalent nature of EU minority conditionality and post-membership 
monitoring problems associated with technocratic EU institutions.21  
Second, as logical extension of the first point, the ambivalence of conditionality 
on minority rights make it a ‘hard case’ to reveal how the EU informs domestic rule 
adoption. For instance, one of the mainstream Europeanisation accounts, external 
incentives model, suggests that rule compliance depends on the credibility of EU 
commitments and the size of rewards in return for domestic compliance.22 The model 
also argues that rule adoption takes place depending on the outcome of rationalist cost-
benefit calculations. Top-down hierarchical approaches, on a broader scale, conceptualise 
the domestic realm as an obstacle that must be overcome to ensure rule compliance in the 
relevant policy area. On that note, high domestic adoption costs for governments prevent 
rule adoption.23 As a result, as the argument goes, compliance becomes a likely policy 
outcome if national policy-makers perceive domestic costs of rule adoption relatively low 
and EU conditionality is perceived consistent and credible.  
This dissertation maintains that adoption of minority-friendly regimes is a 
difficult case for mainstream top-down approaches as the EU norms in the minority 
policy area are not clearly defined and consistently implemented. Furthermore, domestic 
compliance costs are likely to be very high due to the politically sensitive nature of inter-
ethnic relations that is likely to be perceived as a challenge to the sovereignty of the 
																																																						
21 Nevena Nancheva, “Imagining Policies: European Integration and the European Minority Rights 
Regime,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 24, no. 1 (2016): 132-148. 
22 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier “Governance by Conditionality.” Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich 
Sedelmeier, “Introduction,” in The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Frank 




Westphalian nation-states.24 However, as discussed with reference to empirical cases in 
this dissertation, compliance in minority rights may still take place even though adoption 
costs appear to be relatively high for domestic ruling elites and EU regulations are 
politicised and contested in the field of minority rights. That being said, rule compliance 
in minority rights policies tends to follow diverging patterns across cases, which leads to 
an intriguing puzzle on the domestic and external conditions under which minority-
friendly policies are adopted in states aspiring to become EU members. This dissertation 
offers a two-level model that integrates domestic factors and EU conditionality to solve 
the puzzle as to how complex interaction of multi-level factors feed into diverging 
outcomes in minority policies.    
 
1.2. Case selection 
This dissertation focuses on Bulgaria’s minority rights regime as a ‘deviant case’ for 
mainstream Europeanisation accounts as it hardly fits into the existing templates. As Jack 
S. Levy suggests, “deviant case study research designs focus on observed empirical 
anomalies in existing theoretical propositions, with the aim of explaining why the case 
deviates from theoretical expectations and in the process refining the existing theory and 
generating additional hypotheses.”25 As such, deviant cases serve the aim of refining 
																																																						
24 On the question of sovereignty, minority rights, and multiculturalism, see Jennifer Jackson Preece, 
National Minorities and European Nation-State System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Will 
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995).   
25 Jack S. Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Conflict Management and Peace 
Science 25 (2008): 13. 
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existing explanations and offering new frameworks.26 All three junctures in Bulgaria 
investigated in the following chapters – pre-candidacy period (1989-1999), candidacy 
(1999-2007), post-membership (2007-2017) – can be considered as difficult cases that 
hierarchical models of conditionality do not entirely account for.  
First, as briefly mentioned above, top-down models of Europeanisation are 
inclined to assume that domestic area poses an impediment toward external rule adoption 
(see chapter 2). It is not, however, entirely possible to explain pre-candidacy period in 
Bulgaria (1989-1999) with reference to top-down frameworks, as significant 
transformation in minority rights policies took place mainly thanks to the conciliatory 
approach of the domestic elites – which this dissertation framed as ‘double moderation,’ 
rather than explicit EU conditionality. Second, the minority reform performance of the 
Bulgarian government during the candidacy process also creates puzzles that are difficult 
to accommodate within the context of mainstream accounts. The literature suggests that 
EU impact reaches its zenith during the candidacy process and the aspiring states are 
more eager to comply with the EU rules and norms. However, as demonstrated in chapter 
4, the reform performance of the Bulgarian governments fell short of expectations in the 
candidacy process, especially in comparison to the pre-candidacy period. This was the 
case, even when the Turkish minority party, Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) 
joined the government as a coalition partner. On the other hand, the changing domestic 
political scene put the famous ‘Bulgarian ethnic model’ into jeopardy, as anti-minority 
sentiments surfaced and became more organised than the 1990s. Bulgaria’s candidacy 
																																																						
26 John Gerring, Case Study Research (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 105-115. 
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process, therefore, leads to new puzzles regarding the domestic and external scope 
conditions of reform-activism or reform-inertia in the minority rights area.  
Third, post-membership developments regarding minority-majority relations in 
Bulgaria lead to new empirical puzzles as well. The conditionality literature suggests that 
EU leverage decreases considerably once the states join the EU. As Börzel and 
Schimmelfennig demonstrate “once countries become members, the EU’s political 
integration capacity weakens.”27 In this regard, recent democratic regression and anti-
minority sentiments in several new member and candidate countries is an illustrating case 
in point – an important point addressed below. Despite challenges it currently faces and 
discernibility of anti-minority sentiments, the resilience of the Bulgarian ethnic model 
provides new empirical evidence to reveal under which domestic and external conditions 
minority-friendly policies are harder to reverse.  
The empirical puzzles emanating from the Bulgarian case provide new avenues to 
revise and refine the relevant strand of literature. However, as Levy suggests, “the 
examination of deviant cases is not the end of inquiry, as the theory refined on the basis 
of deviant case analysis must be subject to subsequent testing against new evidence by 
applying the revised hypotheses to other cases or to unexamined aspects of the same 
case.”28 To this end, this dissertation also compares two new member and candidate 
countries with the Bulgarian case in chapter 5 to explore different constellations of 
domestic and external factors as parts of the ‘two-level model’ sketched out in chapter 2. 
The Croatian and Montenegrin cases are also investigated along with Bulgaria for two 
																																																						
27 Tanja A. Börzel and Frank Schimmelfennig, “Coming together or Drifting Apart? The EU’s Political 
Integration Capacity in Eastern Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 24, no. 2 (2017): 278.  
28 Levy, “Case Studies,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 13. 
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main reasons. First, these two Western Balkan countries – which are new member and 
candidate states, respectively – also have a heavy baggage concerning inter-ethnic 
relations due to regime changes following the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Thus minority 
issues have been at the forefront of their relations with the EU since early 1990s. Second, 
different combinations of domestic and external factors lead to contrasting policy 
outcomes in these three cases, which share difficult background conditions, are expected 
to help overcoming problems associated with “selecting extreme cases on the dependent 
variable.”29     
1.3. Main argument and contributions to the literature 
Drawing on three contentious cases – Bulgaria, Croatia, and Montenegro, this dissertation 
explores continuity and change in minority rights policies in new member and candidate 
states through two-level analytical framework. In-depth analysis of Bulgaria and 
comparative account of the three cases are illuminative to reveal the causal patterns of 
transformation in minority-majority relations in states located in the periphery of Europe 
and to assess the role of the EU over the process. Accordingly, main question addressed 
in this research is as follows: How do the different modes of interactions between EU-led 
conditionality and domestic-factors inform the degree of change in the minority rights 
policies?  
By addressing the main question posed above and focusing on the ‘domestic’ in 
particular, this dissertation aims to contribute to the literature in two main ways. First, it 
develops a new framework that accounts for the dynamics of complex transformations in 
																																																						
29 David Collier and James Mahoney, “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research,” World 
Politics 49, no. 1 (1996): 59. 
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the minority rights area that existing top-down and bottom-up approaches, per se, cannot 
entirely explain (see chapter 2). The cases selected in this dissertation are particularly 
challenging as the violent nature of inter-ethnic relations have dominated the Balkans 
region for decades.30 Several Balkans states implemented aggressive nationalist 
programmes glorifying dominant ethnic groups and eliminating minority communities 
through employment of violent exclusion and suppression tactics in different shapes and 
forms. One can suggest that identity construction in these states used to follow a pattern 
of exclusion and discrimination against ethnic minorities.31 Most recently, the fall of 
communism in 1990s and bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia sparked a new wave of 
political violence that transformed the entire region into a conflict zone. Despite the early 
failure of the EU to contain Yugoslavian wars and avoid humanitarian tragedies in 
Europe’s sphere of interest, as Juncos suggested, it has gradually become a central actor 
in the region that played its role in transforming the political and economic systems of the 
countries located in the Balkans region.32 Parallel to this, minority regimes in the regional 
states also significantly transformed over the last three decades, which signified the 
peaceful coexistence of minority and majority communities.  
The three cases covered in this dissertation also passed through major paradigm 
shifts (see chapter 5). The emergence and consolidation of ‘the Bulgarian ethnic model’ 
in the post-1990 period is a striking example of inter-ethnic moderation and mutual 
																																																						
30 Brad K. Blitz, eds., War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict, and Cooperation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Misha Glenny, The Balkans (1804-1999): Nationalism, 
War, and the Great Powers (London: Granta Books, 1999).  
31 Neophytos G. Loizides, “Religious Nationalism and Adaptation in Southeast Europe,” Nationalities 
Papers 37, no. 2 (2009): 206. 
32 Ana E. Juncos, “The EU’s post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)Integrating the 
Balkans and/or (re)Inventing the EU?” Southeast European Politics 6, no. 2 (2005): 88-108. 
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toleration.33 The state of Turkish minority rights demonstrated massive shifts from 
exclusion to inclusion and, as relevant chapters demonstrate, Bulgaria now appears to 
have an effective minority-friendly regime. The gradual exclusion of the Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria started in early the 1960s as part of the state’s “homogenisation” 
policies. Todor Zhivkov, who ruled Bulgaria with an iron fist for 35 years (1954-1989), 
increasingly perceived the Turkish minority as a threat in terms of the stability and order. 
As a result, the collective identity of Turks was first ignored, and then, denied by the 
Bulgarian government at the time. Zhivkov’s anti-minority policies reached its zenith 
with the so-called “national revival process” in the late 1980s as a result of which more 
than 340,000 Turks were forced to leave Bulgaria.34  
The post-1990 developments that coincided with substantive democratisation of 
Bulgaria marked significant improvements with regards to inter-ethnic relations. From 
the perspectives of mainstream theories on democratisation and ethnic conflict – such as 
Mann and Brubaker, Bulgaria can be considered as a plausible case in terms of further 
escalation of inter-ethnic conflict.35 However, contrary to the expectations, Bulgaria 
experienced peaceful transition to democracy. As such, the emergence of inclusive 
minority policies enabled gradual integration of ethnic Turkish community into Bulgarian 
																																																						
33 Antonina Zhelyazkova, “The Bulgarian Ethnic Model,” East European Constitutional Review 10, no. 4 
(2001): 62-66; Benedict E. DeDominicis, “The Bulgarian Ethnic Model: Post-1989 Bulgarian Ethnic 
Conflict Resolution,” Nationalities Papers 39, no. 3 (2011): 441-460. 
34 R. Ercüment Konukman, Tarihi Belgeler Işığında Büyük Göç ve Anavatan: Nedenleri, Boyutları, 
Sonuçları, yayına hazırlayan Kutlay Dogan (Ankara: Türk Basın Birliği, 1990): 61, 71. Maria Bakalova 
gives the total number as 360,000. See: “The Bulgarian Turkish Names: Conflict and Democratic 
Transition,” Innovation 19, no. 3-4 (2006): 235. 
35 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining 
Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
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socio-political mainstream, which marked a shift in minority policies. However, as 
suggested in the previous section, existing explanations fall short of accommodating the 
causal factors that informed the emergence and consolidation of Bulgarian ethnic model 
and the EU’s role thereof. Having taken the stock of studies on conditionality, this 
dissertation aims to contribute to the literature by reconceptualising the domestic field as 
a potential driver for change. In this sense, ‘double moderation’ between domestic 
minority and majority leaders is offered as a necessary condition that facilitates the 
emergence of minority-friendly policies (see chapter 2 and chapter 5).      
Second, this dissertation aims to contribute to the literature by applying the two-
level model to the transformation of majority-minority relations in Croatia and 
Montenegro along with Bulgaria. The two post-conflict Western Balkan states refer to 
other striking cases through which EU rules and norms on minority rights made its way 
into conflict-ridden countries in the region.36 Following the civil war in Croatia, inter-
communal relations between ethnic Croats and Serbs improved significantly in the 2000s 
– as Croatian governments adopted EU regulations on minority protection that formed 
legal and institutional framework to design peaceful co-existence of different ethnic 
groups. Montenegro, another Western Balkan state, also refers to a striking but 
																																																						
36 There are several different definitions of “conflict” in the literature (for a comprehensive review, see 
Tropp, 2012). The term “post-conflict” is defined as follows in this study. According to Junne and 
Verokren (2004), post-conflict is “a conflict situation in which open warfare has come to an end. Such 
situations remain tense for years or decades and can easily relapse into large-scale violence.” The three 
cases examined in this dissertation are categorised as “post-conflict” because in Bulgaria, the Turkish 
minority were targeted by the Bulgarian militia during the peaceful demonstrations in the winter of 1984-85 
which resulted in the death of over a hundred members of Turkish minority community. Until 1989, they 
were subject to systematic state repression, imprisonment, internal displacement, and forced migration. The 
other two cases are also categorised as “post-conflict” because those states (Croatia and Montenegro) 
gained their independence following the bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia, which had long-lasting 




underexplored case as it hosts several ethnic groups.37 Montenegro started accession 
negotiations with the EU in 2012 and minority rights posed one of the central concerns 
attached to EU conditionality. As demonstrated in chapter 5, Montenegrin governments 
avowedly adopted pro-EU stance, which in turn, informed the minority policies of the 
Montenegrin ruling elites significantly. The comparative analysis of Bulgaria, Croatia 
and Montenegro provide solid cases that demonstrate under which conditions minority 
reforms take place and remain stagnated in the new member and candidate countries. 
These three cases, altogether, pose significant challenges for the mainstream 
Europeanisation accounts. The external incentive model, for example, does not entirely 
explain the dynamics of change in minority regimes of Balkan states. As demonstrated in 
following chapters, this dissertation argues that EU-impact diverges significantly across 
cases depending on combinative impact of three main factors: EU-pressure in the form of 
external conditionality, double moderation of minority-majority leaders, and state 
capacity.  
The comparative analysis of Bulgarian and Croatian cases demonstrates the causal 
weight of domestic factors as ‘double moderation’ between minority and majority elites 
emerges as a necessary condition for substantive policy transformation. As such, rule 
compliance in the field of minority rights does not take place in the absence of inter-elite 
moderation regardless of the degree of EU-pressure. The comparative analysis of 
Montenegro and Croatia also reveal the importance of ‘state capacity’ as a mediating 
factor that links domestic willingness for reform and EU-pressure toward effective 
implementation of minority policies. In the Europeanisation literature, state capacity is 
																																																						
37 Jelena Dzankic, “Montenegro’s Minorities in the Tangles of Citizenship, Participation, and Access to 
Rights,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 11, no. 3 (2012): 40-59. 
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addressed in an implicit manner at best and completely ignored in most cases. Given the 
fact that the EU dealt with states which had sufficient degree of state capacity in the 
previous enlargement waves, the capacity problems associated with recent candidates and 
the ways in which it informs reform performance appears to be a neglected aspect in the 
literature. This dissertation makes the point that weak state capacity poses an impediment 
in terms of the effective implementation of minority reforms even though domestic elites 
are willing to adopt EU regulations and external conditionality is consistently applied. 
Having taken stock of the literature, the two-level model revises and re-frames the 
existing explanations to account for the complex transformations in new member and 
candidate countries. In conclusion, this research suggests that domestic dissatisfaction 
leading to ‘double moderation,’ ‘EU-level pressure’ and ‘state capacity’ constitute 
necessary conditions that jointly inform effective improvement in minority rights regime 
in new member and candidate states.38   
 
1.4. Chapter outline 
This dissertation maintains that ‘double moderation’ in the domestic realm and the 
consistency of EU-level conditionality informs the progress and endurance of minority 
rights protection in member and candidate countries. It also argues that the outcome of 
the domestic and EU factors are conditioned by the degree of state capacity – a neglected 
aspect in the relevant literature. To develop and substantiate this main argument, chapters 
are organised as follows: Chapter 2 offers a critical review of the literature on the 
conceptual vocabulary and theoretical frameworks on Europeanisation. It is possible to 
																																																						
38 For the definition and operationalisation of these concepts, see chapter 2 and table 2.1.  
	
17	
review the mainstream explanations along two major strands: (1) the logic of causality – 
rationalist vs. constructivist and (2) the direction of change – top-down vs. bottom-up. 
This review section aims to demonstrate that literature on EU’s transformative impact 
does not entirely explain the dynamics of status quo and change in minority rights 
policies. This chapter, then, sketches out two-level model that integrates domestic and 
EU-level factors to account for the gap in the relevant strand of research. The research 
design, methodological issues and information about data collection are also covered in 
this chapter.  
The rest of the dissertation applies two-level model to three different periods in 
Bulgaria. As such, empirical chapters explore the combined effects of the EU 
conditionality and domestic factors. Accordingly, chapter 3 focuses on transformation of 
minority rights in Bulgaria between 1990 and 1999. The period in question poses 
intriguing empirical puzzles to test the hypotheses in terms of the weight of domestic and 
EU-level factors as substantive transformation took place in minority-majority relations. 
In line with the main argument, this chapter, by focusing on ‘double moderation’ between 
majority and minority ruling elites, demonstrates that domestic realm does not always 
pose an impediment for effective Europeanisation. The chapter also discusses why this is 
a counterintuitive finding that the hierarchical top-down approaches fall short of 
explaining adequately. This chapter, finally, explores the indirect ways through which 
European level factors act as a source of legitimate policy frames that domestic minority 
and majority leaders in Bulgaria relied on during transition period and afterwards.  
Chapter 4 discusses the Bulgarian governments’ minority rights policies between 
1999 and 2017. The post-1999 period refers to a critical juncture during which the EU-
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pressure considerably increased because of the candidacy process. This chapter argues 
that Bulgaria, again, poses a paradoxical case, as minority rights improvements remained 
modest despite Turkish minority party secured seats in the Parliament and leverage of the 
EU increased remarkably over Bulgaria as part of the candidacy process. This chapter 
proffers the view that Bulgarian ethnic model is challenged in this episode since 
increasing institutional power of Turkish minority party and rising anti-minority 
sentiment among Bulgarian mainstream parties jointly jeopardised the consensus on 
double moderation between minority and majority elites. This chapter, therefore, 
demonstrates how different combinations of domestic and EU-level factors inform 
Bulgaria’s minority reforms performance. Finally, this chapter discusses post-
membership process to understand whether external conditionality ceases and rule-
compliance weakens following the membership.  
Chapter 5 extends the scope of the debate by comparing the Bulgarian case with 
Croatia and Montenegro. The minority regimes in both cases changed significantly over 
the same time frame in different directions and degrees. The variance in outcomes 
enables exploring different combinations of explanatory factors that form parts of the 
two-level model. This chapter puts the pieces of puzzle together to address how different 
modes of interactions between external conditionality and domestic factors inform the 
degree of change in the minority rights policies in the new member and candidate states.  
Finally, chapter 6 concludes the dissertation. This chapter, first, revisits the 
research puzzle and summarises empirical findings. Main alternative explanations are 
also addressed in this part to demonstrate how two-level model builds on and expands 
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current accounts of Europeanisation. The final section points to new avenues for further 
research.               
 
1.5. Dynamics of EU conditionality in a changing Europe 
The recent problems that Bulgarian ethnic model encounters coincide with the rising 
wave of de-Europeanisation in several EU member states. The Bulgarian ethnic model, 
which was consolidated during the 1990s, currently appears to be under stress as 
European-level dynamics that facilitated multi-ethnic co-existence has taken a turn for 
the worse, especially in the aftermath of ‘Europe’s multiple crises’. The recent 
developments provide new insights to reconsider the resilience of the Bulgarian ethnic 
model and sustainability of minority rights reforms given the reversing fortunes of 
European integration project.39 On that note, Central and East European members, such 
as Hungary and Poland, have experienced significant setbacks in terms of democracy, 
rule of law, and human rights.40 Hungary, for instance, appears to move towards 
“building an illiberal state” under the premiership of Viktor Orbán.41 The Orbán 
government, resorting to populist-nationalist policies, has put several illiberal policies 
into implementation that constrained the activities of civil society organisations, curtailed 
																																																						
39 For a recent review on changing dynamics of European integration and dis-integration, see Douglas 
Webber, “How Likely is it that the European Union Will Disintegrate? A Critical Analysis of Competing 
Theoretical Perspectives,” European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 2 (2013): 341-365.  
40 Attila Àgh, “Decline of Democracy in East-central Europe: the Last Decade as the Lost Decade in 
Democratization,” Journal of Comparative Politics 7, no. 2 (2014): 4-33; Daniel Kelemen, “Europe’s Other 
Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic Union,” Government and 
Opposition 52, no. 2 (2017): 211-238.  





the freedom of media, and restricted democratic rights and freedoms.42 Likewise, Orban 
has adopted an explicitly anti-minority and anti-migrant rhetoric that has shrunk the 
democratic space considerably for minority populations.43 
The attractiveness of the liberal norms and values advocated by the EU also faded 
in Poland – a country labelled as the poster child of Europeanisation due to the scale and 
speed of economic and democratisation reforms along the lines of the EU since 1990s.44 
The current Law and Justice Party government, which swept the Polish Parliament in 
2015 elections, has implemented a series of illiberal policies that raise question marks 
with regards to the quality of democracy, rule of law, and human rights. The conservative 
populists in Poland, gathered under the umbrella of Law and Justice Party, gained strong 
support of the population. The EU president Donald Tusk, who also happens to be the 
former prime minister of Poland, for instance, argued that the country “was moving 
backwards and eastwards.”45 The European Commission also launched an infringement 
procedure on the ground that Polish government violated the principle of judicial 
independence.46 Similar to the Hungarian case, the scapegoating of migrants and 
minorities constitutes an integral aspect of exclusionary political discourse and illiberal 
slant of the governing Law and Justice Party. For instance, the representatives of the 
																																																						
42 Agnes Batory, “Populists in Government? Hungary’s ‘System of National Cooperation’,” 
Democratization 23, no. 2 (2016): 294-296; János Kornai, “Hungary’s U-Turn,” Capitalism and Society 10, 
no. 1 (2015): 1-24. 
43 Ivan Krastev, “Eastern Europe’s Illiberal Revolution,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 3. (May/June 2018): 49.   
44 Wojciech Przybylski, “Can Poland's Backsliding Be Stopped?” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 (2018): 
52-64. 
45 Wojciech Moskwa and Rodney Jefferson, “Poland’s Populist Turn,” Politico, December 25, 2016, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/poland  
46 European Commission, “Press Release: Rule of Law: European Commission takes next step in 
infringement procedure to protect the independence of the Polish Supreme Court Press Release,” August 
14, 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4987_en.htm 
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minority communities in Poland felt compelled to write a letter to the Polish president 
expressing “concern about what they see as a rising wave of aggression based on 
nationality, race and religion.”47 
The declining appeal of the EU and its weakening anchor role over member and 
candidate states are closely associated with the ‘multiple crises’ that European integration 
is passing through.48 The stagnation in European economies and structural problems of 
the euro area, the migration crisis, and the Brexit conundrum represent different aspects 
of EU’s multiple and multi-dimensional challenges. On a broader scale, as Sakwa points 
out, “there is a crisis in the development of European continentalism” that invites 
geopolitical rivalries, internal divisions, and “thereby the spectre of war” as exemplified 
by the conflict in Ukraine.49 The domestic and external challenges that the EU currently 
faces jeopardise the appeal of the EU over target states as they reduce the allure of the 
liberal model undergirding EU norms and values. The growing intolerance toward 
minorities and migrant communities in an increasingly illiberal political context that 
lauds electoral majoritarianism rather than political pluralism constitutes an integral 
aspect of the emerging trend. It is striking to note that the Bulgarian case, as discussed in 
chapter 4, seems to protect itself from the vagaries of illiberal surge until now despite 
apparent problems associated with the quality of democracy and rule of law in the 
																																																						
47 The Associated Press, “Minority Groups in Poland Decry Aggression, anti-Semitism,” Atlantic 
Broadban, February 4, 2018. http://www.atlanticbb.net/front_controller.php/news/read/category/ 
Europe%20News/ article/the_associated_press-minority_groups_in_poland_decry_aggression_antisem-ap  
48 For a comprehensive analysis of the EU’s multiple crises, see Desmond Dinan, Neill Nugent and William 
E. Paterson, eds., The European Union in Crisis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).  
49 Richard Sakwa, “The Death of Europe? Continental Fates after Ukraine,” International Affairs 91, no. 3 
(2015): 553-554. Also see Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands (London and New 
York: I. B. Tauris, 2016).  
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country. The Bulgarian ethnic model, though facing challenges, manages to survive the 
recent wave of de-Europeanisation taking place in several other cases. The two-level 
model offered in this dissertation is likely to shed light to the resilience of the minority-
majority relations in Bulgaria in comparison to the Croatian and Montenegrin cases. The 
































CHAPTER II. Conceptual Framework: Europeanisation as a Two-level Process 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter offers a conceptual framework that explains reform dynamics in minority 
rights policies in new member and candidate countries with particular reference to 
Europeanisation literature. Europeanisation is a bourgeoning yet controversial area in 
European studies. As Olsen suggests, the term is “applied in a number of ways [for] a 
variety of phenomena and processes of change” and it “has many faces.”50 In general, the 
concept has become integral part of the frequently applied frameworks to analyse 
transformations in domestic polities (i.e., institutions), politics, and policies of the target 
states in several fields, including but not limited to foreign policy, cohesion policy, 
environmental policy, and macroeconomic policy.51 Despite the term has been a growth 
industry in European studies, the conceptual underpinnings, mechanisms, and the 
outcome of the EU impact is still a matter of controversy. The impact of the EU is 
especially controversial in areas, such as minority rights policies, where the EU’s policy 
templates are not clearly defined and consistently implemented. This dissertation aims to 
shed light on this area by developing a conceptual model that account for the continuity 
and change of minority policies in new member and candidate countries. The following 
section focuses on the stages of Europeanisation literature and sketches out the research 
puzzle. The third section offers a conceptual framework to reveal how Europeanisation 
																																																						
50 Johan P. Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanisation,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 5 
(2002): 921. 
51 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, “When Europe Hits Home: Europeanisation and Domestic Change,” 




works and applies it to the minority rights policies. The fourth section discusses the main 
aspects of cases selected and addresses issues pertaining to research design. The final 
section concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2. Brief overview of literature and research puzzle 
The Europeanisation literature that explores the EU’s impact on member-states has 
proliferated parallel to the EU enlargement waves and expansion of the EU’s policy 
competences. It is plausible to suggest that the literature is expanded and refined as each 
enlargement wave brought new set of novel empirical and conceptual puzzles regarding 
the causal mechanisms and mediating factors through which EU conditionality makes its 
way into domestic politics. 
The first wave of Europeanisation, which refers to pre-2004 enlargement and 
confined to the dynamics and mechanisms of policy changes in old member states 
constitutes a distinct and well-established research agenda. Featherstone and Radaelli 
demonstrated in a comprehensive account within the context of old member states that 
Europeanisation had been mainly conceptualised as the impact of the EU-level pressures 
on national public institutional systems, which they labelled as “domestic [institutional] 
adaptation to the pressures emanating directly and indirectly from EU membership.”52 
The first wave of Europeanisation research concentrates on the implementation of the EU 
regulations in policy domains where the EU has very clear policy templates in terms of 
fundamental rules and supranational norms. The policy areas such as cohesion policy, 
																																																						
52 Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanisation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003): 7. 
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environmental policy, and transport policy and the rule adoption capabilities of the old 
member countries in the well-established policy domains have been the main focus of the 
literature in question. As Graziano and Vink aptly point out the “classic” policy domains, 
which concerned the old member-states, “have been extensively studied.”53  
The second wave, which primarily deals with the Central and East European 
Countries (CEECs) which entered the EU in 2004 and 2007, also emerged as a promising 
research area that deal with the mechanisms of substantial economic and political regime 
transformations.54 As each enlargement brought new puzzles, the causal mechanisms 
through which the EU hits domestic economic social, political, and institutional 
arrangements were also modified. Radaelli and Pasquier note that the early and 
traditional research mostly focused on top-down mechanisms of Europeanisation and 
mainly revolved around the conceptual and definitional issues.55 Their contributions to 
the emergence and consolidation of a new research agenda notwithstanding, these studies 
did not put adequate emphasis on the complex dynamics and different modalities of 
policy transformations in new member and candidate countries. The second wave of 
Europeanisation literature dealing with new EU member and candidate states, therefore, 
is still considered as a work in progress. As Sedelmeier underlines “the Europeanisation 
																																																						
53 Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano, “Challenges of a New Research Agenda,” in Europeanisation: 
New Research Agendas, edited by Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Bakingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007): 7. 
54 For an overview see, Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Europeanisation in New Member and Candidate States,” Living 
Reviews in European Governance 6, no. 1 (2011): 5-52; Mileda, A. Vachudova, Europe Undivided: 
Democracy, Leverage and Integration After Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
55 Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier, “Conceptual Issues,” in Europeanisation: New Research 
Agendas, edited by Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Bakingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 39-41. 
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of candidate countries has emerged only recently as a separate research area.”56 
Theoretically-informed empirical works on new cases, according to Vink and Graziano, 
are still pending to “explain different degrees of Europeanisation between countries, 
weighting the explanatory value of the European sources of domestic change against 
alternative explanations, and trying to understand [different] meanings of ‘EU 
pressure.’”57  
This implies that the study of new member and candidate countries as part of the 
new wave of Europeanisation literature might shed light on the causal mechanisms 
through which the EU influences domestic politics and institutional arrangements in these 
polities.58 One important puzzle that recent accounts of Europeanisation point out is the 
diverging outcomes of EU-level pressure. There are two aspects to the issue. On the one 
hand, one needs to explain when/how the EU-level pressure paves the way for substantial 
policy transformations in target countries. Stated differently, what determines the rule 
adaptation and transformation in domestic polities? On the other hand, recent empirical 
research, observing and documenting contrasting adaptation capacity of the member and 
candidate countries, aims to place the impact of EU conditionality into its proper context 
by taking domestic policy preferences and institutional arrangements more seriously. The 
main puzzle addressed in this dissertation is to determine scope conditions that account 
																																																						
56 Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Europeanisation in New Member and Candidate States,” 5. 
57 Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano, “Challenges of a New Research Agenda,” 17.  
58 Another strand of research, which is not covered in this dissertation, focuses on the EU’s transformative 
impact over countries that are not considered as part of enlargement process but still in its sphere of 
interest. For a comprehensive account, on the EU neighborhood policy, see Elena Korosteleva, The 
European Union and its Eastern Neighbours: towards a more Ambitious Partnership? (London:  
Routledge, 2012). Also see Elena Korosteleva, “The EU, Russia and the Eastern Region: The Analytics of 
Government for Sustainable Cohabitation,” Cooperation and Conflict 51, no. 3 (2016): 365-383.     
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for the compliance performance of target states especially in policy areas where clear 
templates that undergird EU conditionality do not exist.  
The premise of this dissertation is that this puzzle points to the importance of 
developing comprehensive frameworks that account for EU-level and domestic factors 
simultaneously to account for complex causality. Stating differently, delineating the 
temporal and contextual patterns of Europeanisation proves crucial to explain the 
interaction of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives to reveal the diverging impacts of 
EU conditionality on target states (see below).  
The concept of Europeanisation, however, cannot be studied in the abstract. This 
dissertation investigates the Europeanisation of minority rights in Bulgaria and contrasts 
the findings with Croatia and Montenegro. It seeks answers to the following research 
question: How do the different modes of interactions between EU-led conditionality and 
domestic-factors inform the degree of change in the minority rights policies in the recent 
member and candidate countries? To address this question, the next section delves into 
the literature on Europeanisation and sketches out a ‘two-level model.’  
 
2.3. Conceptual framework: How Europeanisation works?   
The vast literature on the subject matter illustrates that Europeanisation is a contested 
term.59 This section locates the critical approach adopted in this dissertation into the 
existing literature as its main starting point. The critical perspectives on Europeanisation 
can be grouped under two broader categories.  
																																																						
59 For an extensive literature review, see Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Europeanisation in New Member and 
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The first strand of criticism focuses on the flawed ontological logic and 
hegemonic usage of the term. The dominant accounts of Europeanisation, according to 
this view, assume the EU as a predominant “civilizing actor” that represents universal 
values and exports these norms to hierarchically inferior subjectivities. Zielonka, for 
instance, argues that the EU’s approach to its periphery involves the use of an imperial 
paradigm blended with a normative discourse.60 Sakwa convincingly suggests that the EU 
adopted a monist understanding of Europeanisation which relies on the notion of 
“historical West” – i.e., the prioritization of the Atlantic community and its allies.61 This 
narrow usage of the term fails to incorporate the multiple traditions of ‘greater Europe’ 
by subsuming other European states such as Russia in line with a pluralist pan-European 
agenda.62  Since the EU “effectively claimed to be the sole legitimate voice of Europe”, 
Sakwa points out, the narrow usage of ‘Europeanisation’ basically “described as 
conforming to EU conditionality.”63 As such, the euphemistically hierarchical usage of 
the term “normative power” is itself considered as a form of hegemony.64 Similarly, 
Flockhart also offers a compelling critique of the current literature on Europeanisation by 
pointing that the existing definitions and conceptualisation of the term, despite being 
																																																						
60 Jan Zielonka, “Europe's new Civilizing Missions: the EU's Normative Power Discourse,” Journal of 
Political Ideologies 18, no. 1 (2013): 35-55. 
61 Richard Sakwa, “One Europe or None? Monism, Involution and Relations with Russia,” Europe-Asia 
Studies (forthcoming, 2018): 2.   
62 Ibid., 1-3. For a comprehensive historical perspective see Richard Sakwa on the missed opportunity of 
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the (Lack of) Europeanisation,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 3 (2008): 397-422.   
64 Thomas Diez, “Normative Power as Hegemony,” Cooperation and Conflict 48, no. 2 (2013): 194-210. 
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broad and theoretically inclusive, are still flawed as they mainly focus on the EU.65 
Flockhart argues that existing approaches tend to focus on  “political processes which 
relate almost exclusively to change brought about by the EU, thereby de facto excluding 
other processes which may also logically be regarded as Europeanization.”66 This narrow 
construction of the term, the argument goes, does not only limits the scope but also imply 
a euro-centric and permanently superior construction of EU identity. To overcome the 
narrow focus of the literature, Flockhart offers a distinction between ‘Europeanization’ 
and ‘EU-ization’, the latter being restricted to the EU’s direct impact on domestic 
policies, institutions, and norms whereas the former refers to a more comprehensive 
historical and sociological content of the term.67 
The second line of criticism directed to the dominant accounts of Europeanisation 
is mainly about the direction and nature of causality that inform contrasting policy 
outcomes and the relative weight of the EU conditionality in the process. The critical 
perspectives on that front mainly question the explanatory power of top-down 
hierarchical approaches and focus on the domestic-level to account for diverging degree 
of policy and political compliance across cases. While acknowledging the eye-opening 
role of the ontological criticisms toward Europeanisation literature summarised in the 
preceding paragraph, this dissertation mainly confines itself to the limits of this second 
group of critical accounts – though it draws from insights of former perspectives where 
																																																						
65 Trine Flockhart, “Europeanization or EU-ization? The Transfer of European Norms across Time and 
Space,” Journal of Common Market Studies 48, no. 4 (2010): 789. 
66 Ibid., 790. 
67 Also see Helen Wallace, “Europeanization and Globalization: Complementary or Contradictory Trends,” 
New Political Economy 5, no. 3 (2000): 369-382. 
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relevant. The rest of this section reviews the literature from this particular angle and 
sketches a two-level model to explain the policy shifts in minority policies.      
Approached from the latter point of view, one concurs that different accounts 
define the concept as a shortcut to denote domestic impact of the EU. As Goetz put it, 
Europeanisation is often described “as a cause in search of an effect.”68 The dominant 
approaches develop a certain level of bias that overemphasise the hierarchical factors and 
tend to conceive domestic area as an obstacle and impediment, which should be 
overcome during Europeanisation process. In fact, as the emerging literature tries to 
grasp, the domestic realm can act as an opportunity space that empowers the EU’s 
transformative impact via direct and indirect ways.69 In order to rectify this bias, this 
research proposes a two-level analytical model that account for the dynamics of 
continuity and change in the minority rights policies. This study, therefore, aims to build 
on the existing literature and expand it by offering a more dynamic and interactive 
account without prioritising one level of analysis vis-à-vis the other yet explicitly 
acknowledging the interactive impact of these two levels on the observable outcome.  
 
2.3.1. Causal logic of Europeanisation 
 
The existing literature can be grouped along two interrelated dimensions to offer a 
conceptual framework that explains the dynamics of EU’s diverging impact concerning 
minority rights policies in new member and candidate countries: (a) rationalist-
																																																						
68 Klaus H. Goetz, “European Integration and National Executives: A Cause in Search of an Effect?” West 
European Politics 23, no. 4 (2000): 211-231.  
69 For a discussion in this direction, see: Gözde Yılmaz, “It is Pull-and-Push that Matters for External 
Europeanisation,” Mediterranean Politics 19, no. 2 (2014): 238-258 
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constructivist nexus and (b) external-domestic nexus. As such, a critical review of the 
literature proves useful to assess the causal logic and direction of change in 
Europeanisation research agenda.  
The first dimension concerns the logic of causality. The main question that all 
accounts need to address is how European policies, regulations, and norms affect 
domestic institutional structures.70 Thus Europeanisation frameworks deal with different 
versions of institutionalist accounts. As Vink and Graziano suggest;  
Europeanisation scholars have reverted almost without exception to the broad 
spectrum of theories that fall under the umbrella of the so-called ‘new 
institutionalism’. In fact, one might even go as far as to say that the 
Europeanisation research agenda as such exemplifies the institutionalist turn in 
the political science of the 1980s.71   
 
The causal mechanisms through which change takes place, however, considerably 
diverge according to different logics. It should be stated at the outset that the major 
challenge on Europeanisation is to establish the causal significance of external 
conditionality and offer explicit causal mechanisms through which the EU informs 
domestic change especially in areas that fall within the scope of ‘soft EU law.’72 As such, 
two major explanations derive from distinct causal logics and mechanisms: (1) the 
																																																						
70 One approach adopts a strict view on the sources of Europeanisation and tends to equate the concept with 
the EU. Another strand adopts from a more comprehensive stance and includes other international 
organisations such as CoE and OSCE into consideration as well. Since this dissertation deals with the 
minority rights policies of Bulgaria, Croatia, and Montenegro, the second approach is adopted as the EU 
heavily relies on the Council of Europe and OSCE concerning the minority rights regulations.    
71 Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano, “Challenges of a New Research Agenda,” 13. 
72 For a debate on ‘hard law vs. soft law’, see David M. Trubek and Louise G. Trubek, “Hard and Soft Law 
in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination,” European Law 
Journal 11, no. 3 (2005): 343–364. 
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rationalist and (2) the constructivist frameworks of Europeanisation.73 These two 
approaches also provide useful toolkits to conceptualise the dynamics of persistence and 
change in minority rights regimes in member and candidate countries, which this research 
mainly focuses on.  
Rationalist frameworks, also known as ‘logic of consequences,’ examine the ways 
in which new resources, formal institutions, and opportunities inform actors’ interests to 
achieve pre-determined goals.74 The main assumption of rationalist theory is that rational 
actors are goal-oriented utility maximisers that act according to cost-benefit 
calculations.75 This suggests that if domestic elites view the political costs of compliance 
in the area of minority rights higher than the perceived benefits, they are likely to resist 
change.76 The Europeanisation process, from a rationalist point of view, “is conceived as 
an emerging political opportunity structure which offers some actors additional resources 
to exert influence, while severely constraining the ability of others to pursue their 
goals.”77 EU conditionality enables new opportunities for domestic pro-change actors to 
form interest-based coalitions and defend their causes, which in turn, changes the 
																																																						
73 Also see, Ian Bache and Stephen George, Politics in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006): 58-65; Mark Pollack, “The New Institutionalisms and European Integration,” in European 
Integration Theory, edited by Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004): 
137-159.   
74 Mark A. Pollack, “Rational Choice and EU Politics,” in The SAGE Handbook of European Union 
Politics, edited by Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark Pollack, Ben Rosamond (London: Sage, 2007): 41. 
75 Andrew H. Kydd, “Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations, edited by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008): 425-443. 
76 For an analysis in the Cental European context, see Peter Vermeersh, “EU Enlargement and Minority 
Rights Policies in Central Europe: Explaining Policy Shifts in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland,” 
Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 1, no. 1 (2003): 1-32. 
77 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, “When Europe Hits Home,” 6.  
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distribution of power in domestic politics.78 The logic of consequences works efficiently 
especially in areas where EU conditionality is established clearly in the EU acquis. From 
this point of view, rule adoption in the field of minority rights is likely to remain patchy 
in member and candidate states, as EU conditionality still is not well-established due to 
the politically contested and analytically porous nature of the minority concept. Although 
“the respect for and protection of national minorities” was enshrined in the Copenhagen 
criteria, the legal foundation of minority rights in EU law is not as comprehensive as 
established policy areas.79 Therefore national governments, more often than not, have 
ample discretion over the implementation of minority policies, which are likely to 
undermine the fundamentals of the European minority regime.80  
Börzel and Risse suggest that EU conditionality works through two mediating 
factors according to the logic of consequences: veto points and formal institutions. 
Individual and collective veto players operating at different institutional contexts – 
depending on how much they are empowered within the context of interactions with the 
EU – can promote certain policy reform proposals and impede others through using veto 
power in decision-making procedures.81 Formal institutions, on the other hand, can 
empower certain actors over others to seize new material opportunities. From the logic of 
																																																						
78 Christoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl, “The National Impact of European Union Regulatory Policy: Three 
Europeanization Mechanisms,” European Journal of Political Research 41, no.2 (2002): 258; Adrienne 
Héritier et al., Differential Europe: New Opportunities and Restrictions for Member-state Policies 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). 
79 Gwendolyn Sasse, “The Politics of EU Conditionality: The Norm of Minority Protection during and 
beyond EU Accession,” Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 6 (2008): 842. 
80 Ece Özlem Atikcan, “European Union and Minorities: Different Paths of Europeanisation,” Journal of 
European Integration 32, no. 4 (2010): 375-392.  
81 For an overview of veto players, see George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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consequences point of view, the EU might have indirect impact on the improvements of 
minority rights by promoting the establishment and consolidation of power sharing 
institutions in candidate and member countries through broader democratisation reforms. 
For instance, the changes in the electoral systems, such as proportional representation, 
might embark on a series of changes in the power balances in majority-minority relations, 
which lead to more inclusive power-sharing mechanisms and better representation of 
minorities at the domestic political arena.82  
On the other hand, constructivist frameworks, which rely on ‘logic of 
appropriateness,’ primarily focus on shared norms, convergence on identities and social 
learning as the main dynamics of rule adoption.83 The main point is ontological 
prioritisation of social processes, which informs the ways through which individuals form 
their preferences in line with dominant norms and values that shape their perception of 
rationality and rational action.84 The social constructivist approaches prioritise the 
processes through which actors construct particular interests rather than assuming 
political structures and interest functions of actors given.85 Preferences of actors are 
amenable to change not only because of shifting cost-benefit calculations but also due to 
the change in acquired norms and values that inform the ultimate goals, not only 
																																																						
82 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “The Influence of EU Accession on Minorities’ Status in East Central Europe”, 
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instruments. This perspective suggests two main mechanisms that are likely to invite 
domestic change through social learning. The first factor is change agents, also known as 
‘norm entrepreneurs,’ which are interlocutors advocating policy change in the particular 
area with a capacity to form pro-reform coalitions through alternative frames along the 
lines of European norms.  
The second mechanism is the fortification of civic political culture that undergirds 
consensus-building and public deliberation through the penetration of EU norms, values, 
and ideas penetrate into domestic polities. The civic political culture might help 
underpinning social learning processes along European values, i.e., socialization, which 
Checkel defines as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given 
community.”86 Once certain norms and rules have been internalised, they start to form the 
normal, right or benign behaviour.87 Accordingly, the ruling minority elites are likely to 
have new opportunities to develop alternative frames with regard to the underlying 
principles of minority-majority relationship and ensure ownership of their discourse 
thanks to the legitimizing role of the European institutions and actors. The EU, as an 
actor that puts emphasis on political pluralism and multiculturalism, is considered to have 
major impact on member and candidate countries since it promotes certain norms and 
values in the broader areas of democratic governance, rule of law, human rights and 
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minority issues.88 Depending on the intensity of inter-ethnic moderation and depth of 
norm internalisation, as the argument goes, it becomes a less likely option for national 
governments to shift the main parameters of minority rights policies as rule compliance 
creates normative and institutional lock-in effects in later stages.   
The more recent literature has explored new causal mechanisms and offered 
alternative typologies through which the EU informs policy change at the domestic level. 
For instance, Moumoutzis and Zartaloudis identify four distinct causal mechanisms that 
could be operationalised with reference to rationalist and constructivist explanations: (1) 
instrumental learning, (2) social learning, (3) naming and shaming, and (4) peer 
pressure.89 Policy learning, which is the most popular explanation in Europeanisation 
literature, can be either in the form of instrumental or social learning. Accordingly, in 
instrumental learning, domestic policy-makers assess the new information they acquire as 
a result of EU-level interactions and adjust their policies if they calculate that this would 
facilitate achieving their goals. The social learning, on the other hand, leads to alteration 
in policy ends. As such, social learning does not only lead to a change in policy 
instruments but also goals and ends of the policies pursued. In case the EU provides new 
material opportunities to the domestic policy-makers in achieving their goals, this refers 
to instrumental learning. On the other hand, when the EU informs the ways in which 
domestic policy-makers conceive the problem itself that leads to the change in policy 
objectives, then, social learning takes place. 
																																																						
88 On the concept of ‘civilian power’ and ‘normative power’, see Richard Whitman, From Civilian to 
Superpower? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998). Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A 
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Naming and shaming and peer pressure refer to other, rather rarely observed, 
causal mechanisms in the literature on Europeanisation. It is suggested that in non-
binding EU policy areas under-performing countries can face the pressure from peers and 
other EU institutions, which in turn lead to increasing political pressure. This might also 
result in the increasing possibility of the ruling elite to lose in the earliest elections due to 
the domestic audience cost. Through naming and shaming and peer pressure mechanisms, 
the EU is likely to motivate the national policy makers informally and indirectly, as the 
ruling elite might feel obliged to change the dominant policy course in order not to lose 
prestige and perform poorly in domestic elections.90 The latter two mechanisms, 
however, assume that the EU plays a progressive role in domestic political scene and 
receiving the support of EU institutions is considered as a positive development in terms 
of domestic empowerment that turns into a source of power and legitimacy all the time. 
This linear and progressive interpretation of the EU’s domestic impact, however, proves 
naive given the recent developments in the EU member countries. Especially, the rise of 
nationalist-populist movements across European states and their ability to increase vote 
shares through Eurosceptic political rhetoric suggests that the EU’s transformative power 
via naming and shaming and peer-pressure should be taken cautiously.91 The different 
causal paths through which the EU leverage informs domestic policies are demonstrated 
in figure 2.1 below.       
																																																						
90 Moumoutzis and Zartaloudis, however, suggest that the naming and shaming is rationalist in nature, 
while peer pressure is about norms and values so can be explained in sociological terms.  
91 For a recent and comprehensive overview of the rising Euroscepticism in the EU, see Benjamin Leruth, 
Nicholas Startin, Simon Usherwood, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism, London: Routledge, 
2017. Also see Catherine E. De Vries, Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration, Oxford: 
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 Figure 2.1. Causal mechanisms of Europeanisation 
 Source: Author’s compilation 
 
This dissertation maintains that these causal mechanisms, i.e. rationalist and 
social-constructivist interpretations and four distinct ways of operationalisation of these 
overarching frameworks (see figure 2.1), are not necessarily mutually exclusive in 
explaining the continuity and change in minority rights policies. In fact, identifying 
causal mechanisms is an empirical challenge as diverging causal pathways might be at 
work at different cases and policy areas. Thus, a priori exclusion of one approach in 
favour of the other is likely to result in omitted mechanisms problems, which in turn, 
paves the way for incomplete causation or over-determination of the causal variable 
under investigation.92 One should admit that the dichotomic portrayal of these two 
distinct accounts masks more complex mechanisms that enable and enfeeble the 
improvement in different policy areas. Given the limitations of mono-causal explanations 
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in political science, recent scholarship has started to develop synthetic frameworks that 
capture complex but more nuanced portrayal of the diverse set of causal factors at work.93 
The synthetic Europeanisation frameworks, along these lines, are also applied in several 
studies.94 For instance, Börzel and Risse95 and Börzel96 adopt multi-causal frameworks 
that incorporate twin-track set of factors from rational choice and constructivist variants 
of institutionalist approaches to reveal the exact causal mechanisms at work. Along the 
same lines, this dissertation shall offer an eclectic approach as part of the two-level model 
sketched in the next section.  
2.3.2. Direction of change in Europeanisation 
 
The second dimension concerns the interactions between EU and domestic-level factors 
and their particular impact on the degree and direction of change in member and 
candidate states. As Bulmer argues, one of the most important debates in the field is 
whether “Europeanisation is exclusively a top-down phenomenon or whether it is in part 
horizontal.”97 This dissertation challenges the conventional top-down accounts on the 
ground that hierarchical approaches are likely to over-estimate the EU-factor and 
																																																						
93 For a comprehensive account on the benefits and procedures of eclecticism in political science, see Rudra 
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York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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eschews the capacity of the domestic field toward adaption and change. Stated 
differently, mainstream approaches tend to underestimate the importance of domestic-
level factors as they concentrate on top-down adjustment mechanisms.98 The top-down 
perspectives mainly focus on supranational mechanisms of Europeanisation since it was 
assumed that “what matters for domestic actors and institutions is how the delegation to 
the European level affects policy outcomes in the domestic arena.”99 Accordingly, the 
single most decisive factor for the degree of domestic change in this literature is goodness 
of fit. According to Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso, the degree of pressure from the EU 
leads to adaptational response at the domestic polities. Their argument is rather 
straightforward and mechanic: 
Degree of adaptational pressure generated by Europeanisation depends on the ‘fit’ 
or ‘misfit’ between European institutions and domestic structures. The lower the 
compatibility between the European institutions, on the one hand, and national 
institutions, on the other, the higher the adaptational pressures.100    
     
The ‘goodness of fit’ analyses tend to conceive the EU policies standard, 
homogenous, and clearly defined that are implemented in a coherent and consistent 
manner. Furthermore, they assume domestic arena as a passive entity that absorbs the EU 
directives and regulations based on diverging resilience of status quo forces. 
Accordingly, the EU’s role is mainly conceptualised as a “lock-in effect” or a 
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“reinforcement mechanism.”101 The efficiency of EU conditionality, as such, is framed as 
the outcome of the EU external incentive and candidate state’s domestic costs of 
compliance.  
The ‘external incentives model’, offered by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, for 
instance, argue that four sets of factors determine the compliance performance of 
candidate states: determinacy of conditions, size of adoption costs, speed and size of 
rewards, and the credibility of threats and promises.102 Accordingly, the likelihood of 
adopting EU regulations by the member states increases (1) if the EU has clear set of 
conditionality criteria in respective policy area, (2) if rule adoption is perceived to bring 
considerable benefits in foreseeable future, (3) if the cost of adopting EU conditionality is 
considered less than the anticipated benefits, and finally, (4) if the member and candidate 
states perceive the EU as a credible actor regarding the threats and rewards in the event of 
non-compliance and compliance with the conditionality criteria.103   
This dissertation suggests that external incentives model and other hierarchical 
approaches do not capture the complexity of Europeanisation process in minority rights 
due to three main reasons. First, hierarchical cost-benefit perspectives are likely to be 
biased, as they tend to risk overestimating the causal significance of the EU, which 
invites an identification problem regarding the motives and mechanisms of effective rule 
adoption and substantive policy change. Also, these approaches mainly deal with the 
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ways in which the EU shapes domestic realm without explicitly acknowledging domestic 
responses to emerging opportunity structures. The fit/misfit frameworks start the analysis 
with the identification of the divergence between the domestic and external levels. Then, 
with reference to the casual mechanisms and intervening variables, these hierarchical 
frameworks try to explain the factors that lead to domestic rule adoption and policy 
transformation. However, Knill and Lehmkuhl104 and Heritier and Knill,105 inter alia, 
have demonstrated that misfit is not always a precondition for the Europeanisation of 
domestic arena. Thus linear top-down explanation of domestic rule adoption does not 
always capture the complexity and multi-faceted aspect of Europeanisation.         
The second reason why hierarchical fit/misfit frameworks prove inadequate 
explaining the mechanisms of policy transformation in member and candidates states 
concerns the type of policy area. The hierarchical approaches, for instance external 
incentive model, tend to have more explanatory power especially in well-established 
policy areas. Accordingly, consistent and credible EU conditionality and low domestic 
adjustment costs explain the effective rule adoption in member and candidate states. By 
definition, these frameworks exclude policy areas where EU conditionality is not well 
established, porous, and subject to interpretation. However, Europeanisation takes place 
in ambiguous policy areas as well. Then, what explains the dynamics, scope conditions, 
and mechanisms of rule adoption in the areas concerned?  
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The issue of minority rights, which is the focal point of this research, is a very 
good example to explore this question. Sasse rightly points out that minority 
conditionality should not be effective according to these perspectives as the EU 
conditionality is not credible and consistent.106 The literature suggests that EU’s approach 
to minority rights diverge considerably across cases. As Tocci underlines, the issue is 
highly politicised: “the choice of which conditions to emphasise, how to interpret them 
and what benchmarks to set is inevitably subjective and ‘political.’”107 Furthermore, 
adopting minority-friendly policies would be extremely costly for the incumbent political 
elites, especially in post-conflict societies, such as the three cases examined in this 
dissertation. Thus a coherent conceptual framework of Europeanisation needs to 
concentrate on how EU conditionality and domestic factors operate in minority policies – 
which this dissertation aims to develop in the following pages.  
One should also concentrate on historical evolution of the EU’s approach to the 
protection of national minorities to account for temporal factors. As stated above, 
minority condition of the EU is highly ambiguous and contested.108 Rather than being a 
policy realm that clear-cut regulations and policy standards are implemented, it remains 
mostly a political concern that is mainly operationalised in a selective fashion as part of 
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broader democratic conditionality.109 Furthermore, old and core member states have 
diverging policies in regard to the definition and treatment of minorities, which suggest 
that EU lacks a standard template. The old member countries such as France, Greece, 
Belgium, and Germany have significant differences in their treatment of national 
minorities. Furthermore, as Koinova highlights, “the new applicants are also treated 
differently from each other”110 mainly because of the diverging priorities of core member 
states in their bilateral relations with the candidate states. The discussions on minority 
rights conditionality – which will be explored in further detail in the following section – 
suggest that the EU’s approach is not always consistent and credible in certain policy 
areas. The Europeanisation in minority rights seems to have more multi-faceted nature 
and hierarchical cost-benefit frameworks fail to grasp this complexity, as external 
conditionality is ambiguous and domestic adoption costs are very high.111  
Third, hierarchical Europeanisation frameworks need to be tested with reference 
to the new member and candidate countries to assess the effects of EU conditionality. As 
stated in the preceding section, the overwhelming majority of the Europeanisation 
research deals with West European cases, and recently with the Central and East 
European states. The comparative literature, however, is still underdeveloped about the 
ways in which the EU informs stability and change in the countries that have become 
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member and/or candidate in the post-2004. As will be discussed in more detail in the case 
selection section below, this dissertation aims to build on and expand the existing 
accounts by sketching out a two-level model and applying it in three post-conflict 
societies that have recently become members of the EU (Bulgaria and Croatia) and hold 
candidacy status (Montenegro).   
 
2.3.1. Two-level model on Europeanisation of minority rights 
This dissertation focuses on causal pathways in a way that put emphasis on the interactive 
nature of EU and domestic identifiers that inform policy outcomes.112 All three factors 
discussed above suggest that dynamics of Europeanisation need to be reassessed with 
particular reference to the domestic factors and how they respond to EU conditionality.  
EU conditionality in the realm of minority rights is best understood with reference 
to Ladrech’s useful classification of policy areas. Ladrech analyses EU’s diverging 
impact on member and candidate countries with reference to ‘soft EU policy’ and ‘hard 
EU policy.’113 The impact of the EU is expected to be more pronounced and direct in 
areas where hard EU policy applies and less influential and indirect in policy realms 
where soft EU policy applies.114 Given the fact that the EU does not have strict 
regulations codifying volumes of documents and institutionalised arrangements that set 
unequivocal standards for minority rights protection, it is one of the areas that makes it 
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difficult to assess the EU impact. That being said, this does not mean that there is no 
room for Europeanisation of minority rights because formal supranational policies are not 
the only way that EU regulations makes its way to domestic politics. Furthermore, the EU 
gradually adopted a set of criteria concerning minority rights protection. In order to 
reveal the mechanisms through which the EU plays transformative role in the 
improvement of minority protection, the two-level model is proposed below.115  
The first aspect of the ‘two-level model’ spelled out in this dissertation focuses on 
how and to what extent the EU exerts its influence on member and candidate countries. 
The literature is well established regarding the effectiveness and limits of EU political 
conditionality.116 The effectiveness of EU conditionality, first, depends on the degree of 
credibility and consistency of the policy amendments. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
suggest that “the determinacy of the conditions set by the EU and the determinacy of the 
rules from which they are derived enhances the likelihood of rule adoption by the 
candidate countries.”117 The clearly defined EU rules and consistent application of the 
conditionality within and across cases send credible signals to target states. The 
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(1988), for instance, in his pioneering study, “the logic of two-level games,” argues that international 
equilibrium is the outcome of domestic and international negotiations. At the domestic area, chief 
negotiator absorbs the interests and concerns of non-state actors. At the international area, chief negotiator 
seeks an agreement that is acceptable for the domestic audience. The outcome is shaped by the interaction 
of domestic and international levels that jointly inform the ultimate “win-sets.” This dissertation differs 
from “two-level games” as it does not consider chief negotiators as the only actors but also takes minority 
and majority elites into consideration at the domestic-level with non-fixed preferences. It analyses the 
conciliation process at the domestic level to reveal how the ‘double moderation’ between minority and 
majority elites leads to the shifts in their preferences in an interactive manner with the EU-factor.  
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signalling of the EU will also guide the aspiring states what they are expected to do to 
obtain membership. Second, the effectiveness of the EU conditionality derives from the 
size of the rewards in return for rule compliance. The conditionality literature suggests 
that rule convergence occurs in a “non-synchronized” and “patchy” manner at best if the 
aspiring states are not offered a clear roadmap toward membership.118 The empirical 
findings confirm that if the aspiring states are not in “an endgame of highly credible 
political conditionality”,119 the compliance appears to be “fake”, “partial”, or 
“imposed.”120                       
The second aspect of the two-level model, which this dissertation particularly 
delves into, explores domestic scope conditions. The main premise is that at the 
domestic-level the key factors are related to the degree of domestic dissatisfaction on part 
of the majority and minority elites, which informs effective adoption of the EU-related 
legislation. As Börzel states, domestic push for change may emanate from a number of 
stakeholders.121 Within the context of minorities, Malloy also suggests that domestic 
minority groups should be conceived as subjects of standards and policies, rather than 
objects or passive receivers of legal regulations.122 Accordingly, the degree of 
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dissatisfaction of the majority elites vis-à-vis status quo forces and the emerging power-
sharing mechanisms underlying this shift is crucial in informing the success of 
Europeanisation in the field of minority rights.  
Given that minority issues are part of contentious power struggle between 
contesting ethnic groups in the post-conflict societies, degree of collaboration and 
moderation between minority and majority elites play a crucial role that inform policy 
outcomes. The ‘double moderation’, as conceptualised in this dissertation, constitutes the 
first domestic prerequisite of adopting minority-friendly legislation. Political leaders on 
the minority and majority sides can act as catalysts towards inter-ethnic moderation by 
adopting a conciliatory language and owning the minority-friendly agenda through 
domestic framing of the EU during the membership process. Thus, any analysis of 
Europeanisation of minority rights policies should start by analysing whether the majority 
elites are dissatisfied with existing equilibrium and whether ‘double moderation’ takes 
place between majority and minority leaders during the candidacy process. On the basis 
of the role of minority-majority elites, this dissertation offers ‘double moderation’ 
hypothesis: 
The likelihood of rule adoption in minority rights policies increases, if ruling 
majority elites are dissatisfied with the existing policies and if double moderation 
takes place between majority and minority leaders.   
 
Having taken stock of hierarchical Europeanisation frameworks and building on 
the emerging literature that concentrates on domestic drivers of change, this dissertation 
demonstrates that domestic factors do not necessarily pose obstacles to alter exclusionary 
minority rights regimes. On the contrary, they might provide underexplored opportunities 
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to introduce substantial reforms given that domestic elites are prepared for and willing to 
instigate new set of minority-friendly policies along the lines of EU norms and 
regulations. In this regard, the role of the minority groups and the ways in which they 
organise themselves and interact with majority elites play a crucial role in terms of 
informing the policy outcomes.123   
As part of the two-level model, finally, intervening factors linking domestic 
dissatisfaction with EU conditionality should be taken into consideration within the 
context of new member and candidate countries. In fact, mediating factors have been 
integral part of the mainstream Europeanisation frameworks. As the literature suggests, 
being effective, EU conditionality must fell on the fertile domestic ground, which is 
determined by domestic scope conditions. Caporaso, for instance, highlights “mediating 
factors” as the final step in his hierarchical three-stage framework.124 In this vein, 
domestic cultural factors and institutional decision-making processes are the most 
common variables tested in the Europeanisation literature.125 Each enlargement wave 
brings new mediating factors as part of the causal story since new cases highlight the 
importance of new set of variables that were either omitted or taken for granted in the 
previous cases. In this context, this dissertation maintains that the mediating factors that 
facilitate (obstruct) Europeanisation in new member and candidate countries, especially 
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within the context of Western Balkans region, are qualitatively different than the previous 
cases due to a crucial mediating factor: state capacity. 
State capacity can be defined as “state’s ability to accomplish its intended policy 
actions.”126 As Weber put decades ago, “state is a human community that claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”127 The 
monopoly over the legitimate use of violence within pre-determined fixed borders 
requires a set of historically hard-won capabilities, “infrastructural power” in Mann’s 
terminology,128 such as certain level of extractive capacity to raise fiscal revenue,129 
effective control of the physical borders of the state130 and effective government ensuring 
political centralisation, voice and accountability that ensure basic level of institutional 
power sharing, and regulatory quality of central governments.131  
States with low capacity are likely to face significant problems in terms of 
adopting and implementing political change. Since political authority is not capable of 
ensuring collectively binding rules, free rider problems tend to be ample that lead to poor 
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performance of rule-based behaviour. The role and importance of state capacity is not 
adequately acknowledged in the Europeanisation literature since the Central and East 
European cases meet the basic template of state capacity. As the literature on Central and 
East European states already highlight, these states also suffered from ineffective 
administrative capacities, which lead to “shallow Europeanisation” in some cases.132 
However, state capacity was not a major problem in these cases as “CEE accession 
countries were largely consolidated states – even after Czechoslovakia had broken up.”133  
The problem of state capacity – defined and measured in terms of ‘voice and 
accountability,’ ‘government effectiveness’ and ‘regulatory quality’ – appears to be an 
important challenge for Europeanisation literature as the EU prepares to enlarge toward 
Western Balkans states which suffer from ubiquitous limited statehood problems.134 Due 
to weak state capacity, rule adoption is likely to remain shallow even though the EU 
conditionality is consistent and domestic willingness to adopt EU norms – dissatisfaction 
with existing policies – are relatively high in the minority rights area. The lack of 
institutional infrastructure to ensure rule-binding actor behaviour and efficient extraction 
and allocation of resources is likely to inform poor implementation performance even 
though adoption of the EU rules and norms take place on paper. In the absence of state 
capacity, the EU rewards in the form of fiscal assistance and material benefits may even 
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lead to further detachment of formal rule compliance and informal behaviours of 
domestic actors, as they might unintentionally strengthen institutionally-entrenched 
clientelistic and corrupt behaviour. This leads to the ‘state capacity’ hypothesis:     
The lower the capacity of a state, the more difficult to adopt EU-induced minority 
rights reforms in target countries.  
 
As stated in the introduction, this dissertation particularly explores how different 
combinations of EU-level conditionality and domestic dissatisfaction of the existing 
policies inform diverging reform performance in minority rights protection. Based on the 
complex interactions of the external conditionality and degree of domestic dissatisfaction, 
mediated by state capacity, two ideal-typical configurations can be drawn.  
 
Figure 2.2. Two-level model 




First, if the external EU credibility is high, i.e. the EU puts pressure to implement 
of minority rights conditionality in a proper and consistent manner in return for credible 
rewards, and if domestic dissatisfaction of the current minority policies is also high 
enough that paves the way for ‘double moderation’ on part of both majority and minority 
elites, it is more likely that Europeanisation has deeper and long-lasting impacts. On the 
other hand, second, if the external EU credibility is low, i.e. the EU conditionality is 
politicised and selectively implemented in return for non-credible rewards, and/or if 
domestic dissatisfaction of the existing minority rights policies in the eyes of domestic 
audience is also low and/or political institutional setup suffers from a set of reform 
capacity problems, it is more likely that change in minority rights policies remain shallow 
and selective at best. As such, this dissertation not only concentrates on how preference 
functions of domestic political elites are shaped by external EU-level incentives, but also 
sheds light on when and how domestic political elites act as subjects of change in 
minority policies.   
 
2.4. Minority rights conditionality of the EU 
At this point, it is important to elaborate on how the EU approaches minority rights issues 
in member and candidate states. In fact, Europeanisation of minority rights is still a 
neglected area in European studies due to the paucity of the EU’s competencies in the 
subject matter. The incomplete legal framework with regard to minority policies paves 
the way for difficulties to harmonise domestic minority regimes in line with the EU 
norms and regulations. To start with, the term minority is rather controversial and 
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contested within the EU acquis.135 Following Sasse and Thielemann, in this dissertation, 
only “national minorities” are taken into consideration defined as “established minorities 
claiming minority rights (e.g. forms of autonomy) to preserve their distinctive features 
and status.”136  
One of the widely used definitions of the term minority offered by Francesco 
Capotorti in his report written for the United Nations (UN). Capotorti, the Special 
Rapporteur of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities at the time, defined the term as follows:  
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-
dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the state – possess ethnic, 
religious or linguistic characteristics differing from the rest of the population and 
show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their 
culture, traditions, religion or language.137 
 
There are two major problems with this definition. First, formulation of the term 
lacks clarity. How can one decide whether a ‘numerically inferior’ group is 
‘characteristically different’ from the other and who can decide on that? Second, the 
definitional ambiguity opens ample space for the rulers of the sovereign states to interpret 
the term according to their interests and perceived security concerns. Thus the term 
minority becomes heavily dependent upon national context that is informed by cultural, 
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historical, and political priorities.138 The diverging interpretation of nation-states leads to 
inconsistent operationalisation of the concept across cases. As a result, it proves very 
difficult to develop an internationally accepted minority rights regime.  
Despite definitional ambiguities and operational difficulties, minority rights 
protection has become an integral aspect of the conditionality criteria in the EU accession 
context. The Copenhagen criteria for accession emphasised the “respect for and the 
protection of minorities”, which for the first time, explicitly highlighted the issue of 
‘minority protection’ as part of the EU conditionality. However, the minority rights 
conditionality in Copenhagen criteria is subject to debate, as the term is not defined 
precisely. Furthermore, as De Witte points out, the term has not been codified into EU 
primary law as a common set of regulations.139  
Then, what are the benchmark regulations of the EU minority conditionality? 
Despite the EU not having well-codified laws in terms of minority rights protection, the 
EU institutions relies on a set of principles and international institutions to promote 
minority rights in member and candidate countries. This dissertation relies on two distinct 
sets of benchmarks to assess whether and to what extent target countries comply with the 
EU conditionality in minority rights area: rule adoption and proper implementation.    
First one concerns the adoption of legal regulations referred by EU institutions in 
the official documents. In addition to Copenhagen criteria, which now frame the main 
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aspects of conditionality, the EU has developed solid norms and regulations in the field 
of non-discrimination, which constitutes a fundamental principle with the EU. The 
abolition of discrimination in the form of gender and nationality is established as a legal 
norm by the European Court of Justice case laws.140 Since the Amsterdam Treaty, non-
discrimination framework has become integral part of the EU’s minority conditionality. 
Amsterdam Treaty stated, “The Community may take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial and ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation.” The EU, based on this legal framework, adopted a directive known as 
the ‘Racial Equality Directive.’141 The European Commission reports, since then, refer to 
the Racial Equality Directive as part of fulfilling conditionality in the realm of minority 
rights.             
The non-discrimination regulations, however, are not adequate to protect the 
rights of national minorities. Non-discrimination is basically an individual right. 
Therefore, non-discrimination regulations do not protect minorities at the group basis 
through state actions such as providing education in native language and preserving 
minority identity. The EU institutions therefore rely on the benchmarks of other 
international organisations to rectify this gap. In this sense, the EU primarily refers to the 
regulations of the Council of Europe to monitor and protect domestic minority rights in 
member and candidate states. Along with Copenhagen criteria and Racial Equality 
Directive, the EU relies on the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the 
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Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) as a measurement of commitment to minority 
rights in aspiring states.142 The specific minority protection instruments enshrined in the 
FCNM are discussed in the following chapters with reference to its controversial aspects 
and the ways in which national governments address these controversies.  
Second benchmark concerns the implementation of minority rights legislation. As 
highlighted in the literature, rule adoption is a necessary but not a sufficient condition in 
assessing the depth and sustainability of Europeanisation in the respective policy area. 
The previous enlargement waves demonstrated that swift adoption of the EU legal 
regulations does not always coincide with effective implementation. Thus, to reveal 
whether and to which extent the EU regulations have been implemented properly, this 
dissertation relies on in-depth semi-structured elite interviews with the majority and 
minority representatives along with the reports of EU institutions, international and non-
governmental organisations. 
The operationalisation of variables is summarised in table 2.1. The minority 
reform outcomes – dependent variable – are analysed according to three parameters. 
First, whether the European minority legislation (Chapter 23 of the acquis, CoE 
Framework Convention, Racial Equality Directive) incorporated by the member and 
candidate countries is assessed in all three cases. Second, domestic legislation such as 
Constitution and relevant body of laws are reviewed to assess whether domestic laws are 
amended toward a minority friendly regime. Third and foremost, the change in minority 
rights is not only assessed based on rule adoption but also the extent to which the new 
rules and regulations are implemented efficiently. To assess proper implementation, this 
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dissertation is mainly relied on EU progress reports and in-depth interviews with minority 
representatives. The data is categorised according to the extent to which the minority 
rights reforms are translated into the domestic plane (rule adoption) and proper 
implementation. Based on the combination of the two parameters mentioned above, three 
reform categories were created: major (rule adoption and proper implementation by 
replacing the existing policies with the new ones and establishing new institutions), 
moderate (rule adoption by patching up the new policies to the existing ones and 
partial/selective implementation to accommodate EU pressure), and minor (rule adoption 
only without substantially transforming the existing policies and institutions).   
 
Table 2.1. Operationalisation of variables 
Variable Description 
Minority reform outcomes (DV) Data is collected based on three sources which are (a) the 
European minority legislation (Chapter 23 of the acquis, 
CoE Framework Convention, Racial Equality Directive) 
incorporated by the member and candidate countries (b) 
domestic legislation (Constitution and relevant body of 
laws and adopted legal texts) (c) interview data with 
policy-makers in the selected cases. The data is 
categorised according to the extent to which the minority 
rights reforms are translated into the domestic plane. 
Based on the combination of (a), (b) and (c) three reform 
categories were created: major, moderate, and minor. 
Domestic dissatisfaction – 
‘double moderation’ (IV): 
Data is collected mainly through interviews and 
triangulated by media reports and press statements of 
majority and minority leaders as well as third party 
observers. Accordingly, four categories of domestic 
dissatisfaction were created: very high, high, low, and 
very low.  
EU-pressure (IV): Data is collected based on two sources, which are (a) 
official EU documents i.e., progress reports and official 
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statements (b) interview data with policy-makers in the 
selected cases. The data is categorised according to the 
extent to which the EU put emphasis on minority rights 
reforms. Based on the combination of (a) and (b) three 
categories of EU-pressure were created: high, moderate 
and low.  
State capacity (Int. V) Data is gathered via World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators. Countries are grouped according to three 
categories, high institutional capacity, moderate 
institutional capacity, and low institutional capacity.143   
 
The conceptual framework sketched in this dissertation suggests that change in 
minority rights are informed by three main causal mechanisms. First and foremost, the 
presence of ‘double moderation’ between majority and minority leaders is proposed as 
the most important factor that informs change in minority rights policies. To this end, 
data is collected through interviews and triangulated by media reports and press 
statements of majority and minority leaders as well as independent observers. 
Accordingly, four categories of domestic dissatisfaction (about existing minority policies) 
were created: very high (strong criticism, using all means to introduce policy change as 
well as mobilising civil society), high (explicit criticism, ownership of reform agenda and 
search for pro-reform coalitions), low (moderate criticism, low willingness to change), 
and very low (no intention at all).  
The second independent variable is the degree of EU-pressure regarding minority 
rights policies – the extent to which the EU raises minority issues (or state of a particular 
minority group) as part of its bilateral agenda. To assess EU-pressure, data is collected 
based on two sources, which are (a) official EU documents i.e., progress reports and press 
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statements, (b) interview data with EU and domestic policy-makers. The data is 
categorised according to which the EU put emphasis on minority rights reforms. Based 
on the combination of the first two parameters, three categories of EU-pressure were 
created: high (explicit criticism and consistent emphasis on minority issues), moderate 
(generic references to minority issues) and low (very rare emphasis or not emphasis at 
all). The high EU-pressure and high-level domestic dissatisfaction paves the way for 
substantive changes in minority policies only if state capacity is high enough, which is 
defined as state’s ability to accomplish its intended policy actions. The measurement of 
state capacity proves controversial in the literature. In this dissertation, data is gathered 
via World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators. As such, countries are grouped 
according to three categories, high institutional capacity, moderate institutional capacity, 
and low institutional capacity. Chapter 5 discusses the parameters of state capacity and 
the interpretation of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. The following section 
elaborates on the research design and methodology of this dissertation.              
 
2.5. Research Design: Case selection and methodology 
This dissertation is based on comparative method. As Brady and Collier,144 Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer,145 King, Keohane, and Verba,146 and Bennett and George,147 suggest in a 
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similar manner, comparative research proves beneficial in generating new hypotheses, 
pointing out previously omitted factors and exploring causal mechanisms. Since this 
dissertation aims to contribute to the relevant strand of research on EU conditionality 
with regards to minority rights by shifting the debate from historical descriptions to 
analytical explanations, in-depth case study research is particularly promising. George 
and Bennett argue that case studies are also helpful in concept development.148 By 
examining the causal mechanisms in detail, case studies help researchers exploring inner 
workings of different parameters and producing contextualised knowledge. To explicate 
the causal mechanisms process tracing proves particularly useful. George and Bennett 
suggest “process tracing identifies the intervening causal process  - the causal chain and 
causal mechanism - between an independent variable - or variables - and the outcome of 
the dependent variable.”149 Process tracing helps researchers identifying the weight of 
different causal mechanisms and exact sequence of the causal patterns designated.150 
Process tracing can therefore be considered as an effective approach to explicate the 
impact of EU conditionality and the ways in which the EU impacts candidate and 
member countries.  
The merits of process tracing on assessing the dynamics of Europeanisation are 
criticised by scholars coming from diverse research traditions. Haverland, for instance, 
suggested that process tracing is unlikely to enable establishing causal importance of the 
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European institutions and/or policies due to equifinality problems.151 In other words, 
several developments such as globalisation, which occur in parallel with the European 
integration, might pave the way for the same outcomes. Thus, it becomes very difficult, if 
not impossible, to deduct the main causal mechanisms of the observed outcome.  
The problems associated with process tracing, however, can be offset by a proper 
research design and data collection strategy. First, exploring the EU factor with reference 
to comparative cases and with-in case analysis can mitigate the problem of equifinality as 
it helps overcoming “selection on dependent variable bias.”152 Second, comparative 
analysis of member and candidate countries depicting divergence in terms of the impact 
of Europeanisation would enable context-bounded generalisations of empirical findings.  
Following the fundamental procedures, this dissertation focuses on national 
minorities in Bulgaria. As discussed in the introduction, Bulgaria refers to a “deviant 
case” in terms of the main accounts on Europeanisation.153 In the 1980s, there was huge 
human suffering in Bulgaria marked by assimilation and ethnic cleansing, internal 
deportations, imprisonments and finally forced migration of Turkish minority. Yet, these 
sufferings did not pave the way for a prolonged ethnic conflict in Bulgaria. On the 
contrary, Bulgaria experienced major transformation in terms of minority-majority 
relations and became EU member in less than two decades. The degree of 
Europeanisation in Bulgaria concerning the minority rights regime, however, is examined 
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as a domestic-driven process, rather than explicit and consistent EU conditionality 
criteria. This dissertation, by offering a within case analysis, explores the dynamics of 
peaceful transition to democracy in Bulgaria and the development of minority rights 
regime throughout 1990s. The analysis of Bulgaria’s transformation makes important 
contributions to the Europeanisation literature as it provides new avenues to explore how 
domestic actors and interest groups use the EU as an opportunity structure towards a new 
minority rights regime.  
The Bulgarian case is compared with Croatia and Montenegro for two main 
reasons. First, minority rights issues occupy a central place in these two post-conflict 
societies as well. As a country that passed through violent conflict, minority issues, 
especially the status and integration of Serb minority, poses important challenges in 
Croatia. Following the break up of Yugoslavia, Croatia declared independence and in a 
short time period, Serbs living in the country rebelled against the newly established 
Croatian state. By late 1991, Serbs organised themselves around self-proclaimed Serb 
Republic of Krajina. As a result, the warfare between Serb minority and Croatian state 
forces escalated, which paved the way to long-lasting minority and displaced people 
problems in the country. Despite this tormented historical experience, the Croatian 
political-elite had taken important steps during 2000s to improve the minority rights 
regime so that the rights of Serb minority are extended significantly. The inertia during 
1990s and substantive transformation of minority-majority relations in 2000s and the 
underlying mechanisms that lead to the shifting preferences of the ruling elite is 
illuminative in terms of contextualising the scope conditions of the EU influence.  
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Montenegro is the third country explored in this dissertation that is still an 
understudied case in Europeanisation literature. Montenegro, a post-conflict Western 
Balkan country gained its independence in 2006, also deals with minority issues, as the 
country hosts Serbs, Bosniaks, Muslims, Croats, and Albanians as major ethnic groups.154 
Montenegro started accession negotiations with the EU in June 2012. As the political 
participation of minority groups is one of the central concerns attached to EU 
conditionality, the response of the domestic-level factors to the EU criteria and the ways 
through which the EU operationalises conditionality measures in the Montenegrin case is 
currently an underexploited research area. The comparative analysis of Montenegro as a 
candidate state with two new EU member states provides variance in cases to assess how 
and to what extent the EU matters. Thus, the observable outcomes in three post-conflict 
Balkan states in terms of ethnic relations that are currently anchored to the EU 
governance enable generalizable inferences regarding the mechanisms of 
Europeanisation.  
 
Table 2.2. Minority groups in Bulgaria, Croatia and Montenegro 
 Bulgaria Croatia Montenegro 
EU membership status 2007       2013 Candidate 
Examined minority group Turks Serbs Bosniaks and Albanians 
Percentage of the minority groups* 8% 4,4% 8,7% and 4,9% 
*Source: National Statistical Institute in Bulgaria (nsi.bg) Croatia (dzh.hr), and Montenegro (monstat.org) 
 
																																																						
154 Jelena Dzankic, “Montenegro’s Minorities in the Tangles of Citizenship, Participation, and Access to 
Rights,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 11, no. 3 (2012): 40-59. 
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The comparative analysis of Bulgaria, Croatia and Montenegro is illuminative not 
only because the intra and inter-comparison of these three cases reveal the outcome of 
different constellations of the EU and domestic-level factors, but also because they 
provide variance in terms of contextual and temporal factors. The EU conditionality on 
minorities turned out to be a major political concern starting from the 1990s. The EU, for 
the first time, incorporated minority related issues as part of membership criteria in 
Copenhagen in 1993. Accordingly, “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities”155 became sine 
qua non to join the EU. Thus, the European institutions did not implement any concrete 
policies toward minority rights protection for extant member countries. The EU’s 
minority rights policies started to be more pronounced after 2000s and became an integral 
part of the enlargement negotiations, despite the politicised nature of the issue remained 
intact. In terms of temporality, Bulgaria, Croatia and Montenegro have been drawn into 
the EU’s orbit within a relatively similar time frame. Since this dissertation aims to 
understand how the scope and implementation of the EU conditionality has been shaped 
in new member and candidate countries, a comparative study of these three cases may 
shed fresh light on how Europeanisation works in different domestic grounds. In addition 
to the comparative analysis of three different cases of Europeanisation, this research also 
offers an in-depth within-case analysis as it explores Europeanisation of minority rights 
regime in Bulgaria from 1990s to 2017, which is expected to mitigate equifinality 
problems.  
																																																						
155 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, DOC SN 180/93, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, 
para. 7.  
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Since the study of minority rights is a contested field that requires combinative 
analysis of hard and soft data, this dissertation relies on both types of sources.  First, for 
an appropriate process tracing and careful analysis of the interactive impact of domestic 
and EU level variables, this research draws on in-depth semi-structured elite interviews. 
Elite interviews are particularly useful when the researcher seeks to gain a true 
understanding of “the inner workings of the political process, the machinations between 
influential actors and how a sequence of events is viewed and responded to within the 
political machine.”156 Elite interviews also enable the researcher to gain access to the 
crucial information that is very difficult, if not impossible, to gather through the review of 
other primary and secondary sources of data. Furthermore, elite interviews prove 
particularly beneficial when the researcher deals with contemporary issues that are still 
understudied and unrecorded.157  
The interview data were gathered in line with the ‘purposive sampling’ 
technique.158 Three distinct categories that reflect different perspectives in these cases 
formed the interviewee sample: (a) ruling elites of major political parties, and national 
and EU officials, (b) ruling elites of the minority communities, (c) informed third party 
observers closely following the EU membership process and minority-majority relations 
in these cases. The semi-structured in-depth elite interviews are conducted to reveal how 
elites on majority and minority elites approach the EU rules and norms in minority rights 
																																																						
156 Darren G. Lilleker, “Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential Minefield,” Politics 23, no. 
3 (2003): 208.  
157 Ibid., 213. 
158 Ariadne Vromen, “Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches” Theory and Methods in 
Political Science, edited by in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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and frame the debate at the domestic-level while setting their preferences as part of their 
interactions with the EU institutions.159  
Accordingly, purposive sampling was utilised to reveal the perspectives of 
bureaucratic elites, who directly and indirectly took part in the design and 
implementation of minority rights policies as well as leading representatives of the 
minority and majority sides to gather more information about the inner workings of the 
transformations that took place in these three cases. On that note, a total of 85 interviews 
conducted in Bulgaria, Croatia and Montenegro. The total number of interviews 
conducted in Bulgaria is 51 and 22 of them are representatives of Turkish minority 
including the leaders of the MRF, DOST and PPFD (political parties of Turks in 
Bulgaria) and the people who were subject to assimilation and forced migration during 
1989 and returned to Bulgaria thereafter. The policy-makers that designed Bulgaria’s 
minority policies are also interviewed during the field research. Accordingly, 16 of the 
interviewees include the political and bureaucratic elite in Bulgaria including Minister of 
Interior and Head of European Commission; 13 of them are third party observers –
experts of Bulgarian politics and majority-minority relations in Bulgaria such as NGO 
representatives, scholars, and journalists (see appendix 1). The interviewees, therefore, 
represent actors who are able to provide inner workings of the policy processes and 
reflect the preferences of the minority and minority groups regarding the EU rules and 
regulations in the minority rights area.   
The same sampling strategy is pursued in other two cases as well. In Croatia, a 
total number of 18 interviews were conducted during the field research. Eight of them 
																																																						
159 Furthermore, ordinary minority members were also interviewed to supplement the elite-level findings. 
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refer to the political and bureaucratic elite, who represents the Croatian majority and Serb 
minority; whereas 10 of them are composed of third party observers closely following 
Croatia-EU relations and minority rights issues in the Western Balkans. In Montenegro, 
the total number of interviews is 16. Six of them include the political and bureaucratic 
elites; four of them are the representatives of minority groups and six of them are 
informed third party observers.  
 In each interview, I directed eight semi-structured open-ended questions (see 
appendix 2). Asking open-ended questions are particularly useful as they enable the 
researcher to reveal “interviewee’s views, interpretations of events, understandings, 
experiences and opinions.”160 Furthermore, as Aberbach and Rockman suggest, high-
level policy makers “do not like being put in the straightjacket of close-ended 
questions.”161 In that sense, semi-structured open-ended questions prove useful as they 
enable the respondents to frame their answers as they wish and address different aspects 
of the issue in line with their perspectives.162 Average duration of an interview was 
around one hour. The interviews are recorded and stored in digital files. The ethical 
considerations are properly addressed before, during, and after the interviews. The 
interviews were conducted in Turkish, English, Bulgarian and Montenegrin.  
However, Silverman points out that interviews do not always guarantee access to 
the facts but guide pundits to gather primary data about the ways in which ruling elites 
																																																						
160 Brigitte Byrne, “Qualitative Interviewing,” in Researching Society and Culture, edited by Clive Seale 
(London: Sage Publications, 2004): 182.  
161 Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman, “Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews,” PS: Political 
Science and Politics 35, no. 4 (2002): 674.  
162 Ibid.  
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perceive the political developments.163 Therefore, the interview data need to be 
triangulated with other sources of data to crosscheck in terms of reliability and validity.164 
In addition to interview data and scholarly literature, the present dissertation draws on 
several archival documents and official reports prepared by different organisations. 
Accordingly, European Commission reports, Council of Europe documents, OSCE 
briefings, and the reports of several other non-governmental organisations are consulted. 
Finally, this dissertation also relied on previously published materials, press statements, 
op-eds, and speeches of minority and majority representatives in three countries.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter offered a conceptual framework to account for the recent wave of 
Europeanisation research. The literature acknowledges that the impact of the EU on 
member and candidate countries is uneven, incremental, and subject to reversals. Yet the 
underlying reason as to why this is the case is still understudied especially in new 
member and candidate countries. The literature is underdeveloped as to whether and in 
which ways the EU informs the transformation of minority rights regimes in these 
polities. Particularly, comparative analysis in the subject matter is rare. This dissertation 
examines the evolution of minority-majority relations in Bulgaria, Croatia, and 
Montenegro to address the conceptual and empirical lacuna in the literature.  
																																																						
163 David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data: A Guide to the Principles of Qualitative Research 
(London: Sage Publications, 2011): 168.  
164 Angela Dale, “Quality in Social Research,” International Journal of Social Research Methodology 9, 
no. 2 (2006): 81.  
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These three cases are important not only because they are understudied in the 
relevant body of literature but also crucial in the context of Europeanisation literature as 
they represent significant degree of Europeanisation thanks to the mutual interaction of 
domestic and EU-level dynamics. The Europeanisation of these countries, which was 
contrary to the expectations, is an unusual story that deserves in-depth analysis. The rest 
of this dissertation shall explicate the underlying dynamics of this transformation with 



















CHAPTER III. Minority Rights Reforms in Bulgaria (1989-1999) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to explore the transformation of minority rights in Bulgaria and the role 
of the EU in this process. The chapter covers the period from Bulgaria’s democratic 
transition in late-1980s to its declaration as EU candidate country in December 1999. 
Bulgaria is a striking case in terms of the Europeanisation of minority rights as it 
experiences one of the successful transformations despite unsuitable circumstances. The 
chapter applies the conceptual model introduced in the previous chapter to assess the 
dynamics of minority-majority relations in Bulgaria. It argues that strong ‘domestic 
dissatisfaction’ on part of the majority and minority representatives due to the coercive 
policies of the Communist regime towards Turks and the complementary role of the EU 
enabled ‘double moderation’ in Bulgarian politics throughout the 1990s and lead to 
adoption of minority-friendly policies.165   
The first section of the chapter provides a succinct history of Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria. Exclusionary policies toward the Turkish community members starting from 
1960s and their forced migration in 1989 are also discussed in this section. The second 
section explores Bulgaria’s transformation in detail and explains the dynamics of 
democratisation and Europeanisation under difficult circumstances. In particular, 
improvements in Bulgaria’s minority rights policies as a result of ‘double moderation’ 
																																																						
165 An earlier article version of this chapter has been published in International Migration, see Muzaffer 
Kutlay, “The Turks of Bulgaria: An Outlier Case of Forced Migration and Voluntary Return,” International 
Migration 55, no. 5 (2017): 162-179. 
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process are analysed within the context of two-level model. The final section concludes 
the chapter.   
3.2. Turkish minority in Bulgaria: From tolerance to assimilation  
The co-existence of different ethno-religious groups in Bulgarian territories has a very 
long history going back to the 14th century with the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans. 
The Balkans region, where Bulgaria is geographically located, was dominated by 
different hegemonic powers throughout history. The long Ottoman rule in Bulgaria, 
approximately lasting for five centuries, consolidated the ethnically heterogeneous nature 
of the country. Despite the independence of Bulgaria in 1908 along with the 
establishment of other nation-states in the region, ethnic heterogeneity remained part of 
the socio-political life. For instance, Bulgaria inherited several minority groups, including 
Turks, Pomaks, Albanians, Romanians, Roma, Macedonians, Greeks, Jews, Armenians, 
Vlachs, inter alia. However, the war of independence and the Balkans Wars at the turn of 
the century, the two world wars and following border conflicts and shifts significantly 
reduced the number of minorities in modern Bulgaria. Furthermore, the thorny minority 
issues have become part of the political conflicts in the country. In this context, Turks in 
Bulgaria deserve special attention as being one of the indigenous and politically well-
organised minority communities in the country. According to 2011 census, it is estimated 
that Turks make up to 8 per cent of the entire population — 588,318 out of 7.4 million in 
total. Since the term ‘minority’, as discussed in detail below, is a contested concept in 
Bulgaria, none of the official documents refer to the ‘Turkish minority’ explicitly.166 The 
																																																						
166 During author’s interview, the then Interior Minister of Bulgaria Tsvetan Tsvetanov took the liberty of 
using ‘Turkish minority’ term several times. However, at the end of the meeting Mr Tsvetanov noted that 
the term ‘minority’ should be understood and cited as “Bulgarian citizens with Turkish origins.” Tsvetan 
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Turkish community deserve a special place not only because of their numeric superiority 
but also, they were subject to systematic discrimination and exclusionary treatment 
during the Communist rule starting from 1960s. The anti-minority policies of the 
Communist regime culminated into a full-fledged state-led assimilation policy, which 
resulted in mass deportation of Turks in 1989.167 Thus, the contemporary minority-
majority relations in Bulgaria rests on a tormented past.168 Despite such unfavourable 
background conditions, Bulgaria did not experience inter-ethnic conflict during transition 
to democracy as observed in neighbouring countries. On the contrary, Bulgarian policy-
makers managed to sustain peaceful transition to democracy and the minority rights 
regime in Bulgaria improved in a rather unexpected manner — endured until now. These 
factors altogether make the Turkish minority a critical case in terms of successful 
transformation of minority-majority relations. 
In order to shed light on the development of Bulgaria’s minority rights policies 
and peaceful democratisation experience —a case that was not predicted accurately by the 
mainstream theories— it will be appropriate to briefly investigate the state of minority 
communities in Bulgaria with a special focus on the period after Second World War 
																																																																																																																																																																	
Tsvetanov (the Minister of Interior of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2009-2013), interviewed by author, May 
28, 2010. The interview conducted as part of the author’s unpublished MSc dissertation. See: Muzaffer 
Vatansever Kutlay, “Europeanization of Minority Rights in Bulgaria” (MSc Thesis, The Middle East 
Technical University, 2013).  
167 Kemal H. Karpat, ed., The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Culture, and Political Fate of a Minority 
(Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1990); Eminov, Ali (1990). “There are no Turks in Bulgaria: Rewriting History 
by Administrative Fiat,” in Kemal Karpat, ed., The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Culture and Political 
Fate of a Minority (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1990): 203-222. Kemal H. Karpat, “The Turks of Bulgaria: The 
Struggle for National-Religious Survival of a Muslim Minority,” Nationalities Papers 23, no. 4 (1995): 
725-749.   
168 Amnesty International, Bulgaria: Imprisonment of Ethnic Turks – Human Rights Abuses during the 
Forced Assimilation of the Ethnic Turkish Community (Amnesty International: London, 1986). 
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when discrimination and assimilation policies became increasingly explicit and state-
mandated. In the post-1945, official state policies towards Turks varied significantly. 
However, historically informed analysis suggests that the state’s approach to Turkish 
minority incrementally shifted from ‘toleration’ to ‘assimilation’ over the years.  
Brown points out in his succinct analysis that the Bulgarian Communist Party 
(BCP) consolidated its grip in the post-1945 period and targeted different social groups 
with an ultimate aim of extending state control over entire society.169 The BCP elites’ 
approach to minority communities was also informed by the same logic of subtle micro-
surveillance. Even though the official state policy toward minorities fluctuated over time, 
main motivation of keeping minority groups under strict political control remained the 
same.170  
As a matter of fact, the BCP adopted a tolerant approach towards the Turkish 
minority in the initial years of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, which was established 
in 1946. The 1947 Constitution guaranteed equality of all Bulgarian citizens regardless of 
their ethnic background and religion.171 The 1947 Constitution was a progressive 
document in terms of the protection of minority populations as the term “national 
minority” and the existence of national minorities were recognized for the first time. The 
Bulgarian Constitution also secured the religious and ethnic rights of the minority 
																																																						
169 For a detailed analysis on different aspects of public policy throughout the initial phases of Communist 
rule see, James F. Brown, Bulgaria Under Communist Rule (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970). 
170 Several representatives of Turkish minority as well as Bulgarian scholars highlighted this issue 
including Nikola Theodossiev (Dr, Sofia University Department of History and Geography), interview by 
author, March 22, 2016; İbrahim Yalımov (Professor and Rector of Sofia High Institute of Islam), 
interview by author, March 24, 2016; Cengiz Hakov (Professor of Bulgarian Academy of Science, Institute 
for Balkan Studies), interview by author March 19, 2016. 
171 Iskra Baeva and Evgenia Kalinova, “Bulgarian Turks during the Transition Period,” in Bulgaria and 
Europe: Shifting Identitites, edited by Stefanos Katsikas (London: Anthem Press, 2012): 64. 
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members. The educational rights of minority groups and their right to access education in 
their mother tongue were also enshrined in the 1947 Constitution (article 79): “The 
citizens have the right for education. The education is secular, with democratic and 
progressive spirit. National minorities have the right to learn their mother tongue and to 
develop their national culture as learning of Bulgarian language is obligatory.”172 In 
compliance with the communitarian ideology of the new regime, the Bulgarian 
government nationalised all schools in 1946 including the ones that belonged to minority 
communities. The number of schools that teach Turkish language, however, increased 
significantly in the same period. Also, the administrators of these schools were selected 
from the members of Turkish minority. In some cases, native Turkish teachers from 
Turkey were recruited.173 The number of primary and secondary-level schools teaching 
Turkish language and students attending classes increased significantly partially because 
of the compulsory attendance policy of the state.174 For instance, the number of schools in 
this category rose from 673 (in 1946) to 1,199 in just five years.175 The members of 
Turkish community also had the opportunity to access university education – with Sofia 
University being the most popular one. 
Although positive steps taken in the initial years of the Communist rule, the 
nationalisation of Turkish schools lead to significant changes in the curriculum and 
Bulgarian instructors replaced the Turkish teachers in the coming years, as two critical 
																																																						
172 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, 1947. 
173 Rossen Vassilev, “Restoring the Ethnolinguistic Rights of Bulgaria’s Turkish Minority,” Ethnopolitics 
9, no. 3-4 (2010): 296. 
174 Julia Stefanova, “The Four Transition in Bulgarian Education,” International Journal of the Sociology 
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developments that had had long-lasting implications. According to Zhelyazkova, the 
government in fact had a different strategy in mind at the time. The main motivation and 
ultimate aim of the Communist ruling elites was to re-educate the minority communities 
in line with official ideology and recruit new members to the Party from Turkish 
minority.176 Kostadin Grozev, a leading Bulgarian historian, also underlines the latter 
point as follows:   
 This policy could be interpreted as cultural assimilation of Turks through 
education, through privileges to young Turks to study in the Universities, through 
job promotions provided by the Communist Party -since they have a certain quota 
for the members of Turkish community that reserved for the Turks in the 
Communist Party.177 
 
The Bulgarian state also supported the printed media, especially newspapers, by 
funding book publishers, promoting radio programs and organising regular cultural 
events. Regardless of the ultimate aim of the government, Turkish minority members 
gained new opportunities to publish books in Turkish language, circulate newspapers, 
and broadcast on the Bulgarian National Radio.178 Acaroglu documents that the number 
																																																						
176 Antonina Zhelyazkova, “The Social and Cultural Adaptation of Bulgarian Immigrants in Turkey,” in 
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of widely circulated journal and newspapers published in Turkish reached 35 as a result 
of these policies.179 
All these developments suggest that Bulgarian government adopted a tolerant 
approach with regard to the educational and cultural rights of Turkish minority in early 
years of the Communist regime, despite ideological elements also permeate to school 
curriculums in the same period. The relatively conciliatory approach of the regime, 
however, took a sharp turn to explicit assimilation policies when Todor Zhivkov became 
the leader of BCP on 4 March 1954. In his long reign as the head of state until 1989, the 
state of Turkish minority constantly deteriorated. The first policy change to this end was 
the promulgation of a new Constitution in 1971. The new text, more commonly known as 
“Zhivkov Constitution”, heralded the forthcoming assimilationist policies towards 
minority communities in general and Turkish minority in particular. First and foremost, 
the term “national minority” was replaced with a euphemistic phrase, which labelled 
national minorities as “citizens with non-Bulgarian origin.”180   
In retrospect, the exclusionary policies of Zhivkov government were put into 
implementation in a gradual manner that preceded the enactment of new Constitution. 
Starting from 1960s, Turkish schools merged with Bulgarian schools, the number and 
circulation of minority newspapers were reduced, and the cultural activities of the 
Turkish minority were restricted. The repressive policies of the Bulgarian government 
were intensified in 1967, when Zhivkov adopted the policy of “homogenous Bulgarian 
																																																						
179 M. Türker Acaroğlu, “Bulgaristan’da 120 Yıllık Türk Gazeteciliği, 1965-1985,” Gazeteciler Cemiyeti 
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180 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, 1971: Article 45 (7). 
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socialist nation.”181 His new approach first targeted Pomaks, as the Pomak minority 
members were re-defined as ancestral Bulgarians. They were forced to leave their 
traditional names and embrace ethnic Bulgarian names instead. Despite strong resistance 
especially in Blagoevgrad region, where they were geographically concentrated, the 
names of almost 200,000 Pomaks had been changed by 1980.182  
 Zhivkov expanded the target of the name-changing policy by focusing on “mixed 
families” between Pomaks and Turks, once he realised that no major reaction took place 
among the minority groups in the country. Finally, the name changing policy and 
depriving of the rights of Turkish minority reached a new threshold when Zhivkov 
justified his policies by saying that the Turks in Bulgaria were in fact “converted Slavs.” 
Todor Zhivkov while addressing the members of Politburo, Central Committee and local 
administrators of the BCP on 18 January 1985 stated this as follows:  
We all know that our so-called ‘Turkish ethnic group’ has nothing, or almost 
nothing, common with the Turkey because they are not a part of Turkish ethnic 
group. They are Bulgarians who were assimilated during 500 years of Turkish 
rule. 183  
 
																																																						
181 Vesselin Dimitrov, “In Search of a Homogeneous Nation: The Assimilation of Bulgaria’s Turkish 
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As Baeva and Kalinova noted, significant effort was also placed on the ‘scientific 
justification’ of assimilationist measures: “All institutes of humanitarian sciences in the 
extensive Bulgarian Academy of Sciences were mobilised to ‘discover the Bulgarian root 
of the Turks’. The ‘scientific’ legitimisation of the campaign, much like the other trick of 
advertising the ‘revival’ as a campaign of local authorities, also cleared the central 
government of any responsibility.”184 The name-changing policy gradually implemented 
until the winter of 1984-1985 when no citizen with Muslim and Turkish names remained 
in Bulgaria.  
Zhivkov blended homogenisation policies with a highly securitised discourse to 
legitimise his exclusionary minority strategy that, more than others, targeted the Turkish 
community in Bulgaria. Zhivkov argued that Turkish minority posed a threat to the 
Bulgarian national security since they occupied the strategic regions in the country: 
Turks are located in the very important border regions. Think Kardzhali for 
example; Turks mostly populate this region. Kardzhali region is the heart of South 
and key to the entire Rodopi region. We recently realised that if there is a 
potential war, Turks are already holding the strategic points. Today, we should 
take the advantage of Turkey’s current conflict with Greece and implement our 
action plan…185  
 
Accordingly, the official denial and systematic assimilation policies against ethnic 
Turks were declared as “national revival process” (Vazroditelen Protses) by the 
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Communist regime and directly targeted Turkish minority in Bulgaria. It was indeed a 
cultural and ethno-linguistic assimilation policy against a specific ethnic group 
characterised by a strong and distinct collective identity as well as close social ties with 
Turkey as a kin state. As later documented in the Bulgarian State Archives,186 it was not 
merely a name changing policy but comprehensive “Bulgarisation campaign” that the 
BCP Politburo designed and carried out systematically with an ultimate aim of 
assimilation of ethnic, religious and cultural identity of Turks.187 As part of the “national 
revival process,” speaking in Turkish was banned in public areas and the religious and 
cultural practices of the Turkish minority were outlawed. The members of Turkish 
community who breached the ban were humiliated and forced to pay high-level fines – in 
some cases amounting to one-third of their salaries.188 All civil society organisations, 
cultural products and activities associated with the Turkish ethnic identity were 
forbidden. The traditional clothes of the minority community, even the trousers that 
Turkish women wearing, known as shalvar, were prohibited in public places. The 
replacement of passports/identity cards, birth certificates, diplomas and other official 
documents were followed. The Bulgarian local authorities even forced the minority 
members to write their new Bulgarian names on the doors of their properties. The 
extravagant policies pushed all limits when state officials deleted the Turkish names on 
the tombstones.189  
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The entire process was reported enthusiastically in the local press, while the 
mainstream media remained relatively silent on the events. As noted by Baeva and 
Kalinova, “not a single national newspaper mentioned the repression by the authorities or 
resistance from the targeted groups that were dismissed, deported, imprisoned in prisons 
and camps, or wounded and died. Such coercive actions were randomly presented as 
voluntary mass activities.”190 
By 1989, the name-changing policy affected more than one million people, the 
vast majority of which were ethnic Turks.191 The most tragic events observed in 
Kardzhali region in the winter of 1984-1985 where the majority of Turks were living. 
The masses poured into the street to protest against the government policies. It was 
indeed a peaceful march accompanied by children and women,192 however pushed back 
by a very harsh response of the Bulgarian militia, which resulted in the death of several 
protestors.193 Helsinki Watch Committee report, prepared by independent observers, 
estimates that more than 100 people were killed and 250 were imprisoned on 23 
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December 1984 just because they protested name changing policy of the government.194 
An updated version of Helsinki Watch Committee report estimates that between 300 and 
1,500 people belonging to the Turkish minority community were killed in total 
throughout “national revival process.”195 According to other credible sources, 517 
members of Turkish minority were arrested during, and following weeks of the peaceful 
protests. These people were detained and tortured; some of them were deported and, in 
some instances, sent to notorious Belene camp without any trial beforehand,196 where 
they were forced to work in tough conditions and subject to intense political 
indoctrination.197 
The Bulgarian government expanded the anti-minority regulations, bans and name 
changing policies across the country over the next four years. After years spent in Belene 
camp and various prisons, the leaders and active members of the Turkish minority were 
internally exiled and their mobility strictly restricted.198 The intensification of 
assimilation policies triggered a new wave of protests in early 1989. The Turkish 
community organised themselves around a massive passive resistance movement that 
included hunger strikes, gathering in city centres and sending letters to state officials and 
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international organisations to mobilise international society and increase external 
pressure over the Zhivkov regime.199 The Turks of Bulgaria basically demanded from the 
government to lift the political and cultural sanctions along with the reversal of the exile 
and internal displacements.200 However, Zhivkov’s response to these requests was harsh 
and intolerant. On 29 May 1989, Zhivkov appeared on Bulgarian National Television and 
Radio to announce the government plan, which was indeed the start of the forced 
migration of Turkish minority. Zhivkov stated that the Bulgarian government opened the 
borders and allowed anyone to leave the country willing to visit Turkey. The government 
labelled it as “great excursion”, however the Ministry of Interior prepared special 
application forms and distributed among Turkish community implying that they should 
leave.201 Among others, some of the Turkish community members were accompanied by 
the state officials to complete all the paper work in a working day and forced to leave the 
country immediately without having their belongings with them.202 As a result, more than 
340,000 members of Turkish community had to left Bulgaria in three months. 
In the initial phases of migration, the Turkish government pursued an open door 
policy and welcomed all migrants.203 However, in August 1989, the Turkish authorities, 
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being unable to manage such a very high number of human flows, decided to close the 
borders.204 The entire process paved the way for massive human tragedies and inter-
communal tensions as bilateral relations between Bulgaria and Turkey also strained 
significantly. After Zhivkov was ousted on 10 November 1989 and transition to 
democracy started, however, a new chapter opened in minority-majority relations in 
Bulgaria. As a result, in a short time, almost 40 per cent of forced migrants voluntarily 
returned back to the country.205 The next section discusses the causes of this massive 
policy change and explores the role of domestic actors in this process.   
 
3.3. Explaining peaceful transition: Democratisation-Europeanisation nexus 
Bulgaria is a counterintuitive example and ‘deviant case’ in terms democratisation and 
Europeanisation frameworks because of the ways in which antagonistic inter-ethnic 
relations were unfolded during 1990s. Democratic transitions are considered as the most 
contentious episodes in terms of domestic politics and international relations. As Snyder 
and Mansfield argued, transitional regimes are more likely to descent into conflict and 
war due to the weak institutional structures and vibrancy of nationalist-populist 
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sentiments.206 Mann207 and Brubaker,208 among others, also maintained that 
democratisation is likely to invite different forms of political violence between minority 
and majority members. Establishing functioning democracies in divided societies, which 
suffer from categorical identity-based cleavage structures, appears to be a more perennial 
problem.209 As Stroschein meticulously demonstrate in her comprehensive research, the 
paradox for democratisation “under difficult circumstances” – i.e. in divided societies – is 
that highly politicised minority and majority communities are expected to construct new 
democratic power-sharing mechanisms. Stated differently, “before institutions exist to 
channel disputes between groups, there are strident debates between them regarding the 
sort of institutions that should be constructed in the first place.”210      
The Bulgarian case, on that note, proves illuminating in terms of establishment 
and consolidation of inclusionary minority rights policies under difficult conditions.211 
This section addresses the Bulgarian puzzle with reference to the two-level model offered 
in Chapter 2. As proposed in the conceptual framework, it demonstrates that high degree 
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of domestic dissatisfaction with the minority policies of the Communist regime created a 
strong impetus on the side of domestic actors to alter their preference functions. It argues 
that the new political elites on the minority and majority sides did not only reformulate 
policy instruments but also redefined the entire policy itself in line with the broader 
European norms, which unleashed a virtuous cycle of extensive social learning. 
Therefore, double moderation212  emerged at the domestic level created a highly 
conducive background thanks to which EU norms and regulations make its way into 
Bulgarian politics. Second, this section also demonstrates that the EU played an indirect 
but still considerable role by promoting Bulgaria’s transition to liberal democracy and 
shaping inclusive minority policies. As such, this section maintains that loosely framed 
external conditionality played a complementary role in the period concerned.  
 
3.3.1. Domestic dissatisfaction: Changing political preferences 
The first dynamic one needs to take into account to assess the mechanisms of change and 
continuity in minority rights policies is the degree of domestic dissatisfaction about 
prevailing policies. Bulgaria, from this point of view, is solid example in weighting in the 
factors of a possible change in political preferences. Following the unprecedented impact 
of emigration and changing political atmosphere in Bulgaria, on 10 November 1989, 
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Todov Zhivkov was forced to leave his post with a “palace coup.”213 This unexpected 
event marked a critical juncture as it invited massive transformations in different aspects 
of Bulgarian political life. It also marked the beginning of a completely new era in 
minority-majority relations in the country. Just after the fall of Zhivkov, fourteen non-
Communist groups organised a meeting to establish a new political platform with an aim 
of promoting political pluralism and spearheading political-economic reforms in the 
country and, as a first step, formed a new political movement called Union of Democratic 
Forces (UDF) with Zhelyu Zhelev elected as the leader of the group.214 The regime 
change led to an institutional equilibrium in Bulgaria that the new elite openly expressed 
dissatisfaction with the previous policies toward Turkish minority. 
The new Bulgarian elite’s macro-goal of “returning to Europe” gradually 
increased the importance of the EU leverage in Bulgaria’s domestic political economy 
structure and democratisation process.215 Accordingly, the domestic dissatisfaction on 
part of the Bulgarian majority became increasingly visible, which paved the way for 
gradual transformation in institutional architecture of majority-minority relations and the 
prevailing norms that informed Bulgaria’s minority rights regime. The change in the 
preferences of majority elites was not merely instrumental as the new elite did question 
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not only the policy instruments but the ultimate policy goals as well. To this end, 
coalition building with Turkish minority was conceived as a new way of socialisation 
within the European circles and to develop an alternative collective identity rather than a 
tactical move toward predefined political ends. Zhelyu Zhelev, the leader of the UDF and 
first democratically elected President of Bulgaria in 1990, stated that “the EU was the 
unifying actor between Turkish minority and the pro-reform Bulgarians. So the political 
representatives of Bulgarian majority and Turkish minority strongly supported Bulgaria’s 
EU membership.”216 The goal of reversing the policies of old regime and establishing 
new power-sharing institutions appeared as the common unifying denominators in 
Bulgaria. As Zhelev stated: 
The Bulgarian Turks were part of the new Bulgarian opposition promoting 
democratic European values. They have their role during the abolishment of the 
Bulgarian communist regime. Here the attitude of the Bulgarian opposition was 
similar to Turkish minority. They worked together. They shared same intentions, 
feelings and problems.217 
The changing minority policy of the Bulgarian political elite was an outcome of 
inter-elite conflict and elite-level socialisation. The increasing opposition against the 
prevalent minority policies and the emerging coalitions put pressure on the BCP 
members, who dictated Bulgaria’s minority policies during the Communist regime. The 
post-Communist Bulgarian elites, aligned with the progressive segments of the BCP, 
played an important role in reversing the policies of the Central Committee of the BCP. 
The official shift in minority policies took place with a report that Alexander Lilov, one 
																																																						




of the most powerful figures of the Party, wrote for the ruling elites. The report criticised 
the policies of the ousted Zhivkov regime in an unequivocal manner. Lilov’s report, 
entitled To Overcome the Distortions among the Turkish-Speaking and Muslim 
Population in Bulgaria, described the “national revival” policies as “gross political error 
of great immediate and long-term internal and international consequences.”218 Lilov also 
acknowledged the rights of Turkish community to choose their names freely and exercise 
their religious and ethnic rights without any interference from the state. The policy shift 
of the Party was considered as a tactical step at the time to dissociate the ruling elites 
from the wrongdoings of the past by associating “national revival” debacle with Zhivkov 
and his close aids that also were ousted with the former Communist leader.219  
However, more than adopting an instrumental approach, the democratic 
opposition formed under the leadership of Zhelev considered the abovementioned policy 
change as an opportunity to develop common language and common cause around which 
pro-reformist segments can be united against the previous regime in Bulgaria.220 Marin 
Lessenski, a senior expert on Bulgarian politics, put it nicely, “the former ruling elites 
wished to break with the past and wanted to focus on the new period in Bulgarian 
politics.”221 Mihail Ivanov, adviser to the President Zhelyu Zhelev on minority policies at 
the time, also suggested that the new Bulgarian elites positioned themselves opposite to 
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the former regime and its supporters, and labelled them as the ‘common enemy’ which 
provided the majority and minority members to cooperate on a common ground. 222 The 
approach of the newly formed democratic opposition during the early years of transition, 
was one of the significant factors that united majority and minority communities and 
prevented a possible ethnic clash between Bulgarians and Turks.223 The opinion leaders 
and influential figures of the Turkish minority also shared the same idea. Professor 
İbrahim Yalımov, a former MP of Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) during the transition 
years, underlined the fact that framing the former ruling elites as the “common enemy” 
helped mobilise minority and majority members around a common cause, which enabled 
moderation on both sides of the society that were, otherwise, sitting on the sharp edge of 
the knife during transition years.224  
 In retrospect, one of the critical junctures in inter-ethnic reconciliation was the 
acknowledgement of the suffering that minority groups, especially the Turkish minority, 
endured. As the literature suggests the denial of the past traumas and mass sufferings are 
more likely to lead to the accumulation of inter-ethnic problems, which in turn reduces 
the likelihood of major policy changes. As Volkan argues, in case the wounds of an 
ethnic group are not recognised and healed, it turns into an inter-generational identity-
building instrument.225 It appears that the new ruling elite in Bulgaria, even in an intuitive 
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way, was aware of this fact and willing to admit the mistakes committed in the past. As 
Zhelev stated: 
Communist regime was a dictatorship. They neither believed nor supported the 
existence of any different ethnic groups. The Turkish people were the biggest 
minority in Bulgaria so they were the first one to suffer from the consequences of 
the political aims of the communist party and “the national revival process.” But 
Bulgarians suffered too. On the other hand, the communist regime wanted to 
create one ethnic group, one nation, by using force and violence, which was in 
fact, impossible.226  
Following Lilov’s report, the plenum of the Central Committee of the BCP 
adopted a decree, which expressed the willingness to restore inter-ethnic relations and 
ensure the rights of the Turkish minority. As Baeva and Kalinova point out, the results of 
this symbolic decision turned out to be quite substantial as it enabled a long-lasting 
moderation process.227  
Along with the anti-Communist and reformist political groups within majority 
Bulgarians, the Turkish minority also supported the paradigmatic changes in Bulgarian 
politics under the leadership of Ahmed Dogan, who has remained most influential leader 
of the Turkish minority. Dogan was prisoned on the ground that he mobilised Turkish 
minority against the regime. On 22 December 1989 Ahmed Dogan received amnesty 
along with other Turkish minority members. Immediately after release from prison, 
Dogan started working to form a new political organisation representing Turkish 
minority. As Dogan led the Turkish resistance movement during the Communist regime 
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and created the Turkish National Liberation Movement in Bulgaria (TNLMB) in 1984, he 
had ample experience with regard to politics and political mobilisation of masses. In a 
short time after released from the prison, Dogan established a political party in January 
1990 (officially registered in March 1990), called ‘Movement for Rights and Freedoms’ 
(MRF) – known as Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi in Turkish.228 The MRF emerged as one 
of the influential institutional actors that set the tone of inter-ethnic moderation and 
political conciliation on the minority side. The Party proved highly successful in terms of 
increasing ethnic consciousness among Turkish minority members and overcoming 
collective action problems within Turks. For example, in the first democratic elections 
that took place on 10-17 June 1990, the MRF managed to secure 23 seats in the 
Parliament (total number of seats was 400).  
It should therefore be suggested that the emergence of a favourable institutional 
context provided opportunities for the participation of minorities into decision-making 
processes. The creation of the MRF, as discussed in detail below, provided a unique 
opportunity for the Turkish minority to join the Parliament, articulate their interests and 
express them in a more efficient way. That being said, the Turkish elites struggled a lot to 
register MRF as a political party and join the first democratic elections.  
The Bulgarian Constitution, which was adopted on 12 July 1991, adopted a very 
cautious tone regarding the formation of political parties on ethnic and religious lines. For 
instance, article 11(1) stated this as follows: “there shall be no political parties on ethnic, 
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racial, and religious lines…”229 The same statement was enshrined in the Bulgarian 
Political Party Act as well, which was in fact in force well before the new Constitution. 
The nationalist segments of the Bulgarian political elites, who were very critical of the 
reconciliation and moderation process, attempted to close down the MRF twice on the 
ground that it violated the basic principles of the law on political parties and the 
Bulgarian Constitution. In the run-up to the first democratic elections of post-transition 
Bulgaria, a group of nationalist majority elites applied to the Court to close down the 
MRF. As a matter of fact, a chain of extraordinary events led to the rejection of the 
closure application. Even tough Sofia City Court rejected the MRF’s application to 
register itself just before the election, the Central Election Commission overruled the 
decision taken by the Sofia City Court and allowed the MRF to participate in the 
incoming national election in June 1990.230 It appears that the Central Election 
Commission, taking the delicate political equilibrium into consideration and anticipating 
the potential side effects of excluding Turkish minority from the political contest, 
justified its decision by referring to the previous Court decisions. This was not, however, 
placed the MRF’s political trajectory into a safe track as the anti-minority groups did not 
give up with the decision of the Central Election Commission. The BSP members231 
orchestrated the second attempt in late 1991 to outlaw the MRF.232 The nationalist 
members of the Bulgarian Parliament, this time, applied to the Constitutional Court. They 
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claimed that the existence of the MRF as a political party did not comply with article 
44(2) of the Constitution, which read as follows: 
No organization shall act to the detriment of the country’s sovereignty and 
national integrity, or the unity of the nation, nor shall act to incite racial, national, 
ethnic or religious enmity or an encroachment on the rights and freedoms of 
citizens; no organization shall establish clandestine or paramilitary structures or 
shall attain its aims thorough violence.  
The Constitutional Court, however, rejected the application (see below for the role 
of Zhelev in the process). The decision of the highest legal authority in Bulgaria put an 
end to the discussions on the legal situation of the MRF as a political party. The verdict 
also secured the place of the Turkish minority in Bulgarian politics, which contributed to 
the fragile moderation process evolving between minority and majority elites. Plamen 
Bogoev, legal counsel at Sofia City Court and advisor to the President Zhelyu Zhelev at 
the time, aptly suggested “that the judgement of the Constitutional Court was a definite 
contribution both to the democratic process in the country and to the supremacy of 
law.”233 One should underline at this point that the Constitutional Court took this 
landmark decision by a narrow margin, demonstrating that MRF was walking on a tight 
rope despite the conciliatory policies the MRF leaders adopted at the time.234  
 
3.3.1.2. Double moderation and ‘Bulgarian ethnic model’ 
 
The early years of transition to democracy in Bulgaria proved highly contested in terms 
of inter-ethnic relations. As the rules of the game were yet to be determined and the 
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power relations stabilised, different political and social groups tested each other’s limits 
to gain the upper hand in the post-democratic institutional equilibrium. The paradox of 
regime transitions, as Stroschein points, is that the ruling elites, who had a stake in the 
political system and part of the contentious politics, also are expected to set the rules of 
the new game that facilitate political conciliation and ensure proportional power sharing 
mechanisms.235 The Bulgarian case diverges from the mainstream as the country 
managed to improve the minority-majority relations in a rather unexpected manner 
despite unfavourable background conditions. Not only massive assimilation campaign 
launched by the Communist regime but also the two attempts to end the existence of the 
MRF as a political party demonstrate the scope of difficult circumstances. The political 
developments in the wake of regime transition revealed that the Bulgarian political elite 
and ordinary citizens polarised severely regarding the place of Turkish minority in the 
new political system. The exclusionary policies of the Zhivkov regime were still popular 
among certain segments of the society and the mainstream political actors. As a 
consequence, the Turkish elites realised that the road to the recovery of their rights was 
full of impediments and political contentions.  
The Bulgarian case, as proposed in this dissertation, illustrates the critical 
importance of double moderation on part of the minority and majority leaders toward 
introducing inclusive minority policies. Accordingly, the role of two political leaders as 
change-agents, Ahmed Dogan as the leader of the MRF and Zhelyu Zhelev as the leader 
of the UDF, constituted primary factors that eased existing ethnic tensions and 
																																																						




consolidated political participation of Turkish minority community into Bulgarian 
politics.       
The two leaders played pivotal roles in guiding the social learning processes as 
part of Bulgaria’s integration with Europe and introducing a pluralistic political system 
that mitigated the risk of organised political violence. Ahmed Dogan and Zhelyu Zhelev 
managed to create a common cause around which pro-reformist actors unified and 
mobilised their supporters. A new political rhetoric compatible with European values and 
underscoring Bulgaria’s place in Europe became the backbone of new collective identity 
of the pro-reformist political elites that Zhelev and Dogan framed and communicated on 
both sides.     
On the majority side, Zhelyu Zhelev played a maestro role that facilitated peaceful 
transition. Zhelev, as the first democratically elected president of Bulgaria, was a liberal 
politician with strong anti-communist sentiments. Zhelev, in the aftermath of Zhivkov’s 
removal from the office treated the Turkish minority as a potential ally to form new 
coalitions in consolidating democratic practices and fastening Bulgaria’s integration into 
Euro-Atlantic structures.236 Zhelev, in several critical junctures during transition period, 
supported the Turkish minority in the Parliament by using his presidential authority to 
endorse the MRF’s existence in Bulgarian politics, where possible. For instance, Zhelev 
played a tacit but critical role that tilted the political balance in favour of the MRF in the 
second closure case, when Constitutional Court rejected the application of the BSP 
																																																						
236 Zhelev, interview. 
	
97	
members.237  Zhelev and Dogan found a common adversary around which an inter-ethnic 
coalition was formed under difficult circumstances. The Bulgarian President took 
advantage of the support of Turkish minority to establish closer relations with NATO and 
the EU. Tsvetan Tsvetanov, former Bulgarian Minister of Interior, highlighted this point 
as follows: “The MRF really helped to avoid any ethnic conflicts in the country. They 
also participated in the preparations to join NATO and the EU and supported 
democratisation process.”238              
On the minority side, Ahmed Dogan pursued a very cautious policy that did not 
tolerate any forms of excessive demands endorsing even tacit approval of political 
violence in any shape or form. In fact, the MRF was far from being a homogeneous bloc 
in early stages. The ultra-nationalist wing of the Party was active and not shy in terms of 
seeking autonomy, which could have triggered the already sensitive nerve within 
populist-nationalist segments of the Bulgarian mainstream. However, Dogan never 
adopted a secessionist discourse asking for any forms of political autonomy for the 
Turkish minority. As such, he meticulously side-lined the ‘hawks’ within the MRF ranks:  
In the early days of MRF there were strong party members who were supporting 
the idea of autonomous Turkish regions within northern and southern Bulgaria. 
Their ideas were radical but very influential because these members were arrested 
by Zhivkov regime and sent to prisons and Belene camp. Ahmed Dogan clearly 
rejected these maximalist demands and cut these members’ links with the Party.239   
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The MRF leader and his close aides promoted moderation and pluralistic 
governance guaranteed under the rule of law. As pointed out by Krassimir Kanev, 
Turkish minority elites kept their demands at minimum by mainly asking for fundamental 
rights and freedoms and never adopted secessionist discourse.240 The analysis of the 
speeches of the MRF leader also reveals that ‘moderation,’ ‘peaceful transformation’ and 
‘democratisation’ appeared to be the most frequently underlined themes.241 As Tzvetkov 
puts it: “The ethnic Turks have reacted to all the ordeals inflicted upon them with 
extreme forbearance. It should be noted that the MRF has acted very prudently by 
neutralizing extremist elements in its own camp and keeping the whole problem on a 
civilized level.”242 
The policies of the MRF leadership and the ways in which they expressed Turkish 
minority’s dissatisfaction proves crucial in terms of the transformation of minority rights 
in Bulgaria. The minority leaders promoted inter-ethnic coexistence via peaceful means 
at the Bulgarian and European public sphere. The exercise of the rights of Turkish 
community as equal citizens and their participation on economic, political and social life 
in the country constituted the main pillars of emerging political discourse.243 Dogan’s 
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unequivocal rejection of all forms of political violence and “all kind of maximalist 
demands”244 also strengthened the hands of pro-reformist Bulgarian leaders, first and 
foremost consolidated the position of President Zhelyu Zhelev who acted as a norm 
entrepreneur that promoted inter-ethnic moderation, by way of providing assurance about 
the intentions of Turkish minority elites.  
The moderation at the elites-level paved the way for a constructive path that 
informed a virtuous cycle of reform activism in the rest of the decade. Accordingly, 
Turkish minority gradually restored their fundamental rights thanks to a series of political 
reforms during the 1990s.245 The government restored the rights of Turkish minority to 
use their original names and allowed the minority members to access formal education 
again.246 The restoration of the names and improvements in the educational rights of the 
Turkish community proved crucial at the time as it increased the legitimacy of the new 
regime in the eyes of minority community members.247  
One can suggest that the new political institutions established in the post-
democratisation process, along with the moderation of minority and majority elites, acted 
as important factors as a result of which European norms made their way into the 
political agenda in Bulgaria. At the very least, the institutional representation of Turkish 
minority in the Parliament catapulted the Turkish party into an effective veto point and 
‘king maker’ in coalition building and policy-making processes. The new institutional 
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equilibrium therefore accelerated the reform momentum in the area of minority rights that 
secured the position of Turkish community and helped them to make their voice heard 
again.  
The representation of the MRF in the Bulgarian Parliament provided opportunities 
to follow the legislation processes closely and express their dissent through the use of 
official channels. For instance, the MRF members in the Parliament, contributed to the 
intellectual content of the new Constitution, which secured religious freedom (article 13) 
and respect and tolerance toward believers from different religions (article 37).248 As a 
result of the restoration of the religious rights, mosques were reopened and the 
publication of the Quran, wholly book of Islam, was legalised – two developments that 
facilitated reducing mutual prejudices based on faith and religion, which in turn, 
contributed inter-ethnic moderation.249  
The 1990s also brought about the gradual recovery of ethno-linguistic rights of 
Turkish minority. To start with, complex legal procedure of retaking original Turkish 
names was streamlined. The MRF pursued an active policy in the Parliament to reform 
the bureaucratic aspects of the name restoration policy. Following the changes in the law, 
more than 600,000 Bulgarian citizens with Turkish origin applied to the state authorities 
to restore their original names.250 The Bulgarian state officials also pursued a conciliatory 
approach regarding the establishment of private schools providing education in Turkish 
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language and encoded an article in the new Constitution recognising the right of every 
citizen to flourish authentic cultures along the lines of ethnic self-identification.251       
The 1990s took a clear turn toward democratisation of Bulgaria’s minority 
policies that starkly contrasted with the repressive policies of the Communist regime.252 
The implementation of the reforms enshrined in legal documents, however, proved a 
challenging issue to put into implementation during 1990s. In the first years of transition, 
the UDF government (1991-1992) – supported by the MRF – demonstrated high 
willingness to put democratic reforms into implementation to accelerate Bulgaria’s 
convergence with Europe, which helped improving the status of Turkish minority as well.  
However, the mid-1990s witnessed frequent alternations of governments. 
Following the political turbulence with the fall of the pro-reform UDF government and 
after two years rule of non-party “government of experts”, the BSP managed to form the 
government in 1995 under the premiership of Zhan Videnov (see table 3.1). The BSP 
government appointed Ilcho Dimitrov, one of the figures backing Zhivkov’s assimilation 
policies, as the Minister of Education. Dimitrov pursued a restrictive policy towards 
Turkish minority in the field of education by increasing the ministerial surveillance over 
Turkish schools and shifting the status of Turkish classes into electives as part of 
significant changes in curricula. The change in the status and hours of Turkish classes 
lead to major drops in attendance rates.253Some other implementation problems also 
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remained to be addressed in the areas of public broadcasting, mass publications, and 
cultural affairs during the EU accession process (see chapter 4).254 














BSP 47.15 33.14  43.502 
 
22.074 
UDF  36.21 34.36  24.23 
 
52.265 






3.86  6.513 
 Fatherland Front       
Fatherland Party of 
Labour 
0.60 
0.311     




  4.73   
 
* Care-taker government by a non-party government of experts as Liuben Berov and Reneta Indzhova 
as the Prime Minister.  
** Care-taker government as Stefan Sofiyanski the Prime Minister 
1 Coalition of the Bulgarian National Union (BNS) composed of Bulgarian Fatherland Party and New 
Democracy Bulgarian National Union 
2 Democratic Left a Coalition - BSP + Bulgarian National Agrarian Union 'Alexander Stamboliiski' and 
Ecoglasnost Political Club 
3 Popular Union of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union + the Democratic Party 
4 Democratic Left a Coalition - BSP + Ecoglasnost Political Club 
5Alliance of Democratic Forces led by UDF + DP, BZNS, BSDP 
6 Alliance of National Salvation - Movement for Rights and Freedoms + Bulgarian Agrarian National 
Union ‘Nikola Petkov’, Green Party, Party of the Democratic Centre, New Choice, Federation of the 
Bulgarian Kingdom 
Threshold: 4% 
Governments of Bulgaria, 1990 - 2001 
1990: BSP-UDF Coalition – PM Dimitar Iliev Popov, independent  
1991: UDF – PM Philip Dimitrov, UDF supported by MRF as being the third Party in the Parliament 
and no others achieved %4 threshold. 
1992-94: Care-taker government 
1994: Democratic Left – PM Zhan Videnov, BSP 
1997: Care-taker government 
1997: UDF – PM Ivan Kostov, UDF 
Source: European Election Database, http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database  
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This section argued so far that Bulgaria’s smooth transition to democracy and the 
emergence of a minority-friendly environment became possible mainly due to the double 
moderation that took place between minority and majority leaders who acted as 
spearheads of inter-ethnic conciliation. The leaders on both sides managed to articulate a 
coherent narrative that brought the dissatisfied actors (with the existing minority policies) 
together under common set of values. Yet, what informed the emergence of an alternative 
set of values that formed the basis of minority friendly rhetoric? The next section 
discusses whether and in which ways the EU acted as a facilitator in promoting minority 
rights reforms in Bulgaria, which constitutes the second aspect of two-level model 
developed in the conceptual chapter.     
 
3.3.2. External conditionality: EU-led pressure  
	
Chapter 2 suggested that EU conditionality is not straightforward in the area of minority 
rights, as the EU does not have explicit codifications. Thus EU conditionality on the 
minority rights policies is likely to vary across cases and time. In this dissertation, it is 
hypothesised that if the external pressure is high, i.e. the EU consistently promotes proper 
implementation of minority rights reforms in return for credible rewards, and if the 
domestic dissatisfaction of the current minority policies is high, it is more likely that 
Europeanisation has deeper and long-lasting impacts on the minority rights reforms in 
new member and candidate countries. As discussed above, the evidence suggests that in 
the post-Communist era, the high level of domestic dissatisfaction reflected and 
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mobilised by the majority and minority representatives in Bulgaria created a strong 
impetus for substantial changes. The newly emerging political equilibrium also 
underpinned by the EU and other European organisations through direct and indirect 
mechanisms as the European anchor provided material incentives and normative 
templates for political elites, which in turn, paved the way for significant learning effect 
in the Bulgarian case.  
Following the collapse of Communism, the new Bulgarian elites put integration 
with Europe as a strategic goal. The EU, as the central European organisation, became 
the main political reference point of the pro-reform elites throughout the 1990s. The 
political elites in Bulgaria tried too hard to transform Bulgaria’s economic and political 
system accordingly.255 As Bechev argued, despite the EU was considered as an attractive 
actor, it should be underlined that the “membership was not a decisive force in Bulgarian 
politics during those truly formative years.”256 However, the minority and majority 
leaders’ framing of the EU as a common denominator boosted its legitimacy and leverage 
unparalleled to the direct material benefits. At the very beginning of the transition, 
Europe emerged as the only actor that was considered as a viable option for the new 
Bulgarian elites. Integration with Europe became one of the rare common targets that all 
ex-communists, UDF leadership, and Turkish minority representatives agreed on.  
On the majority side, the incoming ruling elite supported liberal democracy and 
functioning market economy as an alternative to the state-led planning economy model. 
Given the fact that Communist regimes were collapsing across the world and Bulgaria 
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was too small and economically underdeveloped to survive without allies, being part of 
the Euro-Atlantic bloc became most sustainable policy alternative. Despite frequent 
changes in government in the first half of 1990s, Bulgaria’s links with the EU improved 
consistently.257 On the minority side, the European project constituted the main macro-
goal to avoid turning back to the suppressive policies of the Zhivkov regime. In one of 
his speeches, for instance, Ahmed Dogan put this point in an unequivocal manner. On 
November 4, 1991 Dogan pointed out that the EU anchor and the Europeanisation of 
Bulgarian political area remained at the centre of MRF’s political strategy:    
The Movement for Rights and Freedoms is for guaranteeing social peace in the 
Republic of Bulgaria, as well as for making democratisation an irreversible 
process in the complete Europeanisation of the country’s political and 
parliamentary life.258 
 
The EU leverage over Bulgaria increased gradually over the years. The first 
formal relations between the parties were established with the Convention on Trade, 
Business and Economic Relations signed in May 1990. Shorty afterwards, Bulgaria also 
joined Phare, 259 which was administered by the European Commission as a development 
aid programme to support pre-accession convergence of the CEECs with their western 
European peers.260 Bulgaria joined the Phare scheme in 1990, which was re-structured in 
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2008 as part of the accession negotiations. The Bulgarian governments received a total of 
€2.36 billion commitments in total over pre-accession era.261 The Bulgarian economy 
was in a very precarious situation in the post-Communist period and the EU’s financial 
support proved crucial to keep the fragile Bulgarian economy afloat. The material support 
of the EU, on the other hand, was attached to a set of political conditionality – similar to 
other CEECs candidate states.262  
EU-Bulgaria relations were further consolidated with the Europe Agreement 
signed between the parties on 8 March 1993. The Europe Agreement articulated the 
linkage between material support and political conditionality in the realm of human rights 
and democratisation in a clear way. For instance, the document makes direct reference to 
“respect for the democratic principles and human rights” (article 6) as a constitutive 
aspect of the bilateral exchange relationship that link government’s progress in human 
rights and democratisation with the flows of technical and financial assistance to 
Bulgaria.263 
EU conditionality on minority issues started to emerge as part of EU’s approach 
toward aspiring states in early 1990s. In December 1993, the Copenhagen European 
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Council delineated the main framework according to which new enlargement decisions 
would take place. The European leaders specified political criteria, economic criteria and 
the adoption of the acquis as three main pillars of external conditionality.264 The 1993 
Presidency Conclusions also pointed out in an explicit manner that “associated countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European 
Union.”265 The EU’s decision to enlarge eastward also motivated the Bulgarian political 
elite to apply for the membership in 1995. The developments in the aftermath, however, 
proved that Bulgaria’s European path was not straightforward due to political and 
economic reasons. Similar to several other post-Soviet countries, Bulgaria also 
experienced deep economic transformations while trying to adjust its economy to free 
market principles.266 The Berov (1992-1994) and Videnov (1994-1997) governments, 
however, hesitated to implement the reform templates of the external creditors, which 
recommended large-scale liberalisations, reducing red tape and rent-seeking activities in 
the management of domestic economy. The state capacity and power vacuum problems 
that were exacerbated with the collapse of Yugoslavia also opened up a space for 
criminal networks – protected by the political elite and state bureaucrats. The expansion 
of corruption, the failure of economic modernisation and market-repressing intervention 
of the state paved the way for a deep economic crisis in 1997, which lead to the surge of 
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inflation, banking crisis, massive street protests, and the collapse of the Videnov-led BSP 
government.267        
Bulgaria’s plunge into a very serious economic crisis catapulted the EU into a 
more central position in domestic politics. Under such conditions, the EU financial aid 
and the membership prospects turned into a vital stabilising factor in the short and 
medium term for the Bulgarian elite. The new UDF-led government, formed by Ivan 
Kostov after the early April 1997 elections, adopted even a more pro-European policy 
stance – putting the EU and NATO at the forefront in domestic and foreign affairs. The 
Bulgarian president at the time, Petar Stoyanov, also argued that the EU membership is a 
“civilizational choice” for Bulgaria.268 From the EU’s point of view, Bulgarian elite’s 
willingness to conform to the EU conditionality was considered as leverage to promote 
democratisation through effective issue linkage strategy. On that note, the EU demanded 
the ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(FCPNM) – a very sensitive issue with considerable potential to trigger anxiety among 
nationalist segments of the society. As discussed in chapter 2, in fact, Council of Europe 
adopted FCPNM but the EU codified the Convention as part of its conditionality 
concerning the protection of minorities in candidate states. Bulgarian Parliament ratified 
the FCPNM to clear its path as the EU enlargement process was gaining momentum 
following the agreement on Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. Zhelyu Zhelev underlined this 
point in our interview as follows:  
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The principle institution involved in resolving this ethnic, minority and human 
rights issues is the Council of Europe (CoE). The CoE supports the human rights, 
freedom, and democracy. The EU incorporated the CoE principles. Therefore, 
Framework Convention has become the most important tool for improving 
minority regime in Bulgaria.269  
 
The Turkish minority also benefitted from the EU-factor to improve and 
consolidate their rights. Right form the initial phases, Ahmed Dogan adopted pro-EU 
rhetoric and the EU became the normative focal point for Zhelev and Dogan to frame 
minority friendly reforms. Thus, EU conditionality on minority rights enjoyed high level 
of domestic ownership in Bulgarian politics. The EU succeeded to form pro-reform 
domestic coalitions to keep its pressure pertinent without suffering from major legitimacy 
problems at the domestic-level. Baeva and Kalinova pointed out the role of the EU in 
furthering the rights of Turkish minority as follows:   
The EU role with regard to the ethnic relations can be detected in the pressure that 
it exerts for keeping the minorities’ rights. It was especially true during the 1990s, 
when the EU position was that the MRF presence in the Parliament was a 
necessary condition for Bulgaria to proceed with the negotiations. A number of 
Bulgarians voted for the MRF on purpose, fearing that should it lose its presence 
in the National Assembly, this would hamper Bulgaria’s integration process. The 
MRF made use of this tendency. In Bulgaria, the EU is regarded as a defender of 
the minorities.270  
 
As a result, Bulgaria signed the Framework Convention immediately in October 
1997 and ratified in the Parliament after 2 years in May 1999. However, it had become a 
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hotly debated issue in Bulgarian politics and the ratification process proved difficult due 
to the resistance of pro-status quo forces. A group of Bulgarian MPs applied to the 
Constitutional Court on the ground that the Convention did not conform to the Bulgarian 
Constitution, as there were no “national minorities” in Bulgaria to whom to grant 
collective rights. The Constitutional Court, once again, played a critical role in defending 
the legal fundamentals of the Bulgarian ethnic model by rejecting the application of pro-
nationalist parliamentarians. The candidacy status of Bulgaria and the European 
Commission’s clear position on the subject matter informed the decision of the 
Constitutional Court at a critical juncture. As a result, Framework Convention was put 
into implementation in 1999 as major political parties in the Parliament agreed on its 
ratification. The MRF played a crucial role during the ratification process in the 
Parliament. The MRF leaders tried to act moderately to convince majority representatives 
that the FCPNM would serve in the best interest of all Bulgarian citizens rather than 
being an instrument to undergird minority nationalism and self-determination. To show 
the benign intentions, a reservation to the Convention was added during the ratification 
phase, which was drafted by MRF representatives.271 The reservation reads as follows:  
Confirming its adherence to the values of the Council of Europe and the desire for 
the integration of Bulgaria into the European structures, committed to the policy 
of protection of human rights and tolerance to persons belonging to minorities, 
and their full integration into Bulgarian society, the National Assembly of the 
Republic of Bulgaria declares that the ratification and implementation of the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities do not imply any 
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right to engage in any activity violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
the unitary Bulgarian State, its internal and international security.272 
 
 In conclusion, the EU’s insistence on the Framework Convention and the 
Bulgaria’s willingness to comply with the EU regulations constituted a crucial turning 
point in terms of the status of Turkish minority in the country. As Rechel suggested, for 
the first time, it was explicitly acknowledged that national minorities exist in Bulgaria 
and their rights were put under legal protection.273  
 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the transformation of minority rights policies in Bulgaria with 
particular reference to 1989-1999. The two-level model was elaborated on this chapter to 
assess the causal significance of domestic and EU-level factors in the process. 
Accordingly, first, it was demonstrated that the high degree of domestic dissatisfaction 
concerning the minority policies of the Communist regime created a strong impetus on 
the side of domestic actors to reconsider their preferences. The interview data suggested 
that the majority and minority leaders, as change-agents, played crucial role in assuring 
double moderation – thereby, ensuring peaceful transformation. The EU, in this context, 
became the main external anchor acted as the focal point in terms of legitimate norms and 
guiding principles in the minority rights regime. The new Bulgarian elite on the majority 
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and minority sides did not only reformulate policy instruments but also redefined the 
entire policy sets in line with broader European norms and standards. Second, the EU 
promoted Bulgaria’s transformation toward democratisation and put importance to the 
state of minority rights as part of Copenhagen criteria and other European regulatory 
frameworks. The combination of strong willingness at the domestic sphere and the 
facilitating role of the EU paved the way for peaceful transformation of minority-majority 
relations in Bulgaria, which poses a solid counter-example to the mainstream 
Europeanisation frameworks.        
This chapter also revealed that the main causal mechanisms through which EU 
factor played its role were more than mere instrumental learning. As highlighted in the 
relevant parts of the chapter, the interview data and field research suggest that the 
majority and minority elites in Bulgaria passed through a socialisation process that 
resulted in the change of policy goals, rather than just policy instruments. A possible 
rapprochement with the EU was considered positively by the Bulgarian elite to boost the 
welfare of the country and increase the legitimacy of new political agenda they pursue. In 
this vein, adopting European norms and values, codified as democratisation and 
promotion of human rights, became a central aspect of the political debate. The EU 
norms were considered as a new form of collective identity of the emerging ruling elites 
vis-à-vis the former elites promoting status quo. The combinative impact of domestic 
dissatisfaction and moderate but contextually critical external anchor role of the EU 







CHAPTER IV. Reform and Stagnation of Minority Rights in Bulgaria (1999-2017) 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the transformation of minority rights policies in Bulgaria during 
1999-2017. The chapter divides post-1999 into two major sub-periods, which are 1999-
2007 and 2007-2017. The first sub-period covers the EU candidacy period of Bulgaria 
and deserves a separate analysis, as EU conditionality appears to be highly effective in 
informing domestic transformations across a wide range of policy areas – including 
Bulgaria’s minority rights policies. The external conditionality is attached to sizeable 
benefits for Bulgarian political elites, as membership became a likely policy option. The 
chapter, however, demonstrates that the rights of the Turks of Bulgaria were not 
improved as much as during the early phases of Bulgaria’s Europeanisation (1989-1999)– 
a critical period that was discussed in the previous chapter. This refers to a puzzle in the 
sense that candidacy process reflects the episode during which the EU is expected to have 
very high leverage due to the credibility of reform conditionality attached to sizable 
membership reward. This chapter explains the reasons why this was not the case in the 
Bulgarian example by applying two-level model sketched out in this dissertation.     
The next section discusses the transformation of minority rights policies in 
Bulgaria during the candidacy process. The third section concentrates on the post-
membership process and explores the mechanisms and limits of EU conditionality in a 
member country in which minority issues still considered as ‘a work in progress.’ This 
chapter interrogates how EU-led pressure and domestic political preferences interacted 
and informed the outcomes of Europeanisation during the candidacy and post-
membership processes. The final part concludes the chapter.  
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4.2. The candidacy process (1999-2007): Reform and resistance 
As demonstrated in chapter 3, integrating with the European structures became a major 
policy target for Bulgarian elites since the collapse of the communist regime. In 
December 1990, the Bulgarian Parliament passed a resolution that clearly exhibited 
Bulgarian rule makers’ eagerness to join the European Economic Community.274 The EU 
also included Bulgaria in all European programs starting from early 1990s, including 
Phare and Europe Agreements. In this context, one of the critical turning points was the 
Copenhagen European Council in December 1993.275 Encouraged by the decision taken 
by the EU member states at the time, Bulgarian government applied to the membership 
along with other aspiring states in the region. Four years after its official application and 
following the European Commission opinion, Bulgaria was declared a candidate state at 
the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. The emphasis put on the security and stability of 
the region in Helsinki was quite illuminative that hinted the driving motivation of the EU 
toward eastern enlargement: 
Determined to lend a positive contribution to security and stability on the 
European continent and in the light of recent developments as well as the 
Commission’s reports, the European Council has decided to convene bilateral 
intergovernmental conferences in February 2000 to begin negotiations with 
Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta on the conditions for 
their entry into the Union and the ensuing Treaty adjustments.276 
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The accession negotiations spanned a period of approximately 53 months (15 
February 2000-15 June 2004), which constitutes one of the most intense episodes of 
external conditionality in the history of the country. Bulgarian government signed the 
Accession Treaty on 25 April 2005 and the Bulgarian Parliament ratified the Treaty in 
two weeks, which was symbolic in terms of demonstrating the willingness of Bulgarian 
political elites to join the EU. Finally, Bulgaria became a member state at the beginning 
of 2007. The 1999-2007 period, therefore, refers to one of the episodes that the EU 
leverage over Bulgaria increased significantly. Bulgaria’s minority rights policies and the 
state of the Turkish minority also became a contested issue during the candidacy process. 
The next section discusses the transformation of Bulgaria’s minority rights regime in this 
period to assess the degree of Europeanisation with particular reference to the interaction 
between EU-led conditionality and changing preferences of majority-minority ruling 
elites at the domestic field. 
 
4.2.1. External dynamics: EU-led pressure 
The conceptual framework developed in this dissertation proposes that Europeanisation 
in a particular policy area becomes sustainable when the EU promotes substantial reforms 
in a consistent way. Thus, the degree of EU-led pressure and the ways in which the EU 
conditionality is exercised constitutes one aspect of the two-level framework. The data, in 
this respect, suggest that the EU promoted the protection of and respect for the rights of 
minorities in Bulgaria during candidacy process. The EU institutions, in particular the 
European Commission, underlined the importance of compliance with EU regulations 
concerning minority rights in its regular progress reports. Chapter 2 maintained that EU 
relies on three main documents to promote minority rights in member and candidate 
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states: Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM), Race 
Equality Directive, and Copenhagen criteria as a general template on democratisation, 
human rights and minority protection. These regulations also constituted the cornerstone 
of the EU’s relations with Bulgaria in the post-candidacy process.  
FCPNM constitutes the basic document for the protection of minority rights that 
frame the basic rights of the minority communities and requirements for the 
governments. As discussed in the previous chapter, Bulgarian government signed the 
FCPNM in 1997, but ratification process triggered a nation-wide controversy in the 
political sphere. As stated in chapter 3, the ultra-nationalist members of Bulgarian 
parliament applied the Constitutional Court to revoke the ratification of the Framework 
Convention on the ground that the term “national minority” violates the sovereignty of 
the Bulgarian state and provides opportunities for the minority groups, first and foremost 
the Turkish minority, to legitimise their secessionist agenda.277       
The Constitutional Court, considering Bulgaria’s candidacy status and due to the 
clear signals that the EU sent to the Bulgarian ruling elite, rejected the appeal of 
nationalist deputies.278 At the same time, the MRF members adopted a very conciliatory 
stance to appease the public and encourage their Bulgarian counterparts to ratify the 
Convention. Ahmed Hussein, the then MRF deputy of the parliamentary working 
committee for ratification of Framework Convention at that time, described the scale of 
the dissent as follows: “It created a great anxiety over the society and led to harsh debates 
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in the Parliament.”279 The main concern of the Bulgarian political elite was that 
ratification of the Convention would jeopardise Bulgaria’s territorial integrity. The EU, 
however, tilted the balance in favour of the pro-reform coalitions that lead to the 
ratification of Framework Convention.280 
In practice, the ratification of FCPNM did not have an impact in terms of 
encouraging the minorities toward secession. On the contrary, as suggested in the 
previous chapter, the Turkish minority elite, in another critical juncture, adopted a 
minimalist approach to demonstrate that the MRF does not seek for autonomy or any 
other forms of secession. Furthermore, the Bulgarian government dragged its fee in terms 
of the implementation of the Convention as it took more than five years to adopt an 
action plan specifying the mechanisms through which the regulations adopted in FCPNM 
would be implemented.281 The report (2003) prepared by Bulgarian state to be submitted 
to the Council of Europe clearly transpired the implementation gaps. The European 
Commission highlighted its concerns regarding the implementation of the Framework 
Convention from the early stages of the negotiations. The Bulgarian government, in 
response, had to accept that no specific steps were taken to develop a wholly effective 
minority rights regime complying with the FCPNM.282 To address the concerns of the 
EU, as a result, the Bulgarian government established the National Council on Ethnic and 
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Demographic Issues in 1997 and appointed experts from minority representatives to 
develop action plans with regards to the improvement of minority standards in the 
country.  
Second, the EU asked for the adoption and effective implementation of the Race 
Equality Directive (Council Directive 2000/43), a key document that aims to tackle racial 
and ethnic discrimination and inequalities in member and candidate states. The Directive, 
which became part of the EU minority rights repertoire in 2000, underlined “the principle 
of equal treatment” (article 1).283 As such, the EU states were requested to take all 
necessary measures to mitigate all forms of discrimination in labour markets, education, 
and recourse to public funds. In its regular reports, European Commission highlighted the 
importance of Race Equality Directive to integrate the social status of the minority 
communities in Bulgaria. In subsequent European Commission reports (2000, 2001, 
2002) the EU highlighted shortcomings and constantly reminded Bulgaria to adopt the 
Directive with regard to the anti-discrimination agenda. As a matter of fact, the principle 
of non-discrimination is guaranteed in the Constitution of Bulgaria. However, it was not 
substantiated with comprehensive legal framework to ensure equal treatment in different 
areas. The European Commission pointed out this by stating that “comprehensive anti-
discrimination legislation has still not been adopted and anti-discrimination acquis has 
still not been transposed.”284 The EU’s assertive stance on anti-discrimination as part of 
conditionality compelled the Bulgarian government to adopt a new set of regulations that 
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aim to eliminate all forms of discrimination. The government, along these lines, 
established a consultative body, The Commission for Protection against Discrimination, 
which started to function in early 2004. Furthermore, as a symbolic gesture, a member of 
Turkish minority community, Kemal Eyüp, was appointed as the first chairman of the 
Commission. As Eyüp stated the establishment of the Commission as an important step to 
document the discrimination cases, though problems were not always addressed 
effectively due to the non-binding nature of the Commission:           
 
 The Commission was established upon the request of the EU. The tasks and 
scope of the Commission were not clear. Immediately after its establishment, 
several cases of discrimination were reported. We investigated all cases, however, 
we did not have much to do about the complaints. We simply did not have 
authority apart from recording these discriminatory practices.285  
 
The Turkish minority community welcomed the Race Equality Directive and 
other anti-discriminatory measures due to two main reasons. First, the Bulgarian state, by 
taking steps concerning anti-discrimination conditionality, implicitly accepted the 
problems with regards to the integration of minority communities into the Bulgarian 
social and economic life. Second, the Turkish minority encountered significant degrees of 
discrimination due to the poor socio-economic conditions.286 As overwhelming majority 
of Turkish minority community are less well educated, living in rural areas, and earn 
lower than average ethnic Bulgarian citizen, they are likely to face discrimination and 
exclusion more frequently than the rest of the society.287  
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The EU noted the developments and assessed the government’s performance with 
regards to the inclusion of minority communities during the candidacy process on a 
regular basis. The 2004 progress report, for example, pointed out the necessity to advance 
“the socio-economic situations of Turkish and Roma minority in the country.”288 The 
European Commission, in its report on the preparedness of Bulgaria for membership 
published just before accession, also pointed out the necessity to improve the functioning 
of National Council for Cooperation on Ethnic and Demographic Issues.289  
In addition to the codification of basic EU regulations in the subject matter, the 
EU also pointed out the necessity to expand the cultural rights of minority groups during 
the candidacy process. In response, the Bulgarian government introduced a set of 
improvements to meet the EU conditionality. In theory, the cultural rights of Turkish 
minority were secured in the Constitution enacted in 1991, such as broadcasting in native 
language at local and national radio and TVs, however, the actual means of conducting 
these rights were not provided till 2000s. For example, broadcasting in Turkish language 
was only introduced in 2000 following the EU demands. Accordingly, short (12 minutes) 
afternoon summaries of the news in Turkish language became part of the broadcast 
streaming of the state television, BNT.290 In a similar vein, the government decided to 
dedicate a section on Turkish literature in Sofia City Library in June 2004, which was 
considered as a symbolic step toward peaceful co-existence of minority and majority 
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cultures.291 The EU conditionality, therefore, went beyond the minimum legal adoption of 
relevant legal documents in the minority rights area but expanded to the cultural and 
collective rights of the Turkish minority.  
The “political opportunity structure,” opened at this stage of Bulgaria’s 
integration with the EU, however, could not be exploited by the Turkish minority to the 
fullest extent due to changing preferences of the minority ruling elite in Bulgaria – a 
point to be discussed in detail below. According to Izzet Ismailov, the editor in chief of 
Turkish News Broadcasting Service at BNT, for instance, “the rights of Turks were 
granted during 1990s and we [Turkish minority] did not ask for further. Then, in 2000s, 
the EU asked for more rights on behalf of us [Turkish minority]. In return, Bulgarian 
government enacted a set of regulations. Yet just ask the Turkish minority whether they 
are aware of their rights. Most of them cannot answer as they were not properly 
informed.”292  
 
4.2.2. Bulgarian ethnic model challenged: Shifting domestic preferences 
The literature suggests that the EU leverage increases significantly during the candidacy 
process since membership emerges as the most important reward informing the 
compliance tendency of the ruling elite in target states.293 The candidacy process also 
constituted the most intense period that the EU’s impact shaped Bulgarian politics. The 
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EU membership became an across-the-party target in Bulgaria; thereby, political 
preferences of the majority and minority elites aligned towards the EU’s reform 
templates.  
The interview data, however, suggest that mainly instrumental learning and 
tactical rule compliance informed the shifts in the preferences of the Bulgarian policy 
makers between 1999 and 2007. However, the changing domestic preferences deserve 
deeper analysis. Why intense double moderation was replaced with tactical rule 
compliance despite increasing external conditionality? The following section focuses on 
majority and minority elites to account for this intriguing trend.   
 
4.2.2.1. Bulgaria’s difficult path to the EU 
 
The adoption of the EU regulations was considered a necessity to avoid Bulgaria’s 
isolation from the newly emerging regional order in Europe. Following the initial signs 
that the EU was not willing to include Bulgaria and Romania as part of the Central and 
Eastern European enlargement, this sense of urgency became more pronounced. As a 
matter of fact, in earlier official assessments of the political and economic situation in 
Bulgaria, the European Commission did not consider Bulgaria’s performance satisfactory 
especially in terms of the rule of law and the quality of the governance. The EU criticised 
the treatment of minorities and socially excluded groups in Bulgaria, suggesting “that 
there have been only slight changes in the respect of minority rights and the protection of 
minorities.”294 From an economic point of view, in its Opinion in 1997, the European 
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Commission also stressed that Bulgaria was not in a position to withstand the competitive 
market economies of other EU members especially due to the widespread corruption and 
dire economic conditions. 
Bulgaria’s progress in the creation of a market economy has been limited by the 
absence of a commitment to market-oriented economic policies; it would not be 
able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the 
medium term.295  
Bulgaria was not included in the group formed by Central and East European 
countries to start accession negotiations at the Luxembourg European Council in 
December 1997. However, geopolitical factors worked in favour of Bulgaria’s EU bid. 
The EU decided to begin accession talks with Bulgaria at the Helsinki European Council 
in December 1999 since “compared to the conflict-torn region of the Western Balkans, 
Bulgaria [and Romania] stood as positive examples, which the EU wanted to play up in 
order to send signal to the rest of the region that choosing the path of reform paid off.”296 
A possible exclusion from the rest of the peer countries in the region forced the Bulgarian 
political elites to comply with the reform demands of the EU.297 On that note, prospective 
membership was linked to a strict ‘stick’ policy that promoted comprehensive reforms in 
a number of areas. In addition to the economic reforms, Bulgarian government 
accelerated the adoption of EU regulations regarding minority rights. Accordingly, both 
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the Union of Democratic Forces (1997-2001) and National Movement Simeon II (2001-
2005) governments implemented the reform packages that were discussed in the previous 
section as part of the EU conditionality in the minority rights area.  
As a matter of fact, in the post-2000, the Bulgarian political elite felt under 
constant pressure in terms of adopting the EU regulations to remain in the enlargement 
agenda. The fear of a possible exclusion reached its zenith when it became apparent that 
Bulgaria would not be included in the 2004 big bang enlargement wave.298 The exclusion 
of Bulgaria for the second time triggered a new wave of reform activism on part of the 
government to meet the membership target in January 2007. As such, The Bulgarian 
government adopted a plan to implement the FCPNM only when the European 
Commission highlighted the issue in regular progress reports in 2002 and 2003. 
Similarly, the Commission underlined the need to strengthen the capacity of the National 
Council on Ethnic and Demographic Issues and urged the Bulgarian government to take 
initiative as part of Bulgaria’s potential membership in 2007. It is only after the explicit 
linkage strategy that connected membership with substantial improvements in the 
minority rights regime that Bulgarian government took necessary steps to comply with 
external conditionality. A senior representative from the Ministry of Interior, the 
Committee of the Minorities, stated that point as follows:  
 
With the EU candidacy, we changed our entire attitude to the minorities issue. 
Lots of financial sources released, lots of new measures introduced, a committee 
against discrimination formed among several other initiatives. The only problem 
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was over bureaucratisation, which means the proper implementation took longer 
time.299  
 
Thanks to the adoption of the acquis in several policy areas, including the 
legislation on the minority rights, Bulgaria declared an eligible state to join the EU with 
the Accession Treaty signed on 25 April 2005. The evidence suggests that instrumental 
cost-benefit analysis, rather than norm-driven extensive socialisation, explains the ruling 
elites’ approach to the adoption of the minority rights reforms during the candidacy 
process. The majority of the Bulgarian elite considered the EU membership as the only 
viable trajectory to avoid Bulgaria’s isolation in the region. Thus, the EU reforms were 
perceived as the necessary price to be paid to achieve this ultimate object. Lubov 
Panayotova, Director of European Institute puts this as follows: “EU membership was the 
most important goal for Bulgaria. This was an unquestioned consensus. All state 
resources were utilized to fulfil the criteria. The EU was the main driving force [in 
improving] majority-minority relations in Bulgaria.”300 The Bulgarian public also 
approached the minority rights reforms through the same lens. Antony Todorov from 
New Bulgarian University, similarly, pointed out “that EU was the main source of 
standards and rules in Bulgaria. There was a reward of membership. Some parts of the 
society accepted; some parts didn’t. However, during the accession negotiations, the EU 
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was considered as a panacea. It was the source of modernisation, democratisation and 
Westernisation.”301 
The tactical approach of the Bulgarian elite to the minority rights reforms is also 
evident in the minimalist nature of the reforms that the government adopted. The 
previous part maintained that the EU mainly concentrated on the essential minority 
regulations and did not put exclusive emphasis on the specific cultural and educational 
rights of the Turkish minority. Bulgarian policy makers did not include these particular 
issues into the reform agenda during the candidacy process since the EU did not 
explicitly request Bulgarian state to ensure the educational and cultural rights of the 
Turkish minority as part of membership conditionality.302  
 
4.2.2.2. Making sense of the MRF’s inaction? 
 
At this point, one should also concentrate on the preferences of the Turkish minority 
elites to explore how and to what extent the MRF leaders exploited the political 
opportunities that the EU provided in the candidacy process. As a matter of fact, the 
MRF’s approach to the promotion of the rights of Turkish minority proved puzzling 
during the candidacy process. The evidence suggests that the minority representatives did 
not take advantage of the Europeanisation processes to the fullest degree possible. The 
MRF did not opt for the naming and shaming and peer pressure strategies either, in any 
sense of the terms. The social learning mechanisms were not also discernible as it was the 
case in the 1989-1999 period. The only observable mechanism appeared to be selective 
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promotion of minority rights improvements that benefit the Turkish minority. It is 
puzzling as to why MRF did not utilise European-level instruments effectively to further 
the minority rights in Bulgaria even though it joined the governments as coalition partner 
in the first decade of 21st century. To address this puzzle, one should explore changing 
political preferences and priorities of the Turkish minority elite in the post-2000.  
The ruling elite of the MRF continued to pursue a conciliatory approach in this 
period to manage the expectations of the ethnic Bulgarians. Ahmed Dogan and his close 
aides cautiously kept the demands of Turkish minority from the early days of Bulgaria’s 
transition to democracy at minimum. The structure of the Bulgarian party politics appears 
as one of the main reasons that informed this cautious conciliation strategy. As Rechel 
pointed out Bulgaria’s Constitution does not explicitly accept the existence of national 
minorities in the country.303 Also, the establishment of political parties “on ethnic, racial 
or religious lines” (Article 14(4)) are prohibited. The Bulgarian Constitution, instead, 
refers to “citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian” and granted rights to these 
people “to study and use their own language alongside compulsory study of the Bulgarian 
language” (Article 36(2)). Since the MRF relied on Turkish electorate as its main 
constituency, the Party acted very cautiously to comply with the relevant articles of the 
Constitution and abstained from far-reaching minority demands.304  
The MRF always emphasised its tolerant and ally-seeking approach throughout 
1990s to accommodate itself within the new Bulgarian political system. For this purpose, 
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the Party cadres and Ahmed Dogan in particular, were extremely careful to include ethnic 
Bulgarians and members of other minority groups in the Party’s executive organs and 
nominate them in the Parliamentary elections. This approach became the guiding 
principle during Bulgaria’s EU candidacy as well. Especially starting from 2000s, Roma 
people were actively integrated into the Party. In June 2001 elections, the MRF ran as 
part of a coalition with EuroRoma and Liberal Union. This strategy proved successful in 
the sense that MRF managed to secure 7.45 per cent of total votes, which brought 21 
seats in the Parliament (see table 4.1). Due to its inclusive pre-election strategy, for the 
first time the MRF joined the coalition government with the former Bulgarian King 
Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha’s party – National Movement Simeon II, NMSII (2001-
2005).  
By 2000s, the MRF succeeded to become part of the mainstream political 
establishment in Bulgaria. Thanks to the strong support of the Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria, the MRF increased its vote share by receiving 12.8 per cent of the votes in June 
2005 Parliamentary elections (34 seats) and joined the coalition governments two times 
subsequently between 2001-2005 and 2005-2009. Therefore, the Turkish minority elites 
actively contributed to the reform processes at the Bulgarian Parliament. The MRF even 
succeeded to secure ministerial posts as a junior partner of the coalition governments. 
The Party obtained two ministerial posts in the NMSII government (2001-2005) and three 
ministerial positions in the following Bulgarian Socialist Party government (2005-2009). 
Being part of the government and attending the bilateral negotiations with the EU 
provided new opportunities for the MRF to contribute the agenda of the government in 
terms of shaping and implementing the EU-led minority reforms.  
	
129	
It is striking, however, that the MRF elite did not pursue an active strategy to 
utilize EU-level mechanisms despite several opportunities they had as a partner of the 
coalition government. One can therefore suggest that the ownership of minority reforms 
on part of the MRF remained weak during the candidacy process – and beyond. The MRF 
political elite, in a paradoxical manner, rejected to discuss the rights of Turkish minority 
at the EU platforms. Rather than utilising the EU as a platform to trigger ‘naming and 
shaming’ and ‘peer pressure mechanisms,’ the MRF described the EU as “an external 
actor” with respect to minority rights and conceptualised it as “an issue to be resolved 
domestically.”305 Ruşen Rıza, Deputy Head of MRF put this point as follows: 
The MRF is active in Bulgarian political life for more than 20 years. There is not 
any problem that we cannot solve with our Bulgarian colleagues. Why should we 
complain the EU about each other, then? Furthermore, the EU is an external actor. 
However, the minority issue is the domestic affair of us [in Bulgaria]. We can 
only produce a domestic solution to this issue.306  
 
Why did the MRF refrain to effectively utilise the EU platforms to support the 
rights of Turkish minority? Why did the Turkish minority elites hesitate to take 
advantage of the EU candidacy process to frame a proactive minority rights policy and 
support more in-depth democratisation and human rights reforms in Bulgaria? One can 
suggest that two factors explain the MRF’s unwilling stance to utilise the EU as a 
platform of agenda setting, norm-adoption, and social learning in the post-2000s. First, 
despite the coalition government called itself as the “government for European 
integration” and the MRF, as partner of the coalition government actively involved in the 
																																																						




policy-making processes, the priorities of the MRF ruling elite focused on entirely 
different areas. While adopting a minimalist approach in the field of minority rights, the 
MRF elite became part of the political contest to receive the EU pre-accession funds and 
receive its share in distributive politics along with the mainstream political parties. As a 
matter of fact, the MRF put exclusive emphasis on the material gains as “Ahmed Dogan 
paid special attention to the formation of young professionals, who were to deal with the 
realisation of pre-accession funds,” rather than prioritising minority issues.307 According 
to Müzekki Ahmet, Editor in Chief of Kırcaali Haber, the most influential Turkish 
newspaper in Bulgaria;  
The MRF emerged as the single political movement representing Turkish minority 
during 1990s, which was understandable at the time. The Party played a very 
positive role in defending the rights of the Turks. However, Turkish minority 
failed to multiply representative bodies to take advance of the EU platforms. The 
MRF did not allow this to happen due to its vested interests but also was not 
willing to represent the rights of the Turks, either.308  
 
While integration into the mainstream Bulgarian politics provided new 
opportunities for the MRF elite to become part of the establishment, this repositioning 
also led to the major shifts in terms of the political preference and priorities of the Party.  
Second, and complementary reason, is about the way in which MRF articulated 
political preferences as an outcome of political intra-party struggles. The MRF started to 
be criticised by certain segments of the Turkish minority on the ground that the Party 
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increasingly resembled a “business conglomerate” prioritising economic interests rather 
than actively searching for ways to enhance the rights of Turkish minority in the 
country.309 The electoral success of the MRF provided opportunities to join the Bulgarian 
government as a coalition partner. The Party elite therefore took advantage of the 
economic rents and became part of the distributive contests within Bulgarian political 
system. Despite an in-depth analysis of the intra-party organisation model of the MRF is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is apt to suggest at this point that the MRF 
gradually skipped the role of ethnicity-based cleavage politics as its main competitive 
advantage starting from early 2000s. One of the interviewees underlined this point as 
follows:  
MRF has developed as a financial corporation. Many business-rooted Bulgarians 
were integrated into the Party. They see its members as clients. It is not an ethnic 
or minority party anymore. And there are only a few NGOs and CTOs 
representing minorities and they suffer capacity problems.310 
 
Therefore, in a paradoxical manner, the MRF did not raise the cultural, economic, 
and religious concerns of the Turkish minority as fundamental problem areas at the 
Parliament. Also, the EU platforms were not exploited as opportunity structures during 
candidacy to raise awareness about the rights of Turkish minority. On the contrary, the 
Party elite framed the minority issues as Bulgaria’s “domestic problems” to be addressed 
at the Bulgarian Parliament, rather than the EU echelons. A senior political analyst also 
suggested, “that the MRF became a self-interested, corporation-like political party, not 
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protecting the rights of any minority groups. They were dishonest to their own 
supporters.”311  
As a result, in an environment that the minority representatives did not vividly 
articulate domestic dissatisfaction about the prevailing policies and the EU conditionality 
fell into infertile domestic ground, the European Commission adopted a rather restrictive 
approach in terms of the improvement of the rights of Turkish minority during candidacy 
process. The European Commission basically concentrated on the adoption of essential 
legislation concerning the protection of ethnic minority groups – Roma minority in 
particular. However, the extension of cultural rights of the minority groups was not 
monitored in a systematic manner. For instance, Progress Reports did not problematize 
the education rights of the Turkish minority, a policy area that is considered sine qua non 
for the full exercise of minority rights, so that the EU-led pressure in this particular area 
remained weak. As a result, Turkish minority’s demands to access education in native 
language remained unfulfilled.312 Krassimir Kanev, Head of Bulgarian Helsinki 
Committee also points out the gaps still remaining: “EU created an environment of equal 
rights, freedom of expression and non-discrimination. Bulgaria responded positively and 
introduced important legislative changes. Yet there remains a gap between practice and 
legislation.”313  
The decrease in the number of Turkish students in 2000s, for instance, emerged as 
an inevitable outcome of the policies pursued by the BSP government in mid-1990s. In 
December 1995, as discussed in chapter 3, the BSP government appointed Ilcho Dimitrov 
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as the Minister of Education. The appointment of Dimitrov was a very controversial 
decision, as he was one of the true supporters of assimilation campaign against Turkish 
minority in late 1980s. Dimitrov pursued a very strict surveillance policy by appointing 
inspectors to the regions where Turkish minority were living in great numbers. As the 
Minister of Education, Dimitrov assumed a critical and instrumental role in changing the 
status of Turkish classes to elective modules in the national curriculum that had huge 
negative ramifications on the school attendance levels of minority children. The 
attendance rates dropped dramatically for Turkish students after the curriculum change. 
According to the recent Council of Europe report, which draws on the data from the 
National Electronic Information System for Preschool and School Education, the number 
of Turkish students choosing to study their mother tongue decreased to 6,967.314 
Zhelyazkova points out that this figure was more than 114,000 in the initial periods of 
reconciliation process in early 1990s.315 The dramatic decline, according to Zhelyazkova, 
is mainly because of two factors. First one is related to “high ethno-cultural self-
confidence” of the Turkish minority concerning the Turkish language. Second, it is 
mainly due to the “double standards” that Turkish minority faced in the cultural and 
educational areas.316  
It is rather striking that the Turkish political elite did not raise the latter at the 
meetings with the EU institutions during accession process. Therefore, Turkish classes 
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are still offered as elective modules together with English, French and other foreign 
languages and only available for limited hours and tied to strict regulations in terms of 
hours offered and registered number of students. The underqualified instructors for 
Turkish classes and outdated textbooks remain as important challenges that Turkish 
minority children face at the schools.317 The educational rights and access to education 
still remains one of the problems of the Turkish minority. According to available data just 
2 per cent of the Turkish minority community have a university degree, which is far 
below the national average.318 
In summary, the shift in the priorities of the Turkish minority party, MRF, paved 
the way for missed opportunities in terms of deepening the cultural and educational rights 
of Turkish minority during Bulgaria’s candidacy process. As a result, the main 
(remaining) problems of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria were not addressed in the 
period in question. The shift in the priorities of the MRF ruling elite and intra-minority 
divisions on the political scene became more discernible especially in the post-
membership process, which will be discussed in detail below.        
 
4.3. Post-membership period (2007-2017): Stagnation, not reversal 
This section focuses on the dynamics of EU conditionality in the post-membership 
Bulgaria. Post-accession Bulgaria provides new evidence to explore causal significance 
of the EU and assess the mechanisms and endurance of external conditionality. 
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Hierarchical top-down approaches hypothesise slow-down in the implementation of 
reforms and even reversal under certain conditions due to the weakening of the EU 
anchor.319 As relevant strand of research maintains, external conditionality wanes as 
compliance-reward equilibrium is disturbed significantly in favour of the member 
states.320 As discussed in the introduction and will be re-visited in the conclusion, the 
recent democratic regression in East and Central Europe and increasing illiberalism 
appears to validate this proposition. The Bulgarian case, in this respect, deserves special 
attention because the ‘Bulgarian ethnic model’, despite challenges it encounters, proves 
relatively salient against the rising wave of de-Europeanisation in the rest of the region. 
In the post-membership process, therefore, the preferences of the domestic elite and the 
ways in which they frame the minority-majority issues prove significant factors that 
inform the domestic sources of rule compliance of target states. This section applies two-
level model to the post-membership Bulgaria to account for the recent developments in 
minority-majority relations.  
 
4.3.1. External dynamics: EU-led pressure 
Bulgaria joined the EU as a member state in 2007. Yet the country followed a different 
path in comparison to other member states that was not part of the conditionality 
repertoire in previous enlargement waves. As Bulgaria did not comply with the EU 
acquis completely as of the membership date, a special mechanism was put into 
implementation to assess Bulgaria’s post-membership compliance – entitled “cooperation 
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and verification mechanism.” The European Commission launched a post-accession 
monitoring process that specified relevant criteria for Bulgaria (and Romania) to remain 
under the monitoring of the European Commission. The mechanism was put into 
implementation was unprecedented in the history of European integration because the 
European Commission while recommending Bulgaria’s accession on January 1, 2007 
also linked membership to the condition that the EU should continue overseeing the 
Bulgarian government’s compliance with external conditionality.321 Accordingly, in the 
‘monitoring report’ prepared just before the accession in 2006, the Commission 
determined four specific areas to monitor: management of agricultural funds, aviation 
safety, judicial reform and fight against corruption.322 In the event of failure to comply 
with EU conditionality in any of the above requirements, alternative measures as 
“safeguard clauses” – such as sanctions and withdrawal of EU funds, included into the 
post-membership verification mechanism.323 The cooperation and verification 
instruments and extensive safeguard clauses, jointly, indicated the EU’s concerns about 
Bulgaria’s compliance performance.324     
One should state at this stage that post-accession monitoring did not have a direct 
impact on minority rights policies, as inter-ethnic issues were not part of the EU’s post-
																																																						
321 Linka Toneva-Metodieva, “Beyond the Carrots and Sticks Paradigm: Rethinking the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism Experience of Bulgaria and Romania,” Perspectives on European Politics and 
Society 15, no. 4 (2014): 534-551; For a critical assessment see Georgi Dimitrov et. al., eds., The 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism: Shared Political Irresponsibility between the European 
Commission and the Bulgarian Governments (Sofia: St. Kliment Ohridski University Press, 2014). 
322 European Commission, Monitoring Report on the State of Preparedness, section 3.3. 
323 Commission Decision 2006/929/EC of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation 
and verification of progress in Bulgaria to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and 
the fight against corruption and organized crime (OJ L 354, 14 December 2006).  
324 Gergana Nouthcheva, “Bulgaria and Romania’s Accession to the EU: Postponement, Safeguards and the 
Rule of Law,” CEPS Policy Briefs, no. 102 (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2006). 
	
137	
membership surveillance. Not surprisingly, therefore, the EU remained silent on the state 
of Turkish minority in the post-2007.325 As a matter of fact, the European Commission 
stated in its September 2006 Report that “for some aspects related to human rights, the 
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia will continue its monitoring 
after accession […] with respect to the fight against racism and related discrimination and 
to support of positive integration of minority communities.”326 However, the post-
accession conditionality remained almost non-existent as the state of Turkish minority 
was not raised as an issue in the Commission reports and the EU did not play substantive 
role in shaping the minority rights agenda of the Bulgarian governments – especially with 
regards to the state of Turkish minority.327 The positive minority rights in Bulgaria, 
therefore, remained to be a major concern for Turkish minority community. There has not 
been any significant improvement with regards to the ethno-linguistic and socio-
economic rights of the Turkish minority since Bulgaria’s accession to the EU. On that 
note, the integration into the socio-economic life in Bulgaria is still a fundamental 
question for the members of Turkish community, even for those who are well educated 
and highly qualified.328 It is striking that significant part of Turkish minority prefer to use 
Bulgarian names to find higher quality jobs, feel more secure, and provide better life for 
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their children.329 The post-membership, as such, marks the stagnation, but not reversal in 
any sense, of inter-ethnic relations in Bulgaria. 
 
4.3.2. Making sense of stagnation: Changing domestic preferences 
As part of the two-level model, to explain the post-accession dynamics, one should also 
assess the ways in which preferences of the domestic majority and minority elites 
evolved in the post-membership Bulgaria. The analysis of the shifting sands in the 
domestic realm proves crucial because the weakening EU anchor in the post-2007 does 
not explain the stagnation of the minority rights reforms in Bulgaria if one compares this 
process with the reform performance of the 1990s. As explained in the previous chapter, 
the Bulgarian political elite managed to implement substantial minority reforms in 1990s 
thanks to ‘double moderation’ and normative leverage of the EU even though the weak 
external minority conditionality at the time. However, the same trend did not take place 
in the 2000s and – especially following Bulgaria’s EU accession. What accounts for this 
paradox and how we can explain the shifting preferences of the domestic minority and 
majority representatives in the post-membership?  
This dissertation maintains that more than the weakening EU anchor, the shifting 
relationship between minority and majority elites explain the reform stagnation in 
contemporary Bulgaria. On the majority side, it appears that the shifting sands in the 
domestic political landscape dramatically altered the way in which Turkish minority is 
perceived by the mainstream political actors. The reforms undertaken as part of the EU 
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membership criteria and the MRF’s participation in the coalition governments for two 
consecutive terms in the post-2000 triggered a nationalist backlash in Bulgaria. Even 
though xenophobia remained a latent force, the anti-minority sentiments were not 
organised around political parties that managed to secure enough support from the voters 
in post-transition years. As Bell notes “all of the far-right parties combined were 
supported by less than 2 per cent of the electorate…[and] right-wing extremism did not 
rank on the list of the problems that Bulgaria has faced since the fall of communism.”330 
The situation, however, changed significantly in 2000s with Bulgaria’s integration with 
the EU. In a rather broader context, Auer argues that deepening of European integration 
process leads to rise of populism and ethno-centric nationalism in member states.331 A 
similar trend became discernible in Bulgaria in the period in question, especially 
following the unexpected performance of ATAKA party in 2005 elections. 
 ATAKA, which means ‘attack’ in Bulgarian language, participated in the 2005 
parliamentary elections just a few months after its establishment. The party, in a rather 
surprising manner, received 8.1 per cent of the total vote share and secured 21 seats in the 
Parliament. Furthermore, the charismatic founder and leader of the Party, Volen Siderov, 
succeeded to secure the second highest number of votes in the presidential elections took 
place in 2006. ATAKA also succeeded to secure seats in the European Parliament.332 The 
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party later aligned with “Coalition Patriotic Front” in 2014 and joined the ultra-nationalist 
coalition in 2017 with two other political parties, named “United Patriots” (see table 4.1). 
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GERB: Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria BSP: Bulgarian Socialist Party ATAKA: 
Attack Party MRF: Movement for Rights and Freedoms NDSV: National Movement Simeon II for 
Stability and Progress DSB: Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria BNS: Bulgarian People's Union UDF: 
United Democratic Forces Patriotic Front: Coalition of NFSB and IMRO United Patriots: Coalition 
of NFSB, IMRO, ATAKA ABV: Alternative for a Bulgarian Revival KB: Coalition for Bulgaria – led 
by BSP SDS: United Democratic Forces, coalition led by UDF  Siniata: The Blue Coalition RZS: 
Order, Lawfulness, Justice RB: Reformist Bloc including UDF. 
 




ATAKA portrays typical characteristics of an extreme-right party with its anti-
West, anti-elitist, and anti-minority discourse.333 The spectacular rise of ATAKA 
demonstrates that the establishment of a plural political system is a work in progress in 
the country and that the increasing visibility of minorities in the socio-political life 
strokes a sensitive nerve.  Kavalski underlines that ATAKA’s success relies on the party 
leader’s ability to translate popular unrest to political action at the national level by 
blending anti-minority rhetoric with nationalistic statements.334 The dominant discourse 
of the Party, which blended populist-nativism with anti-minority rhetoric, relied on 
nostalgia for the communist past.335 In this context, the anti-minority and anti-Turkish 
rhetoric was used to express growing dissatisfaction with the overall political situation. 
The European Commission also defined the ATAKA party as “anti-Turkish” and 
“xenophobic.”336 In one of his speeches, Siderov declared that even the name of the Party 
is selected deliberately to give a message to the Turkish minority. 
 
It comes from the Bulgarian attack on Edirne (Adrianople) on March 13, 1913, 
when the Bulgarian troops captured the most impregnable fortress of that time, the 
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pride of the German military machine… This is when the Bulgarian soldier […] 
showed incredible heroism.337      
 
 
ATAKA party mobilised its electorate by claiming that the privileged treatment of 
minorities during the EU membership process created inequalities in disfavour of the 
ethnic Bulgarians. The Party ruling elite constantly questioned the legitimacy of the MRF 
by framing it as the main party at the root cause of the problems in Bulgarian political 
life. Siderov did not hesitate to use pejorative terms in his speeches, where he frequently 
raised minority rights issues.338 He also lamented that the “treasonous acceptance of 
European minority rights legislation, which formed the basis of the Framework 
[Convention].”339 As a matter of fact, the nationalist circles in Bulgaria exploited the 
increasing visibility of the Turkish minority at the political life and exploited this as an 
opportunity to mobilise the Bulgarian majority. The rise of ATAKA also informed the 
changing perceptions of the mainstream parties vis-à-vis Turkish minority. Siderov, for 
instance, quite often underlined that the mainstream parties who established coalition 
governments with the MRF should be held responsible for the “Turkification of the 
country,” as “whole regions of Bulgaria, both culturally and administratively, are 
becoming Turkish.340 
The rise of ATAKA reshuffled the inter-ethnic relations in Bulgaria by 
jeopardising the compromise between majority and minority leaders. First of all, ATAKA 
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became a critical actor in Bulgarian Parliament following the 2009 elections as the 
minority government, European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), relied on the support 
of the far-right party. In return for its support, ATAKA received important posts in the 
Parliamentary committees. Even though ATAKA failed to protect the previous 
performance in terms of total vote shares – the vote rate of the party declined to 4.52 per 
cent, far-right parties continued to influence the political agenda, as the National Front 
for Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) managed to replace the ATAKA party. In fact, NFSB 
emerged as a splinter party from ATAKA and merged with another far-right party the 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) to form Coalition of Patriotic 
Front (PF). The PF attracted 7.28 per cent of the total votes in 2014 general elections and 
became coalition partner of the GERB government headed by Boyko Borisov.  
The march of the far-right parties into Bulgarian mainstream jeopardised the 
Bulgarian ethnic model and undermined the consensus on minority issues. For the first 
time since Bulgaria’s transition to democracy, anti-minority discourse has become 
organisationally represented in the Bulgarian Parliament. Furthermore, the rise of far-
right movements pushed the mainstream political parties toward relatively harsh stance 
concerning minority rights and migration policies. As Krastev pointed out “in Bulgaria 
extreme nationalism is surging, but the mainstream parties and governmental institutions 
are accommodating it instead of fighting it.”341 The leader of GERB, Bulgaria’s largest 
party and the current prime minister of Bulgaria, for instance, expressed his lukewarm 
approach to the Turkish and Roma minorities on several occasions. While acting as the 
Mayor of Sofia and informal leader of GERB, Borisov dubbed Zhivkov’s policies by 
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stating “the communist assimilation campaign against the Muslim population in Bulgaria 
in the 1980s had had right goals but the methods of its implementation were had been 
incorrect.”342 In one of his speeches in 2009, Borisov also stated that Bulgaria’s greatest 
problem is “bad human capital [as] one million Roma, 700,000 Turks, and 2.5 million 
retirees” form “the basis of “Bulgaria’s population.”343 Despite Bulgaria has not yet 
experienced significant institutional regression regarding the quality of democracy and 
state of minorities during the GERB government since 2014 as witnessed in Hungary and 
Poland, the positive minority agenda emerged during the 1990s lost its momentum and 
paved the way for stagnation in mid-2000s.344               
To account for the reversing trend in minority-majority consensus and explain the 
compliance puzzle in Bulgaria during post-membership, one should also analyse the 
dynamics of preference shifts on part of the minority ruling elite. The MRF, in the post-
2000s, became part of the political mainstream and a great deal of criticism directed 
toward the MRF elite from both the Bulgarian majority and Turkish minority. On the 
majority side, in addition to the far-right parties discussed above, the Bulgarian political 
establishment increasingly questioned the legitimacy of the MRF because of the growing 
clientelistic networks and its monopolistic position in Bulgarian politics. Mila Mancheva, 
Senior Analyst at Centre for the Study of Democracy suggested, “in 2000s, corruption 
and fake democracy [emerged as the main] issues [in Bulgaria] and MRF was the 
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forerunner of that model.”345 Despite lack of systematic data, the anecdotal evidence 
suggest that Ahmed Dogan has established very close and non-transparent relations with 
Bulgarian media moguls and businessmen that led to the spread of the corruption 
allegations.346 Dogan, in several different occasions, admitted his key role in distributing 
recourses and rents to the party loyalists. In an interview, for instance, Dogan claimed, 
“in the past 15 years, more than half of the businessmen [with] above medium-size 
[businesses] are established […] with my assistance or at most with my smile.”347 Dogan 
also stated that while the MRF was partner of the coalition government, he played a key 
role in distributing state resources: “The power is in my hands. I am the instrument of 
power that distributes the portions of financing in the state.”348      
On the minority side, the growing criticisms against Ahmed Dogan motivated 
some senior party members to break down the monopoly of the MRF and re-launch an 
assertive agenda to advance the rights of Turkish minority. Post-2010, as a result, 
witnessed the surge of splinter parties. The two leading figures of the MRF, Kasım Dal 
and Korman Ismailov, established the People’s Party for Freedom and Dignity (PPFD) in 
2012. Dal was the vice-chair of the MRF at the time and was the leading candidate to 
succeed Ahmed Dogan as the leader of the Party. However, Dal resigned from the party 
on the ground that in the 2000s, “the MRF acted half-heartedly and hypocritical in 
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defending the rights of Turkish minority.”349 Criticising weak intra-party democracy and 
lack of transparency, Dal argued, “the only concern of the MRF elite has become 
protecting their seats and exploiting their positions to make personal fortunes.”350 The 
PPFD, according to Dal and Ismailov, is established to expand the rights and increase the 
welfare of Turkish minority – “the concerns that are not the main priorities of the MRF 
anymore.”351 The PPFD leaders also pointed out the inertia of the MRF during Bulgaria’s 
candidacy process and implied that the MRF elite did not effectively use the emerging 
opportunity structures provided by the EU membership process. Kasım Dal maintained 
this point as follows: 
The number of students studying Turkish over the last two decades decreased 
roughly from over 100,000 to less than 10,000. [During the EU membership] 
MRF played a critical role as coalition partner in the government. The party 
members assumed critical roles such as the chairman of the parliamentary 
commission for education, deputy minister of education, and the position of vice 
prime ministership. If the MRF ruling elite genuinely wanted to resolve Turkish 
minority’s education problems – especially education rights in native language – 
it could have done so.352    
 
The new Turkish Party PPFD received a relatively strong support from GERB 
because for the first time in modern Bulgaria, the monopoly of the MRF was threatened. 
The PPFD competed against MRF in March 2013 elections. The newly established party, 
however, did not manage to attract enough votes from the Turkish minority as it barely 
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managed to pass the 4 per cent electoral threshold despite electoral coalition with 
National Movement for Stability and Progress (NDSV).  
The resignation of Kasım Dal and Korman Ismailov in 2012, however, opened the 
Pandora’s box for the MRF as it paved the way for new splits. In this vein, Lütfi Mestan, 
the closest aide and successor of Ahmed Dogan as the chairman of MRF, established a 
new political party, DOST, acronym of Democrats for Responsibility, Solidarity and 
Tolerance in 2016. In fact, Mestan expelled from the Party due to a chain of 
extraordinary events. The crisis triggered with Turkey’s shooting down of a Russian 
fighter jet on October 24, 2015. Ahmed Dogan, the honorary chairman of the MRF at the 
time, adopted a pro-Russian stance whereas the chairman, Lütfi Mestan, in a press 
statement urged Bulgarian policy makers to stand in solidarity with Turkey as a NATO 
ally by stating that “Russia's violation of Turkish airspace amounted to a violation of 
sovereignty of NATO territory and that Russia had previously been given many official 
warnings.353  
Mestan’s pro-Turkish statements stroke a sensitive nerve within the MRF circles 
and, Ahmed Dogan accused Mestan for “acting as a fifth column of Turkey in Bulgaria.” 
Dogan argued, “the MRF has never acted as a fifth column of any country and he would 
do whatever it takes to reduce Turkey’s impact in Bulgarian [politics through minority 
politics].”354 As a result, in December 2015, Mestan was expelled from the party and  
established a new political movement in 2016, DOST, to represent the Turkish minority 
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in the country, whereas Mustafa Karadayi was elected as the new leader of the MRF in 
April 2016 – following a short interval of care-taker co-chairs.355  
 
4.3.2.1. Turkey’s changing regional policies 
The regional dynamics and the role of Turkey as a kin state should be discussed at this 
point to contextualise the developments discussed above. As a matter of fact, the split 
within the Turkish minority party was partially the outcome of Turkey’s changing 
political stance towards the Turks in Bulgaria as part of its evolving diaspora politics. 
Since Bulgaria’s transition to democracy, non-interventionism has been the traditional 
policy stance of Turkish policy-makers regarding the state of Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria.356 Turkish policy-makers, in early 1990s, pursued a careful neutrality policy 
and refrained to intervene in Bulgaria’s domestic politics to the extent that some scholars 
even labelled “exemplary” in an otherwise conflict-ridden region.357 Turkey’s tense 
relations with Greece in the Balkans also prevented the Turkish policy-makers to 
jeopardise the bilateral relations between Turkey and Bulgaria. As a result, the Turkish 
minority enjoyed a high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis Turkey.358  
Turkey’s non-interventionism policy, however, gradually shifted in 2000s with 
the rise of Justice and Development Party (AKP, in Turkish acronym). The AKP 
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government, especially starting from the second term in office (2007 onwards), adopted a 
proactive foreign policy in the Middle East and the Balkans based on historical and 
cultural affinity, with an emphasis on economic integration as well.359 The identity-based 
parameters in Turkish foreign policy have become an integral aspect of AKP government 
in 2000s.360 As Fiona B. Adamson suggested diaspora politics has become an 
increasingly central aspect of the foreign policy repertoire and global identity politics of 
states that transcend their borders.361 Following the emerging trend in global politics, 
Turkey’s Islamist oriented conservative AKP government pursued a more hands-on 
approach to utilise the power of Turkish diaspora abroad. In 2010, as part of its “new 
diaspora politics,” Turkish government established the Presidency for Turks Abroad and 
Related Communities.362 Due to their electoral power and numerical superiority, the 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria became one of the priority areas for Turkish policy-makers. 
Ahmed Dogan’s lukewarm stance toward Turkey and his traditional policy of keeping 
Turkey at arm’s length also directed the AKP government to support alternative political 
actors within Turkish community in Bulgaria. The newly established Turkish minority 
parties PPFD and DOST, have received strong support from the Turkish government as 
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Ankara provided financial aid as well as banning Ahmed Dogan’s entry to Turkey 
following Russian fighter jet crisis.363 Both Kasim Dal and Lutfi Mestan, on the other 
hand, adopted avowedly pro-Turkish stance – with this, for the first time over 30 years, 
Turkey has become an assertive actor trying to influence the internal balance of power 
relations within the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Mestan put his support to Turkey as 
follows: 
 
Since I have raised the problems of Turkish minority to access education in native 
language and tried to fix the MRF’s problems with Turkey, I disturbed the MRF 
ruling elite. Turkey is our neighbour and partner country. Bulgaria is a NATO ally 
and we should stand in solidarity with Turkey.364 
 
In the post-accession process, the Europeanisation stalled in the minority rights 
area not only as a result of the weakening EU conditionality but also mainly due to the 
shifting sands in minority-majority relations in Bulgaria that undermined the delicate 
inter-ethnic consensus. Starting from early 2000s, the mainstream Bulgarian parties 
veered to restrictive minority policies to accommodate the rising far-right movements in 
the country and Turkish minority elite has become the subject of intense debates and 
criticism due to the clientelism and corruption allegations. The intra-party conflicts over 
the last decade, along with the corruption allegations, also diverted the attention of 
Turkish ruling elites in Bulgaria, which in turn, led to decreased emphasis put on the 
rights of minorities. As a result, even though Bulgaria has not swayed into illiberalism as 
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observed in Hungary and Poland, the ‘Bulgarian ethnic model’ has been put a series of 
stress tests due to populist-nationalist backlash and the increasing collective action 
problems of Turkish minority elites. 
 
4.4. Conclusions 
This chapter examined the Europeanisation of minority rights in Bulgaria during 1999-
2017. The two-level model was elaborated on to account for the interaction of domestic 
and external factors. The chapter revealed that the main causal mechanisms through 
which EU conditionality played its role mainly fit into instrumental learning rather than 
norm-based socialisation. The candidacy and post-membership periods in Bulgarian 
politics indicate that Bulgaria refers to a puzzling case because, in contrast to the 1990s, 
the opportunity structures provided by the EU were not exploited to the fullest extent 
possible. Based on the conceptual framework, this chapter explains the shifting causal 
mechanisms with reference to changing domestic preferences.    
The hierarchical top-down models of Europeanisation suggest that target country 
becomes more eager to implement substantial reforms on minority rights in the pre-
accession because EU conditionality becomes part of sizeable rewards. The candidate 
states are more likely to comply with the EU regulations in return for membership. 
However, after becoming a member of the EU, the motivation of reform is likely to wane 
as conditionality terminates. Given that the EU requested the implementation of minority 
rights reforms as part of the membership criteria, the Bulgarian governments codified the 
EU’s basic templates on minority rights. However, the EU mainly focused on the basic 
legislation and did not keep an eye on the practical problems that the Turkish minority 
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encounter at the cultural and educational fields. Stated differently, Bulgarian elite defined 
the EU membership as a strategic goal to avoid the isolation of Bulgaria in a critical 
juncture that the EU took decisive steps toward the Central and Eastern Europe. Yet 
minority related reforms were implemented in a rather minimalist manner. 
 
This chapter, however, argued that the main reason for the stagnation of minority 
reforms is not mainly because of the weakening EU conditionality. As such, one cannot 
explain the rapid transformation in Bulgarian minority regime during the 1990s. This 
chapter maintains that the shifting dynamics of minority-majority relationship, coined as 
‘double challenge’, in Bulgaria and re-orientation of the priorities of the Turkish minority 
elite constitute the main causal factors.    
 
It is striking that the main political actor on the minority side, the MRF, neither 
pursued proactive policies to take advantage of the EU platforms to improve the rights of 
Turkish minority nor utilised ‘naming and shaming’ and ‘peer pressure mechanisms.’ The 
MRF had a rare opportunity to contribute the implementation of minority reforms and 
launch a positive minority agenda in Bulgaria as it joined the government as a critical 
coalition partner two times in the post-2000. However, the MRF adopted a minimalist 
approach in terms of promoting the rights of Turkish minority. The interviews suggest 
that the MRF ruling elite deliberately formulated minority issue as “the domestic problem 
of Bulgaria” that should be addressed at the national level. As explained in the relevant 
part, the changing preferences and priorities avoided the MRF elite to take advantage of 
the “EU factor” in the post-2000. The MRF elite increasingly became part of the political 
establishment and rentier distributive politics. As a result, the Party dropped the sensitive 
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minority rights reforms from its political agenda to co-opt with the mainstream political 
parties. The intra-party conflicts, escalated as a result, also diverted the attention of the 
Turkish ruling elite to pursue a coherent and effective agenda at the domestic and 
European platforms.          
On the majority side, the transformation of inter-ethnic relations also informed the 
stagnation of minority reform process. In this regard, the Bulgarian ethnic model, which 
praised for successful accommodation of the minorities, appears to suffer from important 
flaws. The rights that Turks gained during Europeanisation process and the increasing 
political visibility of the Turkish minority seem to disturb part of the Bulgarian society to 
the extent that it paved the way for the rise of a nationalist-populist backlash as 
represented by the rise of extreme-right ATAKA party and Patriotic Front. The far-right 
parties succeeded to secure a place in the Bulgarian parliament in all general elections in 
the post-2005. The far-right parties pursue an explicit discrimination policy, as the anti-
Turkish sentiments are part and parcel of their ultra-nationalist discourse. Therefore, 
latent nationalism that questioned the legality of the MRF in the initial phases of 
Bulgaria’s democratisation surfaced and openly targeted the presence of the Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria. Furthermore, mainstream parties have adopted more exclusionary 
stance toward minorities as exemplified with the rise of GERB and its charismatic leader 
Boyko Borisov. The domestic shifts, therefore, indicate that Bulgarian ethnic model 
based on ‘double moderation’ between minority and majority elites appears to be under 





CHAPTER V. Different Paths to Europeanisation of Minority Rights 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This dissertation argues that mainstream accounts tend to conceive the domestic arena as 
an obstacle and passive receiver, which should be overcome during Europeanisation 
process. In fact, the domestic realm can act as an opportunity space that empowers the 
EU’s transformative impact in minority rights through direct and indirect ways. In order 
to rectify this bias, this research proposes a two-level analytical model that account for 
the dynamics of continuity and change in the minority rights policies with reference to 
three main parameters – domestic dissatisfaction, EU-level pressure, and state capacity – 
operationalised in line with the conceptual framework. Accordingly, this chapter aims to 
build an interactive framework without prioritising one level of analysis vis-à-vis the 
other and explicitly acknowledging the impact of domestic factors on the observable 
outcome.  
By delineating different paths to Europeanisation via exploring three cases – 
Bulgaria, Croatia and Montenegro, this chapter explores the mechanisms and limits of 
Europeanisation in the realm of minority rights in recent member and candidate 
countries. The Bulgarian case, in this context, is compared with a recent member 
(Croatia) and candidate state (Montenegro). As these three cases have tormented histories 
in terms of majority-minority relations and experienced different types of transitions, a 
comparative analysis of the transformation of minority regimes in these post-conflict 
societies shall not only address a key policy area in terms of their integration with the EU 
but also enable juxtaposing Bulgaria with other cases in the Western Balkans – a region 
at the focus of the EU’s next enlargement wave. The first and second sections explore the 
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cases of Croatia and Montenegro. The third section offers a comparative analysis of the 
three cases to delineate the causal patterns that inform divergent patterns of policy 
changes in these polities. The final section concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2. Transformation of minority rights in Croatia 
Following the break-up of Yugoslavia, Croatia declared independence and in a short 
time, the Serbs living in the country rebelled against the newly established Croatian state. 
By late 1991, Serbs organised themselves around the self-proclaimed Serb Republic of 
Krajina. As a result, warfare between the Serbs and Croatian state forces escalated, which 
paved the way for long-lasting minority rights and displaced persons problems in the 
country. Despite this tormented historical experience, the Croatian political elite had 
taken important steps during the 2000s to transform the minority rights regime and 
extend the political and social rights of Serb national minority in Croatia.  
The EU also explicitly asked for the improvement of the state of Serb minority in 
the country during the candidacy process. After fulfilling conditionality criteria including 
the protection of minorities, Croatia finally became a member of the EU as of June 2013. 
This section discusses the Europeanisation of minority rights regime in Croatia with 
reference to the two-level model. In particular, the changing status of Croatian Serbs 
from ‘exclusion’ to ‘integration’ since early 1990s will be investigated. Accordingly, it 
will be demonstrated that during the 1990s, the sub-optimal state of Serb minority 
remained almost intact mainly due to the uncompromising attitude of political elites and 
strong domestic resistance on part of the ruling elite. Croatia adopted a reformist path 
only in the 2000s because of the increasing domestic dissatisfaction in the post-Tudjman 
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period about the prevalent minority rights policies and double moderation between 
majority and minority leaders that coincided with a strong EU conditionality. 
5.2.1. Tudjman era: Stagnation in minority rights 
Yugoslavia’s contested dissolution through conflict (1991-1992) shaped the parameters 
of minority rights developments in contemporary Croatia. With the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia and following the first democratic elections held in spring 1990, the Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ) founded by Franjo Tudjman appeared as the major political 
actor that shaped the entire transition process. The HDZ succeeded to win 41.61 per cent 
of the votes, which gave it 55 of the 80 seats in Sabor, the Croatian Parliament.365 The 
HDZ leader Tudjman, who became the first president of Croatia, played a decisive role in 
determining the political trajectory of the country during 1990s. Franjo Tudjman adopted 
hard-core nationalist policies, and as Melcic points out “he had great support among the 
nationalists in his land.”366 Tudjman’s support base was solid at the time endorsing the 
ultra-nationalist policies and he had the full loyalty of his staff; he was even called as “a 
soft dictator.”367 In retrospect, Tudjman and the HDZ prioritised regime change in 
Croatia and nation building overshadowed the democratisation of the country. His 
attempts to centralise the state structures and homogenisation policies which were 
adopted along the lines of exclusionary citizenship practices informed the main 
parameters of majority-minority relations. In a political context where ruling majority 
																																																						
365 European Election Database, Croatia. http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database  
366 Dunja Melcic, “Building Democracy in Croatia since 1990s,” in Building Democracy in the Yugoslav 
Successor States, edited by Sabrina P. Ramet, Christine M. Hassenstab, Ola Listhaug (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017): 200. 
367 David Orlović (Director, Roma National Council), interview by author, May 18, 2016. 
	
157	
elites focused on building a Croatian state based on ethnic Croat identity had deep 
ramifications in terms of the position of ethnic Serbs in Croatia. The Serb minority was 
categorically rejected and their rights were denied during the 1990s:  
Three categories of citizenship [existed] in Croatia [in 1990s]: included, excluded 
and invited. Included were largely ethnic Croats who were born in Croatia, lived 
in Croatia. Excluded largely others, like the ethnic Serbs but also some other ex-
Yugoslavs, which was relatively significant in numbers in Croatia. Then the 
invited were largely ethnic Croats from abroad, near abroad from Bosnia, but also 
from diaspora.368 
Due to nation building policies and the adverse political climate, the Croatian 
political elites demonstrated little motivation to promote the integration of national 
minorities during the early years of the newly independent state. In fact, the Croatian 
Serbs interpreted the multi-party democratic elections in the post-independence as the 
establishment of an anti-Serb regime, which denies the political representation of the 
ethnic Serbs.  
As a matter of fact, one can suggest that the status of Croatian Serbs gradually 
shifted from ‘self-exclusion’ to ‘exclusionary policies’ during 1990s.369 The new 
Constitution in 1990 defined Croatia as “a nation state” formed by ethnic Croats, but also 
named “other minorities and nationals” as citizens of the newly established Croat state in 
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the Preamble.370 On the one hand, this was a clear recognition of minority groups in the 
country as well as guaranteeing equal citizenship rights, political freedom, and social and 
cultural autonomy. On the other hand, for Serb minority, this was a downgrade of their 
status. As Antonija Petricusic puts it: 
The preamble of the Constitution is only the first paragraphs and it is not legally 
binding. However, at the symbolic level, it matters because it was an 
acknowledgment of some minority groups as being traditionally living on this 
territory and forming the nation – or the state. Yet, the Serbs were making up the 
12 per cent of the population at that time and were showing a strong 
unwillingness to accept the new Constitution as well as their new status and 
overall, the secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia.371 
In fact, the 1990 Constitution and the protection of minorities was not only driven 
by the conflict-prone tendencies and the political atmosphere in the country, but also 
arranged as a counter-measure to satisfy the international community. Prior to its 
international recognition, Croatia was asked to set up human and minority rights 
legislative to provide protection particularly for Serb minority, as they lost their 
constitutive nation status and became a national minority along with other minority 
groups in the newly independent Croatian nation state. Following the recommendations 
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of the Badinter Commission, the Croatian political elite compromised and further 
consolidated minority rights regime by adopting two additional laws; the Constitutional 
Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities 
or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia372  (hereafter the Constitutional Law, 1991) and 
Law on Elections for the Representatives in the Parliament of Republic of Croatia 
(hereafter, the Electoral Law). Accordingly, the new legislations, which were proven to 
be comprehensive, granted special rights for Serbs among other national minorities. 
Namely, they were granted with the territorial autonomy in Glina and Knin regions as 
well as being entitled with proportional representation at the Parliament.373 
However, territorial autonomy never became operational as the inter-ethnic 
conflict broke up soon. The Croatian Serbs radically opposed the changes in the new 
Constitution and, encouraged by the Serbian state, rebelled against the newly independent 
Croatian state, which in turn, triggered a series of events that plunged the minority-
majority relations into a deadlock during the entire decade. The Serb minority, in the 
initial period, decided not to take part in new state institutions and participate in policy-
making processes. The Croatian Serbs, backed by the Yugoslav army, attacked and 
occupied the parts of Croatian territory, which lasted for four years, and declared 
independence by forming the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina.374  
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The ‘self-exclusion’ policies of the Serb minority in early 1990s turned into 
‘exclusionary policies’ in a rather short time as the President Tudjman, and his party, 
HDZ, adopted a series of nationalisation programmes through purging ethnic Serb public 
employees, bureaucrats, and media representatives from the public sphere. In this 
context, the military Operation Storm, launched by the Croatian authorities against the 
self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina, constitutes a major turning point in 1995 as 
it cemented the exclusionary policies against the Croatian Serbs. As a result of this 
operation, Croatian army took back control of the occupied Croatian territories. However, 
the military operation led to massive fleeing of Serb population along with severe human 
tragedies and losses. It is estimated that approximately 300 thousand Serbs, who were 
Croatian citizens, forcibly left the country.375 Due to the intense conflict from 1991 to 
1995, the perception of the Croatian Serbs in the eyes of Croatian majority changed 
dramatically. The inter-ethnic conflict reached a new zenith with the military operations 
to the Serb Republic of Krajina in May and August 1995, which resulted in massive 
deterioration of inter-ethnic relations and rise of aggressive nationalism. 
Open demonstration of nationalism was not tolerated in Yugoslav socialist time, 
yet due to war, it became something tolerable and openly promoted in the society 
during 1990s. 376 
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The military conflict further exacerbated the exclusion of the Serb minority and 
augmented the fear of disintegration within the wider segments of society. The Croatian 
Parliament declared a state of emergency and immediately put the relevant minority 
rights legislation on hold. In this context, the government enacted a law following the 
Operation Storm, which is entitled ‘Law on Temporary Suspension of Particular Articles 
of the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms of Ethnic and National 
Minorities in Croatia’, suspended the rights of Serb minority to be represented in 
municipalities and the Parliament. The suspension of the proportional representation in 
the Croatian Parliament, which was authorised as part of the Constitutional Law (Article 
18.1), totally excluded the Croatian Serbs from the political system. Further restrictions 
were also introduced on housing policies and seizure of the properties that were left 
behind by Serb refugees during the Operation Storm.377 Those measures received serious 
international criticism as the World Bank indefinitely postponed the loans of $30 million 
and the IMF postponed the discussions of releasing further credits while the UK and the 
Netherlands suspended the ratification of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
between the EU and Croatia. 378  
The criticism of the international community, however, made no major impact in 
the way in which Tudjman government framed the minority policies in Croatia during 
1990s. On the contrary, the antagonising policies of the government targeting the Serbs 
mobilised Croatian society and exacerbated the already fragile conflict-prone 
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environment. The Tudjman government’s anti-minority policies paved the way for the 
spread of intolerance and public hostility against the Serbs. As Petsinis highlights, the 
UN expressed its concern in 1995 about “the state authorities’ failure to take action over 
the propagation of ethnic hatred against Serbs.”379 One should also note that ‘double 
moderation’ could not take place during the 1990s not only because of the extravagant 
policies of the Tudjman government but also because of the maximalist demands of the 
Serb minority elites.  In this vein, for instance, the Milosevic regime in Serbia, in 
cooperation with the Serb minority leaders in Croatia, employed aggressive propaganda 
tactics, which jeopardised the inter-ethnic relations significantly. Mesic and Bagic 
underline this point as follows: 
Milosevic’s propaganda machine in Belgrade deepened and spread fear among the 
Serbs in Croatia [during 1990s], claiming that the new Croatian state was the 
successor of the collaborationist fascist regime in the Independent State of Croatia 
(NDH) staged during the Second World War and responsible for mass killings of 
Serbs, Jews, Roma, and Croatian anti-fascists. Distrust of Serbs toward political 
changes in Croatia was strengthened by the fact that the HDZ government under 
President Franco Tudjman used some symbols and terminology, which the NDH 
also used.380    
The exclusionary policies in the post-independence decade extended beyond the 
symbolic references. The political elites of the ruling HDZ believed that Croatia’s 
heterogeneous structure was the outcome of historical discriminations against the ethnic 
Croats. Therefore, homogenisation policies were considered as the rectification of 
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historical wrongdoings against Croatian majority. Tudjman government adopted a set of 
“national cultural purification” policies in textbooks, art, and language. As part of this 
strategy any admixture of the Serbian language was expelled from official Croatian 
language. The cultural purification policies did not only deny the Serbs to enjoy their 
cultural rights but also made them partially incompetent in renewed official language in 
Croatia.381 On the other hand, Tudjman government promoted naturalisation and 
repatriation policies to increase the political and cultural links with ethnic Croats living 
abroad.382   
The military operation, harsh policies of the government, and increasing 
unemployment triggered a massive displacement wave in the second half of 1990s.383 
The share of ethnic Serbs in Croatia, which was 12.2 per cent of the total population in 
1991, declined to just 4.5 per cent at the turn of the century.384 The policy lines of 
Tudjman government were not only targeting ethnic minorities but also any political 
opposition. Tudjman adopted strict measures in order to protect the national unity and 
sovereignty of the Croatian state.  The excessive emphasis on the homogeneity of the 
Croat nation created an unfavourable environment for the ethnic minorities so as their 
political demands were seen as a security problem. As the public reaction very much 
depends on the position of the elites, nationalistic policies and discourse was well 
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received by the majority due to the fresh memories of war. The Serbs were “perceived as 
an enemy”, and the mainstream political stance further provoked domestic hostility 
toward remaining Serb population.385 Even the results of Zagreb Municipality Local 
Assembly election was refused by President Tudjman in October 1995 and the crisis 
resolved in April 1997, only after two opposition members switched to Tudjman’s HDZ 
party which, as a result, gained majority to appoint the Mayor.  
The Tudjman government was very unfriendly when it comes to minorities. I 
think it is not only on ethnic minorities, he was also very unfriendly when it 
comes to political minorities, I mean opposition parties. His authoritarian style of 
governing starting from the first half of 1990s, in fact goes rather well with the 
idea of homogenisation of Croatia.386 
During the Tudjman era until 1999, the Croatian majority elites did not promote 
the protection of minority rights in Croatia and domestic dissatisfaction remained very 
low about the policies implemented in the realm of minority rights. The preference 
functions of the political elites of the emerging HDZ were set in a way that prioritised 
national consolidation, as a result of which the Serb minority was framed as a security 
issue. Hence, their rights were denied despite certain level of pressure from the EU and 
other European institutions (see below). The low level of domestic dissatisfaction on part 
of the political elites, therefore, led to the continuation of exclusionary policies in the 
realm of minority rights during 1990s. On the other hand, reconciliation between 
minority-majority groups could not be achieved not only because of the uncompromising 
homogenisation policies of the government but also maximalist demands of the Serb 
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minority in Croatia. Therefore, minority-majority relations stagnated in a non-optimal 
equilibrium during 1990s. As will be elaborated in further detail, not only the EU 
pressure, but the change in domestic preferences in 2000s, established a new equilibrium 
in minority-majority relations during 2000s – a point to be discussed in the next section.   
 
5.2.2. Post-Tudjman era: Explaining domestic dissatisfaction   
The equilibrium in minority-majority relations changed significantly with the election of 
new government in 2000. Similar to Bulgarian and Montenegrin cases (see following 
section) the major policy changes in Croatia came as an outcome of intra-elite conflicts 
and re-formation of the preferences of domestic political elites. With the presidential 
elections following the death of President Tudjman, Stjepan Mesic elected as the new 
President of Croatia. The Social Democrats (SDP) in partnership with the Croatian Social 
Liberal Party (HSLS) also won the parliamentary elections in the same year by receiving 
the 39.24 per cent of the total votes.387 In the realm of minority rights, the new 
government represented the organised collective dissatisfaction about the existing 
policies. The new coalition government (2000-2003) pursued an active pro-minority 
strategy to re-orient the political priorities of the Croatian state. The SDP government, in 
this context, adopted a series of democratisation reforms to comply with the EU’s 
membership criteria. Accordingly, Article 15 of the Constitutional Law was amended so 
that the proportional representation of the national minorities was ensured in the Croatian 
Parliament.  
																																																						
387 European Election Database, Croatia. http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database 
	
166	
In order to rectify the exclusionary policies of the past, the new Croatian 
government introduced even more substantial reforms. The new Law on the Use of the 
Languages and the Alphabets of National Minorities, which was enacted in May 2000, 
ensured the legal equality of the minority languages (including Serb) with the official 
language. The complementary laws also guaranteed to provide education in minority 
languages alongside Croatian. Also, the new Constitutional Law on the Rights of 
National Minorities (CLRNM) was enacted in December 2002. The Law was entirely 
consistent with the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(FCPNM) as it affirms the individual and collective rights of national minorities – 
including the Serbs. Accordingly, the public use of minority rights, the educational rights 
in minority languages, cultural autonomy, and religious rights were secured by law.388 
Finally, the SDP coalition was the first government in Croatia, which demonstrated 
genuine willingness to improve the legal and political conditions for the Serb refugees 
that left the country in mid-1990s.         
The Tudjman’s party, HDZ, also went through institutional transformation and 
ideological moderation toward Serb minority along with other major political issues. 
Following the general elections in 2003, the HDZ, which passed through significant 
reform, formed a coalition government that continued the SDP government’s policies in 
the field of minority rights. What was special with the elections was that for the first time, 
Serbs were represented in the government in 2003, as Independent Democratic Serb Party 
(SDSS) became a partner of the HDZ coalition government. Being part of the 
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government transmitted a sense of security within Serb minority population.389 The 
minority members were also allowed to serve in the public sector, which was also 
secured by Constitutional Law (Article 22 and 23). The minorities, including ethnic 
Serbs, were recognised as ‘national minorities’ according to Croatian Constitution 
(Section I) and their equal rights were guaranteed (Article 15).390 
One needs to focus on the inter-elite relationships to explain the dynamics of 
major policy changes in Croatia’s minority regime during 2000s. The role of political 
leaders, in this context, proved significant. The ethnic Croat politicians worked toward 
compromise to ease the inter-ethnic tensions. To this end, as explained above, the new 
Croatian political elite adopted a more inclusive minority regime. The conciliatory stance 
of the Croatian policy makers was reciprocated by the Serb minority leaders. On that 
note, Milorad Pupovac, the leader of Serb National Council and the president of SDSS, 
who was known as being very experienced and cautious politician, played an important 
role in terms of ensuring peaceful adoption of inclusive minority rights policies. Pupovac 
was an ideal interlocutor as he was not involved in any secessionist actions in the 1990s. 
Therefore, Pupovac was well accepted in wider segments of Croatian society:  
Dr Pupovac has a very kind personality. He is a university professor, also very 
mild spoken, well respected both domestically and in international community. At 
the moment, it doesn’t seem that he has a partner at the majority side. Yet, during 
the times of the EU accession talks, he played a very positive role in easing the 
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general situation. This was indeed two-sided, there was always somebody else in 
the government interested in compromise.391 
Milorad Pupovac worked very closely with Ivo Sanader who was the Prime 
Minister (2003-2009). Sanader was seen as loyal to Croats and the one who could carry 
the nation into EU membership.392 There has been a long period of compromise and good 
relationship between two leaders. As explained above, the increasing domestic 
dissatisfaction about the political direction of the country towards the end of the Tudjman 
era opened up an opportunity window to introduce new policies to include the Serb 
minority into the political mainstream. The newly emerging political elites on the 
minority and majority sides adopted a conciliatory stance in the post-Tudjman era. The 
willingness of domestic elites to adopt more inclusive minority policies coincided and 
also informed by strong EU conditionality in the post-2000.   
 
5.2.3. External dynamics: Explaining EU-level pressure 
The EU conditionality has been relatively strong not only during the candidacy process 
but also in the 1990s. The EU explicitly underlined the protection of minorities. In 1991, 
the international recognition of Croatia was conditional upon fulfilling three criteria: 
First, Croatia was asked to stop the war with the Yugoslav army. The parties signed a 
ceasefire on 2nd of January, 13 days before the war ended, and it was then recognised as 
an independent state. Second, Croatia agreed upon UN protected areas on its own 
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territory where Serb minority constituted the majority or substantial minority within total 
population. Accordingly, these areas were divided into four sections and three UN 
protection areas created with UN missions (UNPROFOR), which were Eastern Slavonia, 
Western Slavonia and Krajina.393 Third, Croatia agreed to change the Constitutional Law, 
which was enacted as of June 1992 and guaranteed autonomy for ethnic Serbs in two 
regions – namely Krajina and Knin. However, the third condition did not help the Serb 
minority to improve their rights because, as discussed in the preceding section, the Serb 
minority rebelled against the newly established state and the Tudjman government 
demonstrated no interest in developing inclusionary minority policies. Tudjman even 
changed the Constitution to revoke the autonomous regions. 
The international community has taken minority issue very seriously even in 
1991-1992. The issues and minorities were erased almost when it comes to 
implementation [because the government] didn’t pay much attention. As soon as 
it’s possible, just completely neglected what was promised.394  
The EU’s leverage, however, remained very low throughout the 1990s as the 
exclusive policies of the Tudjman government became more explicit. As Jovic points, 
“Croatia ended the decade of 1990s in unofficial isolation with no formal agreements 
with the EU.”395 The EU-pressure only yielded positive results when the domestic 
preferences shifted dramatically with the election of government in 2000. During the 
accession period, the Sanader government was very much open to suggestions from the 
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EU and accommodating towards the demands of Serb minority representatives.396 For 
instance, the new government invited the representatives of minorities in the EU 
accession talks. The Vice President of the Serb Party was also appointed as the Chairman 
of the Foreign Policy Committee in the Parliament. The Serb minority and political elite 
also used the accession process to get more rights and more guarantees to the existing 
rights. Overall, the major reforms in minority rights took place only when high EU-level 
pressure and domestic ownership of reforms joined up in the 2000s.  
The new Croatian government’s compliance with the EU conditionality, however, 
encountered significant challenges mainly due to the handing over ‘war criminals.’ The 
issue proved very challenging for the pro-EU government as it sparked an intense and 
long-lasting debate between the conservatives and liberal pro-reformers. As a result, 
Croatian accession to the EU has been a long journey, which took 12 years. In 2001, 
Croatia ratified the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and, after two years, 
officially applied for the EU membership. The bilateral talks opened in 2005 and Croatia 
joined the EU in 2013.  
The EU conditionality played an instrumental role during the course of accession 
negotiations with deep ramifications on minority-majority relations. Croatia was first 
asked to fully cooperate with the International Criminal Tribune for Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). This was put as a condition before the accession negotiations officially started in 
2005. Before the EU candidacy, Croatia was not very eager to cooperate with the UN and 
constantly refused the indictment requests against several war criminals. However, the 
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171	
policy stance of the Croatian government changed with the EU accession process starting 
from early 2000s. In 2003, the Foreign Minister Tonino Picula put this change as follows:  
Croatia received over 300 requests from ICTY in three years and we are fulfilling 
each and every of them. Our aim is to become [an EU] member by 2007.397  
The EU counterparts, in return, appreciated the efforts and willingness of the 
Croatian political elite. In 2005 Progress Report, for instance, following the ICTY Chief 
Prosecutor’s positive statements regarding Croatia’s full cooperation with the Tribunal, it 
was stated “that outstanding condition for the start of accession negotiations had been 
met.” Yet the Council also agreed “that less than full cooperation with ICTY at any stage 
would affect the overall progress of negotiations and could be grounds for their 
suspension.”398  
The minority conditionality and the state of Serb minority in Croatia has become 
an integral part of the negotiation process since the very beginning. For instance, in 2004 
Accession Partnership document, the EU requested the Croatian government as a “short-
term priority” to “ensure proportional representation of minorities in local and regional 
self government units, in the State administration and judicial bodies, and in bodies of the 
public administration.”399 The EU also underlined the importance of the “proper 
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functioning of elected Minority Councils,”400 which were main institutional bodies that 
provided opportunities for Serb minority representatives to make their voice heard. The 
same document also pointed out the refugee return issue as the main controversy 
concerning the Serb minority. On that note, the EU advised the Croatian government to 
speed up the return of the refugees, take new measures on the repossession and 
reconstruction of their properties. As Özerdem and Sofizada point out, refugee returns 
prove challenging to tackle due to the complex nature of the issue and addressing land-
related problems appears to be one of the key obstacles for that matter.401 The property 
and land-related problems have been one of the top items on the agenda of Serb minority 
community as well, and as several interviewees pointed out, remain one of the main 
aspects of inter-ethnic reconciliation. Even though the criteria in measuring the progress 
in minority rights have never been set in a clear manner, the subsequent EU documents 
followed up the progress done in the state of Serb minority. For instance, in revised 
version of the Accession Partnership document published in 2008, it was stated that 
Croatia should implement the Constitutional Law on National Minorities and complete 
the return of refugees.402  
The European Commission followed the developments in minority rights area in 
general and the state of Serb minority in particular, as the issue was addressed in all 
progress reports. The 2011 progress report, in this sense, appears to adopt a positive tone 
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appraising the improvements taken place. Accordingly, the report concluded 
“cooperation between the political representatives of minorities and the government 
remains good.”403 The Commission also underlined that some structural problems still 
persists especially regarding the Serb minority’s access to public employment and 
property rights: “Members of the Serb minority, both returnees and those who remained 
in Croatia during the war, face difficulties in gaining access to employment, especially in 
the war-affected areas.”404 However, the positive assessment with regard to the overall 
improvement of inter-ethnic relations and the government’s effort on the subject matter 
set the tone of the EU conditionality in post-candidacy Croatia.                 
The Croatian government adopted a constructive approach during the candidacy 
process as it promised full commitment to the implementation of the Framework 
Convention. The anti-Discrimination Act, which took into force in 2008, also played a 
significant role in terms of protecting the rights of Serb minority community in Croatia 
along with other minority groups. On that note, in 2011, the Croatian government 
established a professional service, the Office for Human Rights and Rights of National 
Minorities. One of the senior members of the Office underlined the role and tasks of the 
institution as follows:  
We mainly provide support to the implementation of Framework Convention and 
Anti-Discrimination Act. We also organise seminars and trainings for civil 
servant to prevent and combatting with discrimination. We also conduct projects 
such as the one called “Mind the Gap” in which we cooperate with the Centre for 
Peace Studies and aim to create a Platform that combines inequality data and 
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process this information in order to provide support for vulnerable groups and 
people who experience various forms of discrimination.405  
 
In conclusion, the combination of high-level of domestic dissatisfaction in the 
post-Tudjman era and the explicit EU conditionality regarding the war criminals and the 
state of the Serb minority enabled significant transformation of the minority-majority 
relations in war throne Croatia. Even though some of the problems of Serb minority still 
remain, the double moderation of the minority and majority elite appears to provide a 
fertile domestic ground to sustain a positive minority agenda in the country.   
 
5.3. Transformation of minority rights in Montenegro 
Montenegro, which became an independent state in 2006 and is currently a candidate 
country, constitutes a critical case in terms of the Europeanisation of minority rights due 
to institutional setbacks the country faces. In fact, Montenegro poses new challenges in 
terms of Europeanisation of minority rights as it extends the causal factors beyond the 
external incentives and domestic compliance models. The evidence suggests that the EU 
applied the minority conditionality in an explicit and coherent manner in the Montenegrin 
case. Similarly, at the domestic-level, the majority and minority representatives 
developed a high level of ownership of the minority reforms in line with the EU norms 
and regulations. However, the weak state capacity – i.e. a state’s institutional reform 
capability – appears to be main intervening variable that curtailed the impact of the EU 
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reforms. Thus, the Montenegrin case demonstrates that the transformation in minority 
rights regime remains incomplete due to state capacity problems despite the willingness 
of domestic policy-makers and high-level EU leverage. This section substantiates this 
proposition of the two-level model with reference to field research data and 
supplementary evidence.  
 
5.3.1. Domestic dissatisfaction: High expectations 
The nationhood and minority-majority relations in contemporary Montenegro has been in 
flux. First as a republic in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-2002), then as a 
member of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2002-2006), and finally as an 
independent state, national identity and the state of minorities has been a central issue in 
Montenegrin politics. Over the last two decades, however, the conception of national 
identity and the interethnic relationships changed significantly.406 In March 1992, 95.4 
per cent of voters supported a common state with other former Yugoslav republics in the 
referendum on the independence of Montenegro.407 Given that ethnic minorities at the 
time boycotted the referendum, it can be concluded that overwhelming majority of the 
Montenegrins and Serbs adopted an anti-independence position. This policy stance 
marginalised the minority groups in Montenegrin politics, as Bosniaks and Albanians 
were strong supporters of Montenegro’s independence at the time. However, the 
interethnic cleavages and domestic political alliances shifted significantly in less than two 
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decades, which consolidated the pro-European movement in Montenegrin politics. In the 
second referendum held in May 2006, for instance, 55.5 per cent of the voters supported 
independence.408 In stark contrast with the previous referendum, along with the minority 
groups in Montenegro (Bosniaks and Albanians), the ruling party DPS supported 
independence and aligned with voters who identified themselves as ‘Montenegrins.’ 
Following the independence referendum, all EU member states recognised Montenegro’s 
independence in a short time. The new Montenegrin ruling elite adopted a bold pro-
European perspective, which included a comprehensive minority rights agenda as well. 
The Stabilisation and Association Agreement was signed with the EU in 2007 and 
entered into force in May 2010. The EU also granted official status of the candidate 
country in the same year and started accession negotiations with Montenegro in 2012.409  
In order to place the transformation of the minority rights regime in Montenegro 
into its proper context, one should start the analysis by changing policy preferences of the 
ruling elites. The Social Democratic Party of Montenegro (DPS) represents the main 
institutional actor that shaped the Montenegrin politics for almost two decades. However, 
the policy preferences of the ruling party changed significantly with regard to citizenship 
images, independence of the country, and minority rights during 1990s. In 1992 
referendum, as highlighted above, the DPS elites supported the anti-independence camp 
and aligned with the Serbs to maintain the state union of Serbia and Montenegro. The 
split of the DPS in 1997, however, paved the way for a major change in the preferences 
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of the DPS elite. The wing of the DPS led by Milo Dukanovic, who is the current 
president of Montenegro, turned against Slobodan Milosevic and abandoned the joint 
Serbian-Montenegrin vision by adopting subtle policies that underpin Montenegrin 
independence. As Dzankic underlined, the changing policies of DPS also informed new 
citizenship practises in Montenegro as the ruling elite expressed increasing dissatisfaction 
with the Serbian nationalism informing the majority-minority relations.410 As a result, the 
DPS adopted a set of policies to distance Montenegro from Serbia, which is labelled as 
“creeping independence” by analysts.411 For instance, the government introduced the 
Citizenship Law in 1999 that established Montenegrin citizenship as a separate category.  
The DPS government allied with the minority parties to balance the anti-independent and 
pro-Serbian wing of the Party led by Momir Bulatovic. As Morrison suggests, “in the 
wake of the split, ethnic minority parties would become crucial allies for Milo 
Đukanović’s post-split, anti-Milosevic DPS. And they would prove strong supporters of 
the party’s policy vis-à-vis the Milosevic regime in Serbia and, a decade later, play a 
significant role in facilitating a pro-independence victory.”412  
It can be argued that Dukanovic’s DPS detached from Belgrade mainly for 
instrumental reasons. The new pro-independent policy did not only facilitate creating a 
Montenegrin identity but also gave a new political identity to the ruling elite to mobilise 
citizens and consolidate their power base. For instance, the significant majority of 
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Bosniaks and Albanian minority in the northern municipalities had voted for 
independence in the referendum and supported the DPS-led coalition, as they were very 
dissatisfied with the previous mainstream policies.413 These new set of policies, which 
were supported by the ethnic minority groups in the country, received financial and 
political support from the European countries as well. In particular, the EU provided 
unconditional financial support to the Montenegrin government.414 The pro-independence 
policies of the government in Montenegro and the EU support yielded concrete results in 
May 2006 referendum.  
The data suggest that the policy change in majority-minority relations driven by a 
process of instrumental learning and strategic realignment “that has emanated from 
within the party and as a result intra-party conflict,”415 rather than a process of 
socialisation in line with European norms and values. The DPS-led government adopted a 
pro-European stance along with an explicit emphasis on multiculturalism following the 
independence to retain the support of the minority groups in Montenegro. The governing 
DPS-led coalition including a junior partner and number of minority parties, even called 
itself the ‘Coalition for a European Montenegro’ in 2009 general elections. This reflects 
the symbolic emphasis that the ruling elites placed on Euro-Atlantic integration. The DPS 
shifted its policy preferences significantly to circumvent ethnic Serbian image in the 
country and to appeal to the minorities in the newly established Montenegrin state. 
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Accordingly, the 2007 Constitution underlined that the citizenship was not based on 
national or ethnic belonging.416 Similarly, the 2008 Citizenship Act (article 1) denoted 
that Montenegrin citizenship did not indicate “national and ethnic origins.”417 The OSCE 
mission in Montenegro also endorsed the adoption of new Constitution, suggesting “that 
is generally in line with recommendations from the Council of Europe and OSCE 
institutions such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the 
High Commissioner for National Minorities.”418  
Thus, in the post-independence period, the EU membership emerged as a 
consensus point between the majority and minority representatives, which provided a 
fertile ground for introducing minority related reforms in an otherwise heterogeneous 
polity with polarising cleavage structures. Leon Gjokaj, General Director at the Ministry 
of Human and Minority Rights, underlines this point vividly: “EU is seen as a partner – if 
something told by them, we need to fulfil it immediately. No political party is against the 
EU.”419 As Sebahudin Delic, former Deputy Minister for Human and Minority Rights 
also suggests, “political parties, ethnicities and different segments of the society very well 
understand that they must cooperate because they all want to be an EU member. They 
don’t really understand the content of the negotiations or requirements but they do 
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support at high level.”420 In the same vein, Momcilo Radulovic underlined in the 
interview that, despite in an instrumental manner, “the policy makers showed full 
cooperation” when it comes to integration with the EU’s political and social sphere.421   
Since the independence of Montenegro, the DPS-led government and the 
Montenegrin people consider the EU membership as the most important priority to 
sustain economic development, political stability, and upgraded status in foreign policy. 
The government, at the moment of the independence in 2006, highlighted the EU and 
NATO membership as the main priorities. On the other hand, “Montenegro’s political 
leadership has to date remained one of the Western governments’ most reliable political 
partners in the region.”422 As a small state that recently gained its independence, main 
political actors on the majority and minority sides also support the EU membership, as 
part of which adopting the EU minority rights standards is also considered vital.  
EU is very important and cooperation between the EC and the Ministry is very 
high and good. As a small and young country, you need help. Montenegro wants 
to be in the EU as soon as possible. EU is something to enrich them. People also 
support the EU membership at a high degree. Minorities have always been pro-
European (except most of the Serbs). Again, both people and the government are 
in favour of realisation and full implementation of minority rights and standards 
in order to be a good EU candidate.423 
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Accordingly, the post-independence period marked Montenegro’s decisive march 
toward Euro-Atlantic alliance. The ruling elites, both on the majority and minority sides, 
have made significant progress toward this core objective. The changing domestic 
preferences in line with EU standards, in this context, should be considered as the main 
drivers of political realignment in the country that paved the way for a strong pro-
European domestic constituency. The comparative table below demonstrates that 
Montenegrin political elite appears to be very keen to adopt European regulations in the 
minority rights area to comply with the EU conditionality. For instance, as highlighted in 
the table below, the Montenegrin government signed and ratified the Framework 
Convention, the single most important aspect of EU conditionality pertaining to the 
minority regulations, in the same day without any reservations – in contrast to the usual 
practice that several other EU member and candidate states are inclined to do.  
 
Table 5.1. International instruments on minority rights protection 





Date Signed 07.05.1992 06.11.1996 26.12.2003 
Date Ratified 07.09.1992 05.11.1997 06.06.2006 
Reservations 
and Declarations 
No Yes - see Note 1 Yes - see note 2 
Protocol 12, ECHR 
(2000) 
Date Signed  06.03.2002 26.12.2003 
Date Ratified  03.02.2003 06.06.2006 
Reservations 
and Declarations 
 No No 
Framework 




Date Signed 09.10.1997 06.11.1996 06.06.2006 









2000/43/EC of 29 
June 2000) 
Date Signed ** ** ** 
Date Ratified 01.01.2007 01.07.2013 NA 
Reservations 
and Declarations 
No No No 
Convention on the 
Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
(1969, UN) 
Date Signed 01.06.1966 Succession* Succession* 
Date Ratified 08.08.1966 12.10.1992 23.10.2006 
Reservations 
and Declarations 
Yes, see note 4 No Yes – see note 5 
European 
Convention on the 
Compensation of 
Victims of Violent 
Crimes (1983, 
CoE) 
Date Signed  NA 07.04.2005 08.03.2010 
Date ratified NA 04.07.2008 19.03.2010 
Reservations 
and Declarations 







 Constitution of the 
Republic of 
Bulgaria Art.6 Art. 




Criminal Code of 
the Republic of 
Bulgaria Chp. III / 





Act – 2003 
amended 2006 







on the Rights of 
National 




Criminal Code of 
the Republic of 




The Act on 
Election of the 
Representatives to 
the Croatian 
Parliament, Art. 16 
– 04.05.2003 
The Anti-discrimi-
nation Act – 2008 
Constitution of 
the Republic of 
Montenegro Art. 
25 Art. 79 and 80 
19.10.2007 
amended 2013 




Criminal Code of 
the Republic of 
Montenegro 
Chapter 15 Art. 




the Law on 
Minority Rights 
and Freedoms – 
27.04.2017*** 
Source: Author’s compilation from the CoE, OSCE, EU, UN, official state institutions’ websites. The notes and asterisks in the table 




5.3.2. EU-level pressure: High leverage, never seen before 
The EU has proved the most important driver of political reforms and major external 
source of economic development in Montenegro. The EU has also been an active actor 
that supervised the political transformation of the country. The EU brokered 
Montenegro’s contested independence referendum and all member states swiftly 
recognised the independence of the Montenegrin state. Montenegro’s integration with the 
EU was formalised with the Stability and Association Agreement signed just one year 
after the independence referendum in October 2007. Following Montenegro’s official 
application in 2008, the accession negotiations started in June 2012. During the accession 
talks, along with a broader set of political conditionality, the EU highlighted several 
regulations such as democratisation, minority rights, judicial structures, fight against 
political corruption and organised crime. According to the European Commission’s 
opinion published in 2010, the reforms were considered “broadly correspond[ing] to 
European and international standards.” 424 The analysis of the progress reports since 2008 
also suggests that the EU has acknowledged the DPS government’s positive and 
constructive approach to adopt the EU acquis.425     
The EU-level pressure and external conditionality has been quite visible due to 
two main reasons. First, the peaceful coexistence of minorities in Montenegro is 
considered crucial for the EU to ensure stability in a still volatile region. As Morrison 
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points out “the EU has often touted Montenegro as a beacon of light in a region still beset 
with the residual problems emanating from the disintegration of the SFRJ [Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] in the 1990s.”426 Furthermore, in comparison to other 
Western Balkan countries such as Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, or Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Montenegro appears to become the most successful country in terms of progressing in the 
EU accession process and sustaining political stability. Thus, the EU institutions have 
closely followed the political transformation of Montenegro since its independence. 
Second, from a domestic point of view, the EU proves to exert significant impact on 
Montenegrin politics as the EU membership provides the main orientation for the 
domestic and foreign policy principles in Montenegro. As stated previously, the minority 
and majority elites agree that the EU membership constitutes the single most important 
political target that serves the interests of both sides. Thus, the EU leverage over 
Montenegro proves very high.   
The EU also serves as the main benchmark for the minority rights regulations. For 
instance, the EU advocated the adoption of a new Constitution just after the independence 
“as one of the criteria required for eventual EU membership.”427 Part two of the 
Constitution, in particular, is dedicated to human rights and freedoms, including the 
protection of minorities. The Montenegrin government also developed a strategy 
document for minority protection to be coordinated by the Ministry for the Protection of 
Human and Minority Rights.428 The criteria adopted by the EU and other international 
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organisations provided the benchmark for the reforms in the area of respect for and 
protection of minorities. In this context, one of the interviewees even suggested, “the EC 
progress reports are taken as a holy book [in Montenegro]!”429 Similarly, Sebahudin 
Delic, former Deputy Minister for Human and Minority Rights, underlines the active EU 
monitoring in the minority rights realm: 
Montenegro has the Law on Discrimination, which develops strategies for 
minority populations such as media campaign against discrimination. The EU 
closely observes those media campaign and level of discrimination. The Law and 
institutions are all under the focus of the EU.430 
As stated in the preceding section, the DPS-led government’s core policy of Euro-
Atlantic integration, combined with the EU pressure on the minority rights reforms paved 
the way for political realignments in Montenegrin politics that shifted the preferences of 
the majority and minority elites in a significant manner. In this context, the Bosniaks and 
Albanian minorities, which were pressured by the local extremists during 1990s, 
increasingly became an integral part of the Montenegrin political mainstream. In addition 
to the smaller Muslim-Bosniak parties such as the Bosniak Democratic Alliance (BDS) 
that emerged in Montenegrin politics, the Bosniak minority has also had the opportunity 
to be represented within the ranks of ruling DPS governments to advance their interests 
along with other minority groups in Montenegro. As Suljo Mustafic, an ethnic Bosniak 
Vice President and Secretary General of the Parliament of Montenegro, stated “minority 
rights are protected by law at a very good degree in Montenegro. National minority 
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parties are represented in the Parliament and electoral law is supportive.”431 The 
prevalent idea among ethnic Montenegrin political elite also informs peaceful co-
existence, as minorities are perceived as loyal partners in domestic political struggles 
since independence referendum.  
However, despite the legislative correspondence with the domestic legal 
environment and European standards, the main problematic in the Montenegro emerges 
at a more fundamental level as the weak state capacity avoids efficient implementation of 
the rights (and regulations) encoded into the legal texts. This qualitative difference 
necessitates a more nuanced approach regarding the response of the domestic political 
structures to the external conditionality pressures, which will be discussed in the next 
section.   
5.3.3. When state capacity matters? 
Drawing on field research, this section maintains that Montenegro’s Europeanisation 
performance in the area of minority rights suffer from setbacks not mainly because of the 
domestic veto points towards change in minority rights regime or weak EU-level 
pressure, but due to an omitted intervening variable in mainstream Europeanisation 
accounts. Data suggest that Montenegro suffers from substantial state capacity problems, 
which means that domestic institutional structures could not effectively ensure proper 
implementation of the EU conditionality despite the willingness of domestic and external 
actors.432 The debate on the transformation of minority rights regime is an illustrative 
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case in point. As conceptualised in the framework chapter, the state capacity problem in 
Montenegro emerges as an important intervening parameter that limits the degree of 
success for pro-reform majority and minority representatives to overcome collective 
action problems toward implementing effective policies to improve the political-social 
status of ethnic minorities in Montenegro.  
Even though it is difficult to measure state capacity, as indicated in the conceptual 
chapter, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) along with interview data are likely to 
provide some good proxies. Measuring different aspects of the quality of governance, the 
WGI focus on several parameters – three of which are of primary importance for the 
capacity of a state: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and regulatory 
quality. The following figure demonstrates the percentile rank of Montenegro vis-à-vis 
other states during 2006-2016. The data show that Montenegro’s state capacity remains 
lower in comparison to peer states – as the overall percentile ranks indicate below. 
Montenegro’s capacity indicators are also significantly well below the OECD average 
(overwhelming majority of which are EU members) and lower than other recent member 
and candidate states (see table 5.4).  
Table 5.2. Montenegro's main state capacity indicators (percentile rank, 0-100)* 
  OECD average Montenegro 
  2006 2012 2016 2006 2012 2016 
Voice and accountability 89 88 87 55 55 49 
Government effectiveness 88 88 88 53 60 58 
Regulatory quality 89 88 88 44 52 63 
* Indicates rank of country among all countries in the world. 0 corresponds to lowest rank and 100 
correspond to highest rank. 




Despite a modest improvement in government effectiveness and regulatory 
quality between 2006 and 2012 (table 5.3), it is striking that the relative capacity of the 
Montenegrin state declined significantly concerning the ‘voice and accountability’ and 
‘government effectiveness’ indicators between 2012 and 2016 vis-à-vis other states. The 
table below further indicates that Montenegro’s absolute capacity also declined 
significantly in terms of voice and accountability during 2012-2016, which has direct 
ramifications for the political representation of minorities as well.   
Table 5.3. Montenegro’s main state capacity indicators (absolute scores)* 
 
2006 2012 2016 
Capacity parameters/score*    
Voice and accountability 0.26 0.21 0.08 
Government Effectiveness -0.13 0.10 0.13 
Regulatory quality -0.33 -0.06 0.22 
* Estimate of governance measured on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values correspond to better 
governance and higher capacity. 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (2017). 
 
The interview data also confirm Montenegro’s weak state capacity and its 
negative impact on the implementation of EU reforms. As stated previously, Montenegro 
adopted a new Constitution in 2007, which aimed to accommodate different ethnic, 
political, and national groups. The Constitution envisaged new rights in the realm of 
human rights, representation of authentic minorities in the Montenegrin Parliament, and 
their adequate representation in local administrative bodies. The right of education in 
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mother tongue for minority groups was also accepted in the relevant legal codes.433 The 
Montenegrin Constitution (Article 13) stipulates, “the official language in Montenegro 
shall be Montenegrin. Serbian, Bosniak, Albanian and Croatian shall also be in the 
official use.”434  
The preceding section also highlighted that Montenegro adopted key documents 
regarding minority legislation in a rather impressively short time frame. As Kmezic 
underlines, however, most of these rights remained “rhetorical” due to the insufficient 
administrative capacity at the national and local level.435 Similarly, closer analysis 
demonstrates that the relevant EU reports underline the insufficient implementation 
problems despite the willingness of political actors to adopt pro-minority regime in line 
with the EU standards. In its opinion in 2010, the European Commission highlighted the 
“gaps in implementation of the legislation and existing strategies and action plans” in the 
realms of human rights and minority protection.436 The same report also underscores the 
harmonisation problems among different laws such as electoral law, citizenship law on 
foreigners, and the law guaranteeing access to economic and social rights of the minority 
members.437 Dzankic points out that the rights entitled to the minorities “are too complex 
to realise in practice, because of inconsistent legislation, the politicisation of the 
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434 The Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro, 2007. 
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Montenegrin society, and unclear lines between languages and cultures.”438 Milicia 
Kovacevic also highlights that “Ministry of Human and Minority Rights is established yet 
understaffed and not visible.”439 Suljo Mustafic, similarly, stated that “national minority 
councils are not functioning well as initially designed and thought.”440 
The EU progress reports constantly put emphasis on the state capacity problems 
as the main reason for insufficient improvements in the living conditions of minorities. 
For instance, 2013 EU progress report underscored that “the law prohibiting 
discrimination remains to be amended in order to be aligned with the acquis. 
Shortcomings persist in the enforcement of rights, especially in the area of discrimination 
against vulnerable groups, notably by judicial authorities. Administrative capacity and 
financial means to implement the relevant policies in this area remain limited.”441 The 
2014 progress report reiterates the same points in almost identical sentences.442 Similarly, 
the 2016 EU progress report unequivocally underlines that state’s institutional capacity 
problems still constitute a basic impediment in terms of the improvement of minority 
rights regime in Montenegro: 
Montenegro completed several legislative reforms to further align with the EU 
and international human rights standards and ensure that adequate mechanisms 
are in place to protect vulnerable groups from discrimination. Implementation of 
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the legislation remains weak. Amendments to the overall legislative framework, 
to ensure a coherent sanctioning policy for human rights violations, have not been 
adopted yet. Institutional capacity needs to increase further… the Ministry of 
Human Rights and Minorities, needs to be strengthened further and their 
knowledge of international and European human rights law and standards 
increased. The Ministry’s capacity to handle and supervise the spending of funds 
for minorities and religious communities remains limited [and] lack of a uniform 
approach and low levels of penalties for human rights violations continues to 
create legal uncertainty.443   
Both the assessments of the EU documents and interview data suggest that in the 
Montenegro case, the state’s insufficient capacity emerges as an important variable that 
condition the positions of political elites and limit their capabilities to initiate 
comprehensive reforms, which in turn, hampers substantial improvements in the minority 
regime of the country despite the existence of EU-level conditionality and strong political 
willingness at the domestic level. As Tesic from EU Delegation in Montenegro states; 
State capacity is one of the areas that we invest in here. Montenegro is a young 
state and the main issue is that institutions lack human capacity, which results 
with overtasking.444 
This suggests that the challenge of EU conditionality in the new (potential) 
candidate Western Balkan states is to strengthen the state’s institutional capacity along 
with empowering pro-reform majority and minority coalitions. Montenegro constitutes 
critical case for Europeanisation of minority rights literature due to institutional 
challenges it faces. Montenegro case poses new challenges in terms of Europeanisation of 
																																																						
443 European Commission, Montenegro 2014 Progress Report, SWD(2016) 360 final, November 9, 2016 
(Brussels: European Commission, 2016): 18-19. 
444 Tesic, interview. 
	
192	
minority rights as it extends the causal factors beyond the external incentives and/or 
domestic compliance frameworks. The evidence suggests that in the Montenegrin case, 
the EU applied the minority conditionality in an explicit manner. Similarly, at the 
domestic-level, the majority and minority representatives developed a high level of 
ownership of the minority reforms in line with the EU norms and regulations in the post-
independence period. However, the weak state capacity appears to be the main 
intervening variable that curtailed the impact of the EU reforms. Thus, the Montenegrin 
case demonstrates that the change in minority rights regime remains incomplete due to 
the institutional capacity problems despite the willingness of domestic policy-makers and 
the high-level EU leverage. 
This leads to an inherent dilemma and prioritisation problem for the EU in terms 
of the Europeanisation processes in Western Balkans.445 The prioritisation of state 
building without strengthening civil society and fundamental rights may pave the way for 
the revival of nationalist-populist reflexes, which in turn may pave the way for the retreat 
of minority rights. The single-minded prioritisation of seemingly reform-oriented elites 
on the minority and majority sides, on the other hand, is likely to inform corrupt 
behaviour of state elites and political actors due to the misallocation of funds and weak 
regulatory capacity of the state, which in turn, may impede effective implementation of 
rules adopted. Montenegrin case demonstrates that in the absence of a state capable of 
framing shared objectives and implementing them in coordination with civil society may 
lead to the stagnation in minority rights policies, despite the EU’s extensive support and 
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domestic ownership of the reform agenda. This technocratic approach that omit one side 
of the problem may even pave the way for “state capture” and the exacerbation of 
nationalist-populist backlash.446 It means that empowering domestic reform coalitions 
through external incentives and conditionality policies is not adequate if candidate state 
lacks necessary infrastructure to promote economic and political transformation in a 
coordinated way. The following section explores this point in further detail by analysing 
the dynamics of Europeanisation in a comparative perspective. 
5.4. Comparative analysis of Bulgaria, Croatia, and Montenegro 
This chapter explores different combinations of EU-level pressure and domestic 
dissatisfaction intervened by state capacity. Along these lines, three recent member and 
candidate countries are examined in five different periods. The study of new member and 
candidate countries as part of the new wave of Europeanisation literature might shed light 
on the causal mechanisms through which Europeanisation impact on these polities. It is 
likely to delineate the temporal and contextual patterns of how the focus on 
Europeanisation frameworks can be broadened to account for the complex interaction of 
top-down and bottom-up approaches paved the way for diverging impacts of the EU on 
member and candidate countries. Accordingly, this section seeks to address how different 
constellations of the interactions between EU-led conditionality and domestic-factors 
inform the degree of change in the minority rights policies. 
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The starting point of this research is that dominant approaches in Europeanisation 
literature develop a certain level of bias that put overemphasis on top-down factors. 
Accordingly, the mainstream approaches tend to conceive domestic area as an obstacle 
and impediment, which should be overcome during Europeanisation process. The 
mainstream perspectives tend to underestimate the importance of domestic-level factors 
as they mainly concentrate on top-down adjustment mechanisms.447 Stated differently, 
these approaches are inclined to theorise the domestic area as impediments and obstacles 
rather than possible change-drivers. This perspective is biased as it risks overestimating 
the EU-related factors, which invites an identification problem regarding the motives and 
mechanisms of effective policy change. These approaches also concentrate on how the 
EU shapes the domestic area without explicitly acknowledging the domestic responses to 
emerging policy spaces. In fact, as the emerging literature tries to grasp, and argued in 
this dissertation, the domestic realm can also act as an opportunity space that empowers 
the EU’s transformative impact via direct and indirect ways. In order to rectify this bias, 
this research proposes a two-level analytical model that account for the dynamics of 
continuity and change in the minority rights policies.  
Recognising the limits of mainstream conceptual frameworks, this research 
formulates an alternative approach in a way that put emphasis on the interactive nature of 
the EU and domestic level dynamics that enable/constraint major policy changes with 
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particular reference to the importance of double moderation between minority and 
majority elites.448  
Based on the complex interactions of the EU-level conditionality and domestic-
dynamics, as discussed in Chapter 2, two ideal-typical configurations emerge. First, if the 
external EU credibility is high, i.e. the EU pressurises for proper implementation of 
minority rights conditionality, in return for credible rewards, and domestic dissatisfaction 
of the current policies is also high on the majority-minority sides, it is more likely that 
Europeanisation has deeper impact on the transformation of minority rights policies. 
Second trajectory is that, if the external EU credibility is low, i.e. the EU conditionality is 
selectively implemented and domestic dissatisfaction of the existing minority rights 
policies in the eyes of domestic audience is also low, it is more likely that change in 
minority rights policies remain shallow and selective. The model also hypothesises that 
both EU conditionality and double moderation at the domestic politics are informed by 
the capacity of the state that enable effective implementation of minority-related reforms. 
The joining up of three major parameters is examined to assess the dynamics of 
Europeanisation in minority rights policies in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Montenegro. The 
three cases are informative for the purposes of this research due to two main reasons. 
First, all three countries experienced inter-ethnic conflict in their recent past, which 
makes the minority rights issue as a contested and controversial concept. Second, these 
cases reflect three different episodes of Europeanisation processes in new member and 
candidate countries. Given that the next EU enlargement wave prioritises Western 
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Balkans countries, the theoretical and empirical findings of this research is likely to have 
potential to shed some light on the dynamics of European influence on third countries.   
Bulgaria is one of the rare countries that succeeded to transform majority-
minority relations in a peaceful manner despite adverse background conditions. The 
Turkish minority was subjected to suppression during the Communist regime and 
forcibly displaced from the country in late 1980s. However, as discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3, the rights of the Turkish minority were granted during the 1990s in a swift 
manner so that, to a certain extent, the Bulgarian minority rights regime was transformed 
in line with European norms and values. In terms of Europeanisation literature, major 
reforms were enacted despite low–level of the EU conditionality. The data suggest that 
the majority and minority elites’ moderate policies facilitated adopting the European 
norms and regulations as the main social convention around which new elites converged. 
The social learning emerged as the predominant mechanism toward substantial minority 
rights reforms in this process. The Bulgarian case confirms the main hypothesis that the 
level of domestic dissatisfaction – especially double moderation between minority and 
majority leaders in the wake of interethnic conflict – primarily informs the degree and 
durability of minority rights reforms. Furthermore, the Bulgarian case during 1989-1999 
confirms that domestic arena does not always pose an impediment toward 
Europeanisation. As hypothesised in this research, the domestic majority and minority 
elites managed to develop a common narrative about Bulgaria’s transformation by 
delegitimising the previous regime in the country. Thus, the preferences of the political 
elites on both sides enabled inter-ethnic moderation along the lines promoted by the 
European regulations and institutions. Given that domestic dissatisfaction with the 
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existing policies were high in the 1990s and the new political elites in Bulgaria succeeded 
in developing a common narrative against the policies maintained by the Communist 
ruling elites, the Europeanisation of minority rights was ensured despite relatively low 
EU pressure at the time.       
The Croatian case during 1990s refers to a different political pattern, which also 
validates the main arguments of this research. The interview data and hard evidence 
suggest that Croatia did not introduce substantial minority rights reforms because of the 
low-level of domestic dissatisfaction about the prevailing minority rights regime. The 
Tudjman leadership implemented exclusionary centralisation policies, which in turn, lead 
to the stagnation of the rights of Serb minority in the country. The double moderation, 
which took place between Bulgarian majority and Turkish minority, could not be ensured 
in the Croatian case. On the contrary, due to the bloody civil war that erupted in the wake 
of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, the Croat national identity was constructed through the 
narrative of ‘otherness’, according to which, “Croatia and Croats were victims of Greater 
Serbian aggression and fought in self-defence in order to save Croatian state and 
nation.”449 According to this narrative, as Sokolic argues, “the key characteristics were 
Croatian defence, survival, struggle and victimhood against a Serb, Serbian […] 
aggressor.”450  
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In such hostile environment, the Croatian President Tudjman positioned Serbs as 
the ‘radical other’ of the Croatian nation as a way of unifying Croatian people, which 
appears to be a completely different pattern in comparison to the Bulgarian case. 
According to the Croatia’s former Office of Displaced Persons and Refugees (ODPR), 
almost 300,000 Serbs had to left Croatia by the end of 1995.451 The exclusionary minority 
policies implemented by Tudjman during the 1990s made it almost impossible to enact 
policies that promote the return of displaced Serbs and their integration in Croatian 
politics and society. Not surprisingly, as a result, the EU’s recommendations in terms of 
establishing a more inclusive minority rights regime were side-lined. As discussed in the 
previous sections, the laws enacted in early 1990s denied returning refugees citizenship 
and barred them from returning to their homes, despite the recommendations of the EU 
and other European institutions at the time. Thus, the comparative analysis of the first 
episodes in Bulgaria and Croatia demonstrate the importance of domestic-level variables, 
i.e. the level of dissatisfaction at the domestic realm and the degree of moderation 















State capacity Outcome 
 
Bulgaria (1990-1999) Low Very high Moderate Major reform 
Bulgaria (1999-2017) 
 
High Low Moderate Moderate reform 
Croatia (1990-2004) 
 
High Very low Moderate Minor reform 
Croatia (2004-2017) 
 
High High Moderate Major reform 
Montenegro (2006-2017) 
 
High High Low Moderate reform 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
The comparative analysis of Bulgaria and Croatia in the post-candidacy process 
also proves illuminating in terms of the mechanisms of Europeanisation at work in new 
member countries. The Bulgarian case offers interesting research puzzles in the post-
1999 period, when Bulgaria was declared a candidate country. In this period, the EU-
pressure in the field of minority rights increased significantly. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 4, the EU reports frequently highlighted the problems in minorities’ access to 
education in native language, social exclusion and equal representation. The Bulgarian 
authorities incorporated the main international rules and norms regarding the 
implementation of minority rights during the candidacy process thanks to the EU 
conditionality. However, Bulgaria’s reform performance in this period remained 
moderate. The shifting causal mechanisms of Europeanisation with reference to the 
changing domestic preferences inform Bulgaria’s reform performance. The Bulgarian 
elite, in the post-2000, defined the EU membership as a strategic goal to avoid Bulgaria’s 
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exclusion from the European enlargement process. However, the consensus between the 
majority and minority representatives started to evade as populist nationalism made a 
strong comeback during the EU membership process. The rise of right-wing nationalist 
movements in Bulgaria during 2000s hindered the effective implementation of sensitive 
minority reforms as mainstream parties also refrained to own the more-inclusive minority 
rights agenda in an adverse political setting. Therefore, minority rights reforms were 
implemented in a rather minimalist manner as the Turkish minority still experience 
restrictions in terms of accessing education in mother tongue, broadcasting in Turkish, 
certain religious freedoms and discrimination in labour markets. On the other hand, the 
political representative of the Turkish minority, MRF, did not pursue active policies to 
use EU platforms to promote the rights of the Turkish minority. Despite the MRF had the 
opportunity to contribute to the legal amendments in Bulgaria as a coalition partner in the 
post-2000 in two subsequent terms, the Party adopted a minimalist approach in terms of 
promoting the rights of Turkish minority.  
The MRF ruling elite argued that the minority rights issue is a domestic concern 
of the Bulgarian people rather than considering the EU conditionality as a bargaining 
chip. The MRF also became part of the establishment in Bulgarian politics and intra-party 
struggles diverted the attention of the ruling elites toward more immediate distributive 
interests rather than the concerns of the Turkish minority in terms of the adoption and 
implementation of their rights and freedoms. In summary, the changing preferences of the 
majority and minority elites at the domestic level hindered the consolidation of the rights 
of Turkish minority, despite the relatively high level of EU pressure during the candidacy 
period. Despite no major setbacks took place in Bulgaria in the post-membership process, 
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it appears that the main mechanisms through which the EU factor played its role refer to 
instrumental learning, as rationalist logic seems to have more explanatory capacity than 
norm-based social learning hypotheses.  
Croatia during 2004-2016, in contrast, suggests that domestic dissatisfaction 
regarding the existing minority rights regime intensified with the new political elite 
started to rule the country from 1999 onwards. The interview data suggest that combined 
with the high-level EU-pressure, the post-2000 represented the major transformation in 
terms of the rights of Serb minority. The new government enacted a series of legal texts 
on minority rights and inaugurated the new Constitutional Law on the Rights of National 
Minorities. The new leadership in Croatia also accepted the Serb community as an 
integral part of the Croatian society. Double moderation on the minority and majority 
sides was built on the dissatisfaction of the prevailing exclusionary policies of the 
Tudjman regime. In this environment of drastic preference change, the EU was utilized as 
a fertile avenue to introduce new minority rights regime. The comparative analysis of 
Croatia (2004-2017) and Bulgaria (1999-2017) reveals the impact of domestic-level 
factors in terms of informing reform outcomes. Despite EU pressure concerning the 
minority rights in both countries in the period in question, major reforms took place in 
Croatia while reform-inertia prevailed in Bulgaria mainly because of the diverging 
preferences of the domestic political elites.         
Finally, Montenegrin case shows the causal weight of state capacity and its 
importance in Europeanisation of minority rights as a conditioning parameter. Both 
Bulgaria and Croatia are classified as countries with moderate state capacity in terms of 
WGI. The conventional Europeanisation accounts tend to take certain level of state 
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capacity for granted. Accordingly, as conceptualised in Chapter 2, the main emphasis is 
put on the ‘degree of misfit’ between EU regulations and domestic arrangements. In 
Bulgarian and Croatian cases, state capacity proved high enough to validate this 
assumption. However, the mainstream causal factors of Europeanisation, whether 
proposed by the external incentives model or domestic compliance frameworks, need to 
be tested in contexts where state capacity problems loom large. Therefore, this research 
also concentrated on Montenegro to assess the impact of state capacity.  
In the Montenegrin case, reform process remained relatively moderate so far, 
despite high-level of EU-pressure and strong domestic demand towards the adoption of 
EU rules and norms. The Montenegro case, therefore, sheds light on the ways through 
which state capacity inform the outcome of minority reform processes, controlling EU-
level and domestic factors. The comparative analysis of three cases suggest that given 
certain-level of state capacity, the combination of high-level EU pressure and high 
domestic dissatisfaction – double moderation, in particular – paves the way for major 
reforms in minority rights as demonstrated in the Bulgarian and Croatian cases. However, 
if state capacity remains weak in target countries, the reforms remain moderate at best 
even though the EU exerts high-level of pressure and domestic elites on the majority and 
minority sides adopt compromising policies as demonstrated in the Croatian case.  
This dissertation maintains that ‘state capacity’ emerges as the key factor that 
inform the reform performance of countries given that both external conditionality and 
domestic dissatisfaction, therefore willingness for reform, remain high. The comparative 




Table 5.5. Comparative capacity indicators of Bulgaria, Croatia and Montenegro 
Capacity indicators Country          Year   Governance score* 































































*Measured on a scale between -2.5 and +2.5. Higher values correspond to better values  
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports  
 
 
As stated in the preceding paragraphs, the capacity of the states is estimated based 
on three main parameters, which are voice and accountability, regulatory quality, and 
government effectiveness. Accordingly, ‘voice and accountability’ refers to the extent to 
which the citizens are able to participate electoral process, enjoy freedom of expression, 
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freedom of association etc. Second, ‘regulatory quality’ refers to the capacity of the state 
to device sound and effective policies. Finally, ‘government effectiveness’ refers to the 
quality of public services and civil service as well as government’s capacity to honour its 
commitments.452 Given that state capacity is about the capabilities of the states to 
formulate and implement effective policies and deliver on the promises in terms of 
controlling borders and provide public goods, the above indicators capture essential 
institutional aspects of reform effectiveness. The score in each parameter is “measured on 
a scale between -2.5 and +2.5 – where higher values correspond to better values.”453   
The correlation between state capacity scores and reform effectiveness in minority 
rights does not directly reflect a causal relationship. Therefore, this dissertation also 
reviewed the European Commission reports and gathered more data through semi-
structured elite interviews. The progress reports on Montenegro constantly spots weak 
implementation performance due to major capacity problems. The interview data also 
suggest that despite high EU-pressure and reform willingness at the domestic elite-level, 
Montenegro struggles to improve the conditions of minority groups as the material, 
institutional, and human capacity of the state remain weak. 
One should suggest at this point that Croatia and Bulgaria also suffer from 
administrative problems, which are particularly evident in corruption indicators and in the 
field of the rule of law.454 The EU reports also point out the growing corruption problems 
																																																						
452 For in-depth explanation and measurement of each parameter, see the WGI website: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#faq  
453 Ibid. 
454 According to Worldwide Governance Indicators, for instance, Bulgaria experienced a slight decline in 
terms of its “corruption” score (from -0.07 in 2006 to -0.17 in 2016), which suggests that the EU 
conditionality has yet to make an impact in the area concerned. The interviewees also highlighted 
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especially for Bulgaria – still being monitored by European Commission within the 
context of Cooperation and Verification Mechanism.455 However, the administrative 
problems in these cases seem to be qualitatively different than the stateness problems in 
Montenegro and other Western Balkan states (such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo) 
as the former appears to be related to the ‘institutional misfit’ conceptualised in top-down 
approaches to Europeanisation. The latter, however, is mainly associated with institution-
building and capacity improvement in the first instance, rather than reforming the 
existing administrations to enhance efficiency and compliance capacity.456 As Fagan 
stated, “the pace of reforms in the Western Balkans has generally been slower […and] 
external governance has had to be more stringent and intrusive.”457 The comparative 
analysis of the cases studied in this dissertation also corroborates this inference since 
previous enlargement waves consist of states with a certain degree of capacity that did 
not impede the basic functioning of bureaucratic administrations – as discussed with 
																																																																																																																																																																	
corruption as one of the main problems that indirectly affects the state of minority communities as it paves 
the way for different forms of discrimination in labour market and civil service. Kemal Eyüp (Chairman of 
the Commission for Protection against Discrimination, 2005-2012 and member of the Commission 2012 - 
present), interview by author, March 18, 2016. 
455 The corruption problem still proves a challenging issue for Bulgarian policy makers. Despite a decade 
passed since the EC launched the CVM, the relevant reports still underline the sluggish reform performance 
of Bulgaria. See: European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism, SWD(2017)700 
final, 15 November 2017 (European Commission, Brussels: 2017) 
456 For a comprehensive assessment, see Arolda Elbasani, ed., European Integration and Transformation in 
the Western Balkans: Europeanisation or Business as Usual? (London: Routledge, 2012). 
457 Adam Fagan, Europe’s Balkans Dilemma: Paths to Civil Society or State Building (London: I.B. 
Taurus, 2010): 26. Some scholars criticise the EU’s approach towards Western Balkans, as its interventions 
go beyond ‘external’ conditionality and take a form of ‘direct’ involvement. See David Chandler, “State-
building in Bosnia: The Limits of ‘Informal Trusteeship,’” International Journal of Peace Studies 11, no, 1 
(2006): 17–38.   
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reference to Central and Eastern Europe in the conceptual chapter.458 In these states the 
accession process targeted the transformation of bureaucratic institutional structures of 
the Soviet state machinery. The Western Balkans cases, however, reflect a different 
pattern, which has major consequences in minority rights policies as well: 
 
The issues concerning the role and function of the state in the potential candidate 
and candidate countries of the Western Balkans … have been altogether more 
complex and far-reaching […]. Notions of sovereignty and the basic institutions 
and functions of the state are being built more or less from scratch under 
obviously difficult circumstances.459 
    
Montenegrin case, therefore, appears to be qualitatively different as reform 
outcomes cannot be entirely explained only with reference to the credibility of EU 
conditionality (external incentives) and domestic dissatisfaction (willingness for reform) 
toward reforming and modernising already existing institutions and deep-seated policy 
practises. This dissertation also proposed ‘state capacity’ as a necessary parameter as part 
of the two-level model to account for diverging reform outcomes in recent member and 
candidate countries. The previous accounts take it very much as given since state capacity 
did not emerge as a perennial problem in the previous enlargement waves. As such, 
despite having had a long history of governance experience as of the Montenegrin people 
as being one of the autochthone nations in the region, the newly independent 
Montenegrin state faces capacity problems that go beyond consistency of external 
																																																						
458 Tanja A. Börzel, “When Europeanisation Hits Limited Statehood: The Western Balkans as a Test Case 
for the Transformative Power of the Europe”, KFG Working Paper, no. 30 (2011): 11.  
459 Fagan, Europe’s Balkans Dilemma, 28. 
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conditions and resistance of domestic ruling elites, which hints that state capacity appears 
to the missing link in Europeanisation of domestic arena.   
 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the comparative analysis of Bulgaria, Croatia, and Montenegro. 
These three cases have illustrative capacity as they provide ample empirical evidence to 
explore the dynamics of Europeanisation in new member and candidate countries in the 
realm of minority rights. By studying these three cases, this chapter made two main 
points. First, it built on and revised the mainstream accounts of Europeanisation. 
Accordingly, the main argument is that domestic area does not always constitute an 
impediment to be overcome as part of Europeanisation process. The Bulgarian case 
demonstrates that, even though the EU-pressure is low, the major reforms can take place 
in minority rights in line with the European norms and values if very high elite-level 
dissatisfaction emerges toward a new minority regime. In the Bulgarian case, the 
majority-minority leaders managed to utilize the EU as an opportunity window to ensure 
elite-level consensus. The Croatian case, on the other hand, demonstrates that the 
minority reforms remained minor during 1990-1999 because of the very low domestic 
dissatisfaction and lack of pro-European leadership.  
This chapter also aimed to shed light on the limits of Europeanisation of minority 
rights in EU candidates with weak state capacity, which is a neglected aspect in 
Europeanisation and minority rights scholarship. This chapter pointed out that the 
challenge of the EU conditionality in the new (and potential) candidate states is to 
strengthen the state’s institutional capacity along with empowering pro-reform majority 
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and minority representatives. The Montenegrin case demonstrates that in the absence of 
state capacity to frame shared objectives and implements them in coordination with civil 
society is likely lead to the stagnation in reform process, despite the EU’s extensive 
support and domestic ownership of minority and human rights reforms. The conclusion 
chapter delineates the implications of these findings for broader literature on 

















CHAPTER VI. Conclusion 
 
Donald Puchala, a leading scholar of integration studies, once likened integration 
scholars to blind men trying to define an elephant. Each blind man, touching a different 
part of the elephant, reaches different conclusions.460 This analogy can also be applied to 
Europeanisation research as the mechanisms of the ways in which EU’s impact on 
domestic policies have become more complex with the deepening and expansion of 
European integration project over decades. One can suggest that the EU’s transformative 
power on target states has become one of the fields on which much ink has been spilled. 
As such, the impact of the EU on member and candidate countries now constitutes an 
established yet still unfolding area in European studies. Despite extensive literature on 
EU conditionality especially in old EU members, the dynamics of Europeanisation in 
new member and candidate countries are still underexplored areas. The Europeanisation 
process in minority rights is even more contested as multiple factors interact in highly 
sensitive political contexts. This dissertation focused on the transformation of minority 
rights regime in three new member and candidate states that share a similar tormented 
historical background in terms of inter-ethnic relations to shed light in this underexplored 
area.   
This concluding chapter summarises the main findings of the dissertation. The 
rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: The first part revisits the research puzzle and 
conceptual framework. The second part explores alternative explanations and discusses 
																																																						
460 Donald Puchala, “Of Blind Men, Elephant, and International Integration,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 10, no.3 (1971): 267-284 
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how this dissertation complements existing literature. The final part delineates avenues 
for further research.  
6.1. Revisiting research puzzle and conceptual framework 
The present dissertation focused on the Europeanisation of minority rights policies in 
Bulgaria, Croatia, and Montenegro – three Balkan countries that share a contentious past 
in terms of inter-ethnic relations yet managed to transform the minority regime (broadly) 
in line with the EU norms and values. The comparative analysis of these three cases has 
potential to contribute to the relevant body of literature due to two main reasons. First, 
Europeanisation literature mainly focuses on core EU members and conventional policy 
areas where EU norms and regulations are well established. The recent wave on 
Europeanisation – which can be called as ‘second wave’ – expanded the horizons of the 
literature by focusing on the 2004 big bang enlargement.  
The inclusion of Central and East European countries brought new research 
puzzles and opened up new avenues for further research to assess the EU impact on 
different cases and policy areas.461 The recent enlargement wave including Bulgaria, 
Romania, and finally, Croatia as well as the candidacy of other Western Balkan countries 
motivated new set of studies that focused on the ways through which Europeanisation 
																																																						
461 For instance, see: Tim Haughton, “When Does the EU Make a Difference? Conditionality and the 
Accession Process in Central and Eastern Europe,” Political Studies Review 5, no. 2 (2007): 233-246; 
Heather Grabbe, “Europeanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process,” in 
Politics of Europeanisation, edited by Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli, chapter 13 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier ed. The Europeanisation of 
Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005); Adrienne Heritier, 
“Europeanisation Research East and West: A Comparative Assessment,” in The Europeanisation of Central 
and Eastern Europe, edited by Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich Sedelmeier, chapter 10 (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2005). 
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makes its way into domestic political and social structures.462 The study of new cases 
proves beneficial not only because they test the propositions of mainstream theories but 
also functional in offering alternative causal mechanisms and specifying new, plausibly 
previously omitted causal factors that inform political outcomes. This dissertation also 
aims to build on and expand the recent wave of Europeanisation research by focusing on 
two recent members, Bulgaria and Croatia, and a candidate country – Montenegro.     
Second, this dissertation focuses on minority rights policies – a contested area that 
European norms and values are likely to penetrate into domestic field in a rather slow and 
fragmented manner. The Europeanisation of minority rights regimes in target countries 
tends to be a controversial issue as the EU norms and regulations are not clearly defined 
and rigorously implemented as part of EU conditionality.463 Thus member states are 
likely to interpret the term, “minority”, in a flexible way that might lead to significant 
divergence across cases. This does not, however, mean that the EU conditionality does 
not have any major impact on member and candidate countries. On the contrary, 
especially in the post-Lisbon process, the EU conditionality on minority rights area has 
become central to Europeanisation process.464 However, the mainstream accounts, as 
																																																						
462 On the Europeanisation of Western Balkans, see Gergana Noutcheva and Senem Aydin-Duzgit, “Lost in 
Europeanisation: The Western Balkans and Turkey,” West European Politics 35, no. 1 (2012): 59-78; 
Arolda Elbasani ed., European Integration and Transformation in the Western Balkans: Europeanization 
or Business as Usual? (London: Routledge, 2013); Florian Trauner, The Europeanisation of the Western 
Balkans: EU Justice and Home Affairs in Croatia and Macedonia (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2011). 
463 Gwendolyn Sasse, “Tracing the Construction and Effects of EU Conditionality,” in Minorities in East 
and Central Europe, edited by Bernd Rechel, 17-32 (London: Routledge, 2009); David J. Galbreath and 
Joanne McEvoy, The European Minority Rights Regime: Towards a Theory of Regime Effectiveness 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).   
464 For the increasing importance of minority rights in post-Lisbon EU legislation see Ulrike Barten, 
“Minority Rights in the European Union after Lisbon,” Nordic Journal of Human Rights 33, no. 1 (2015): 
74-94.   
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Sasse rightly points out, are likely to eschew some potential mechanisms through which 
change in minority rights policies may take place in aspiring states.465 Furthermore, one 
can suggest Europeanisation of minority rights regime is discernible in cases that have 
conflictual history of inter-ethnic relations as well.  
In this vein, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Montenegro are illustrative cases to explore 
diverging patterns of Europeanisation in minority rights regime. Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria, which were suppressed by the Zhivkov government in the final phases of the 
communist regime, managed to integrate with the Bulgarian society during 1990s 
following the regime change. The suppressive policies of the Zhivkov era were revoked 
and the basic collective rights of the Turkish minority were restored. The new Bulgarian 
elite adopted an avowedly pro-European stance and implemented rather sensitive 
minority reforms to ensure peaceful democratic transition and inter-ethnic co-existence. 
The status of Turkish minority population gradually consolidated in the 2000s; as a result, 
the political representative of the Turks, the MRF, has become an integral part of the 
Bulgarian political life.466  
The minority-majority relations in Croatia also witnessed dramatic ups and downs 
over the last three decades. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia and the independence 
declaration of Croatia, the violent conflict between ethnic Croats and Serb minority posed 
a significant challenge in terms of restoring domestic stability in the country. The violent 
conflict in Croatia was a great concern for the EU mainly due to its spill over potential 
																																																						
465 Gwendolyn Sasse, “The Politics of EU Conditionality: the Norm of Minority Protection during and 
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across Balkans region in the 1990s. Thus, starting from the early phases of Croatia’s 
independence, the EU pursued active policies to shape minority-majority relations in the 
newly established fragile Western Balkans state. However, the state of Serb minority was 
not improved during the 1990s. On the contrary, the Tudjman regime adopted 
‘exclusionary’ policies toward Serb minority living in Croatia as part of ultra-nationalist 
policies that prevailed thorough the 1990s. The major transformation in Croatia’s 
minority regime came with the 2000s,467 which gradually paved the way for Croatia’s 
integration with the EU in 2013.  
Montenegro is the final – and one of the understudied cases in Europeanisation 
literature. Montenegro, a post-conflict Western Balkan country gained its independence 
in 2006, also deals with minority issues, as the country hosts several ethnic groups 
including Bosniaks and Albanians.468 Montenegro adopted several minority regulations to 
comply with the EU regulations and the rule adoption accelerated since 2012 when 
Montenegro started accession negotiations. Montenegro poses a striking example of 
Europeanisation as the EU-pressure and dissatisfaction of domestic political elites led to 
rapid adoption of EU rules in the minority field. However, the implementation staggers 
due to state capacity problems as discussed in chapter 5. The comparative analysis of 
Montenegro as a candidate state with two new EU member states indicates that 
Montenegro differs remarkably in terms of implementation of the minority rights 
regulations.  
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Based on three cases mentioned above, this dissertation addressed an empirical 
puzzle to reveal under which conditions and through which mechanisms transformation 
in minority-majority policies take place in new member and candidate countries: Despite 
similar – conflictual – inter-ethnic background conditions and the emergence of the EU 
as key external norm-setter in the Western Balkans, why do we observe diverging 
patterns in terms of timing and degree of the Europeanisation of minority rights? Also, 
how do the interactions of domestic and external dynamics shape minority policies in 
these three cases?  
This dissertation sketched out two-level model to account for continuity and 
change in minority rights policies in new member and candidate countries. The external 
incentive model, being dominant analytical framework in Europeanisation research, tends 
to consider domestic area as an impediment that should be overcome to ensure norm 
compliance and rule adoption.469 The two-level model adopted in this dissertation 
challenges this perspective and proposes that domestic area may also act as enabler in 
terms of rule adoption and norm compliance. As such, this dissertation also zooms into 
the domestic factors as drivers of possible change. Accordingly, the two-level model 
focuses on external and domestic drivers simultaneously to weight in the EU factor by 
placing it into its proper context. 
The first level refers to the external conditionality. The hierarchical models that 
follow “logic of consequences” focus on the credibility of the EU conditionality over 
aspiring states. The clearly defined EU rules and consistent application of conditionality 
																																																						
469 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the 
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within and across cases are likely to send credible signals to the candidate and member 
countries.470 The basic assumption is that the EU employs standard set of conditionality, 
i.e. checklist, based on the acquis that frame bilateral relations with target states. 
However, the empirical research suggests that the EU conditionality cannot always be 
considered as a technical and politically neutral process. Brosig, for instance, pointed out 
the fact in Central and Eastern European context that “minority rights norms are vaguely 
formulated and allow for arbitrary interpretations which complicate the application of 
these norms.”471 In politically sensitive areas, such as minority and human rights policies, 
highly politicised nature of the accession and membership process is noted in the 
literature.472 The consistent implementation of the EU conditionality that is tied to 
sizeable rewards increases the likelihood of EU credibility and transformative capacity. 
As such, the research on external conditionality and rule adoption propose that more 
consistent EU rules in the subject matter and more credible rewards proposed by the EU 
increases the likelihood of EU’s reinforcement capacity.473  
The second pillar of the two-level model sketched out in this dissertation focuses 
on domestic drivers of rule adoption and policy change. The top-down approaches to 
Europeanisation, which focus predominantly on the first pillar of the analytical model 
described above, conceptualise ‘domestic’ as an area where status quo prevails. 
Accordingly, the EU conditionality upsets domestic status quo by empowering certain 
																																																						
470 Arista Maria Cirtautas and Frank Schimmelfennig, “Europeanisation Before and After Accession: 
Conditionality, Legacies and Compliance,” Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 3 (2010): 421-441.  
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domestic actors through “incentives for compliance with EU rules.”474 However, the 
linear interpretation of the EU impact and the negligence of the domestic field as possible 
driver of change may lead to over-determination of the EU impact. This dissertation 
maintains that high domestic dissatisfaction of the existing policies may also trigger 
policy change. Stated differently, not only external conditionality that links rule 
compliance with credible rewards, but also domestic dissatisfaction regarding the 
prevalent policies in the minority rights regime may motivate domestic political elite to 
initiate change.  
What determines dissatisfaction of the existing minority policies and which actors 
assume catalyser role in terms of policy change and adoption of new norms? Börzel states 
that domestic push for change is likely to emanate from different players – political 
parties, political elites, and domestic interest groups – depending on temporal and 
contextual scope conditions.475 Drawing on three post-conflict cases, this dissertation 
maintains that political elites on the minority and majority sides play a key role in 
adopting moderate policies – i.e., ‘double moderation’ – along with minority-friendly 
political rhetoric. Therefore, the presence of moderate political elites is likely to create 
enabling scope conditions at the domestic political field to take advantage of the 
Europeanisation processes regardless the domestic political cost of compliance.476  
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The two-level model proposes that major policy changes in the minority field take 
place when domestic dissatisfaction emerges in target states during Europeanisation 
process. The consistent implementation of the EU conditionality, in this context, 
empowers domestic change agents and informs new minority-friendly paradigms framed 
by the minority and majority elites through four causal mechanisms depending on the 
context: instrumental-learning, social learning, naming and shaming, and peer 
pressure.477 The combination of credible EU conditionality and high-level domestic 
dissatisfaction, in turn, leads to substantial policy changes in minority policies. On the 
other hand, in the absence of domestic dissatisfaction, compliance with EU norms and 
regulations remain incomplete and shallow regardless of the level of external 
conditionality. Thus, the two-level model, rather than prioritising one level of analysis 
vis-à-vis the other, offers an interactive analysis treating both levels equally significant. 
The existing literature on the mechanisms of top-down and bottom-up 
Europeanisation, whether they rely on rationalist or constructivist frameworks, mainly 
focus on the sources of misfit between ‘rule adoption’ and ‘policy implementation.’ 
Accordingly, policy de-coupling occurs when legal adoption does not match with the 
effective implementation of EU regulations. It is assumed that effective pressure of the 
EU institutions and high-level domestic dissatisfaction altogether are likely to decrease 
the gap between rule adoption and policy implementation. The administrative reform 
capacities in target states that link reform willingness of the domestic political elite with 
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external conditionality is also highlighted to explain the policy variance across cases.478 
The administrative capacity also discussed extensively in the Europeanisation process of 
Central and Eastern European cases.479 However, the literature on mediating factors that 
explain the ways in which EU conditionality makes its way into domestic policy change 
needs adjustment with recent enlargement wave targeting Western Balkan countries. The 
states in the Western Balkans – such as Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina – have 
more fundamental problems in terms of mediating factors that were not taken into 
consideration in previous enlargement waves. The challenge for the EU in the Western 
Balkans is that the states in question suffer from stateness – i.e., state capacity – 
problems. This dissertation proposes that, in states with weak capacity, policy de-
coupling is likely to be significant even though external conditionality proves consistent 
and domestic dissatisfaction remains relatively high.  
In summary, two-level model offered in this dissertation explains policy variance 
in minority rights – dependent variable – with reference to different constellations of the 
EU conditionality and domestic dissatisfaction – independent variables – that are 
mediated by degree of state capacity. The three empirical cases discussed in the previous 
chapters test different combinations of the EU and domestic-level factors in terms of their 
impact on policy outcomes in the realm of minority rights. 
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6.2. Empirical findings 
Five sub-periods in three different cases provide variance in terms of three building 
blocks of the two-level model sketched in this dissertation: Bulgaria (1990s), Bulgaria 
(2000s), Croatia (1990s), Croatia (2000s), and Montenegro (2000s). The Bulgarian and 
Croatian cases are illuminative to assess different combinations of domestic and EU-level 
dynamics given moderate state capacity.  
 









Bulgaria (1990-1999) Low Very High Adequate Major reform 
Croatia (1990-2004) High Very Low Adequate Minor reform 
Bulgaria (1999-2017) High Low Adequate Moderate reform 
Croatia (2004-2017) High High Adequate Major reform 
  
The table summarises empirical findings about four different periods in two 
countries. Both Bulgaria and Croatia have moderate degree of state capacity that does not 
hamper proper functioning of public administrations.480 Therefore, the comparative 
analysis of Bulgaria and Croatia in different junctures enables observing different 
constellations of domestic and EU-level factors in minority rights reform outcomes. 
During 1990s, Bulgaria achieved major reforms in minority rights – a period that refers to 
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low EU-pressure but very high domestic dissatisfaction regarding the dominant minority 
rights policies. In the same period, due to the intense inter-ethnic conflicts in the Balkans 
region, the EU and other international organisations prioritised the state of ethnic 
minorities in Croatia as well. Thus, one can suggest that EU-pressure remained high with 
regard to minority issues despite Croatia was not part of the EU enlargement scheme at 
the time. The minority policy reforms in both countries, which were suffered from 
conflictual inter-ethnic relations, however, diverged considerably. Whereas Bulgaria 
managed to reverse the anti-minority policies during 1990s, Croatia followed an entirely 
different path that led to the total exclusion of Serb minority in Croatia. The comparative 
analysis of the two cases corroborates the main argument that reform outcomes are 
mainly domestic driven phenomena – basically complemented and guided by the EU 
anchor. In-depth analysis of the Bulgarian case in chapter 3 suggests that one should 
focus on the domestic front, especially the attitudes of minority and majority elites, to 
account for the dynamics of reform inertia or activism in minority rights policies.  
In the Bulgarian case, for instance, key mechanism that explains restoration of the 
rights of Turkish minority appears as ‘double moderation’ between majority and minority 
leaders that reflect the very high dissatisfaction on part of the new political elite in 
Bulgaria. In such a contentious political environment, the EU acted as a common 
denominator and source of legitimacy that informed an alternative political narrative 
regarding minority rights. Therefore, the EU factor played an indirect role by 
empowering pro-reform domestic elites via social learning to legitimise alternative norms 
and policy frames. The Croatian case, in the same period, refers to an alternative policy 
trajectory in terms of the ways in which EU-factor makes its way into domestic polities. 
	
221	
Chapter 5 demonstrated that the EU put more emphasis on minority issues in Croatia in 
comparison to Bulgaria. The minority regime in Croatia was not improved in any way 
due to the categorical exclusion policies of the Tudjman government. President Tudjman 
adopted a very strict exclusionary approach with regard to the state of Serb minority so 
that inter-ethnic moderation was not become possible. As Hajdinjak points out Tudjman 
placed national sovereignty “above the declared importance of joining the European 
Union; hence the EU’s influence over the domestic policy was insignificant.”481             
The comparative analysis of Bulgaria in the post-candidacy process also provides 
empirical data to explore how different joining up of domestic and EU-level factors lead 
to diverging policy outcomes in the minority rights area. The post-candidacy Bulgaria is 
marked by high EU pressure as the European Commission highlighted minority issues in 
progress reports on a regular basis. The remaining restrictions on the collective rights of 
Turkish minority, however, were not entirely addressed in this period – such as education 
in mother tongue, broadcasting and publications in Turkish language, and socio-
economic improvement of the status of Turkish minority members (see Chapter 4). This 
poses a paradox since the stagnation in the rights of Turkish minority emerged in a time 
interval when the EU has increasing leverage over Bulgarian political elite in return for 
sizeable rewards – i.e., membership prospect. Based on the two-level model, it was 
demonstrated that one should focus on changing preferences of domestic minority and 
majority political elite to explain moderate reform performance. The 2000s led to gradual 
transformation of Bulgarian ethnic model from ‘double moderation’ to ‘double challenge’ 
of the minority-majority relations. On the minority side, shifting priorities of the political 
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party, the MRF, that represent the Turks in Bulgaria explains part of the foot-dragging in 
minority reforms. The MRF elites, as discussed in chapter 4, has become part of the 
political establishment in 2000s and played an active role in distributive politics. The 
minority reforms agenda, which has become a very sensitive issue in contemporary 
Bulgarian politics, was downgraded in the priorities of the MRF ruling elite in the period. 
Thus, as interview data revealed, the political elite representing Turkish minority did not 
pursue a proactive strategy at the European platforms and Bulgarian Parliament to push 
for a more inclusive minority regime in Bulgaria.  
The shifting domestic political context should be considered as the other aspect of 
‘double challenge’ in Bulgarian ethnic model. Both hard data and interviews suggest that 
the increasing visibility of Turkish minority in Bulgarian politics, along with economic 
problems and migration challenge, paved the way for the rise of far-right political 
parties.482 The anti-Turkish political rhetoric of the far-right parties slowed down the 
minority reform agenda by dominating the political discourse and pushing the 
mainstream parties toward minority-sceptic political rhetoric, exemplified with the 
election of Boyko Borisov as the new Bulgarian prime minister.483 Even though post-
membership Bulgaria does not reflect a case of “lock-in non-compliance” that reverse 
previously implemented minority reforms as Sedelmeier demonstrated with reference to 
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some Central East European examples,484 the unfavourable domestic conditions restricted 
the consolidation of minority-friendly regime in the post-accession process.    
     Finally, the comparative analysis of Croatia and Montenegro, two Western Balkan 
countries sharing a similar background in terms of conflictual inter-ethnic relations, 
provide empirical evidence to explore how and the ways in which state capacity informs 
reform capacity in aspiring states. The post-2000 period constitutes a new episode in 
terms of minority regime in Croatia. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the new political elite 
that started to rule the country in the post-Tudjman era adopted an avowedly pro-
European discourse as part of which reconciliation with the Serb minority became a 
political priority. The exclusionary policies of the Tudjman regime that constituted the 
founding pillar of nation-building strategy was considered as an impediment for the new 
political elite to deepen Croatia’s relations with Euro-Atlantic alliance.485 At the same 
time, the ruling elite of the Serb minority adopted a moderate stance especially in 
comparison to the 1990s, which in turn, created conducive background for inter-ethnic 
moderation.486  
On the other hand, the minority reforms became part of the EU conditionality 
during Croatia’s candidacy process. As a result, important reforms with regards to 
minority rights were implemented in Croatia that improved the situation of Croatian 
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Serbs. As interview data suggest, despite some problems concerning the return of the 
displaced people and property ownership of the Serb minority members still remains to 
be addressed, collective rights of the Croatian Serbs have been significantly improved.487 
Thus the combination of high EU-pressure and high-level domestic dissatisfaction paved 
the way for significant improvement in minority rights regime.       
The comparative account of the transformation of minority rights regime in 
Montenegro is also illuminative to assess the impact of state capacity on reform 
outcomes. The Montenegrin case refers to a clear example of high-level EU pressure and 
domestic willingness to adopt EU rules and regulations. The DPS government, even 
before independence, considered European integration as a top political priority. 
Furthermore, pro-independence camp in Montenegro’s independence referendum 
“comprised a multi-ethnic coalition that included not only the vast majority of those who 
identify themselves as ethnically Montenegrin but all the national minorities as well.”488 
Thus the DPS government in the post-independence era adopted minority legislation in a 
rapid manner without any significant delay emanating from domestic veto players. The 
EU, on the other hand, prioritised reform processes in Montenegro as the country 
emerged as the most stable and promising candidate in an otherwise instable region. The 
EU conditionality on minority reforms attached to credible commitments and sizeable 
rewards – membership being the most important ultimate goal. For instance, the DPS 
governments met all demands of the EU regarding cooperation with the ICTY and 
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tolerance toward ethnic minorities.489 Thus, the Montenegrin case in this period should be 
considered quite similar to the Croatian case in terms of the degree of EU-pressure and 
high-level domestic dissatisfaction.  
The implementation performance in Montenegro, as discussed in chapter 5, 
however, seems to be lagging behind due to diverging state capacities in two cases. The 
literature on Western Balkans highlights the fact that there occurs a clear gap between the 
transposition of EU rule and implementation performance.490 Elbasani and Sabic, for 
instance, point out that “patterns of compliance [may remain] largely surface-thin.”491   
The problem of de-coupling, i.e., rapid rule adoption but weak implementation 
performance, proves a significant challenge in the Montenegrin case as well. As such, 
most of the minority reforms remained “rhetorical” due to the insufficient state 
administrative capacity at the national and local level.492 The assessments of the EU 
documents and interview data suggest that the state’s insufficient capacity emerges as an 
important factor that condition the positions of political elites and limit their capabilities 
to initiate comprehensive reforms, which in turn, hampers substantial improvements in 
the minority rights regime of the country despite the existence of EU-level conditionality 
and strong political willingness at the domestic level. 
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Accordingly, the comparative analysis leads to three main propositions regarding 
the dynamics of substantial and sustainable policy change in minority rights regime in 
new member and candidate states:  
Proposition 1: The likelihood of rule adoption and compliance in minority rights 
policies increases, if ruling majority elites are dissatisfied with the existing 
policies and double moderation takes place between majority and minority 
leaders. 
Proposition 2: The aspiring states are more likely to adopt international 
regulations on minority rights when the EU applies conditionality in a consistent 
and coherent manner. 
Proposition 3: The lower the capacity of a state, the more difficult to adopt EU-
induced human (and minority) rights reforms in target countries – even though the 
EU pursues a coherent minority agenda and domestic elites are dissatisfied with 
the existing minority policies.  
 
In summary, two-level model suggests that state capacity (proposition 3), 
domestic dissatisfaction (proposition 1) and EU-level pressure (proposition 2) constitute 
necessary conditions separately whereas they jointly constitute sufficient condition for 
effective improvement in minority rights regime in new member and candidate states.   
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6.3. Eliminating alternative explanations  
This section re-visits alternative mainstream Europeanisation accounts to reveal how two-
level model complements the existent explanations. In this context, two main 
perspectives – rationalist external incentives model and lesson-drawing model – that are 
compared with two-level model sketched out in this dissertation. The mainstream 
explanations in the literature mainly focus on the top-down mechanisms that try to 
extrapolate the ways in which the EU inform policy, politics, and polity change at the 
domestic realm. The external incentive model suggests that adoption of EU norms and 
regulations are informed by the credibility and size of material incentives that the EU 
provides. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue that the target governments are likely to 
comply with EU regulations when attached to sizeable rewards. As such, “the likelihood 
of rule adoption increases with the size and speed of rewards.”493 Vachudova also points 
out that adoption costs for domestic governments inform the likelihood of norm-
compliance in target states.494 The likelihood of compliance is therefore considered 
inversely correlated with domestic adoption costs for aspiring states.495 
The external incentives model does not entirely account for the dynamics of 
minority reforms in the cases discussed in this dissertation. For instance, during 1990s, 
Bulgaria achieved major reforms in the areas of minority protection and democratisation. 
The reforms were paradigmatic as both institutional and normative parameters 
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undergirding inter-ethnic relations were transformed. However, external incentives model 
does not account for mechanisms led to the undertaken reforms. First, the membership 
credibility was not high at the time, as the EU did not offer a credible membership 
process at least till the end of 1990s. Second, the adoption costs were very high for the 
government at the time to implement minority-friendly reforms due to long shadow of 
exclusionary policies.  
As discussed in chapter 3, the significant part of ethnic Bulgarians and political 
opposition were sceptical about restoring the rights of Turkish minority in the country. 
However, the political elites, led by Zhelyu Zhelev, implemented major reforms that 
shifted the inter-ethnic relations in a dramatic manner. It appears that hierarchical 
approaches such as external incentive model do not entirely account for policy change in 
candidate and member countries, as they tend to eschew different domestic political 
constellations. In this vein, Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig also admit, “that it can be 
expected that ‘Europeanisation’ will increasingly be informed by domestic political 
structures and resource endowments [and] greater variation of outcomes across policy 
domains is to be expected … according to uniquely configured institutional and socio-
cultural capacities.”496 Two-level model offered in this research aims to rectify this gap 
by explicitly hypothesising that minority rights reforms are more likely to take place 
when domestic ruling elites on the majority and minority sides are dissatisfied with 
existing policies and facilitate double moderation that warrants suitable background 
conditions in terms of domestic ownership of pro-minority reforms. 
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The second alternative explanation is lesson-drawing model. This version of 
policy change mainly focuses on the bottom-up explanations and domestic dissatisfaction 
in particular.497 Accordingly, ‘lesson-drawing’, first suggested by Rose, refers to 
voluntary transfer of rules and norms from abroad without pressure of external 
conditionality.498 Rose suggests that ‘lesson-drawing’ emerges as an outcome of 
dissatisfaction at the domestic level. 499 The literature identifies different types and 
degrees of ‘lesson-drawing.’500 Yet, at the very basic level, it mainly occurs when 
domestic political elite, unhappy with the status quo, looks for alternative policies abroad 
to adopt them at the domestic area. As such, lesson-drawing model, opposite to 
hierarchical top-down approaches, reverses direction of causality by zooming into 
domestic-level. Despite ‘lesson-drawing’ accounts for some of the mechanisms of 
Europeanisation skipped by top-down approaches, it cannot explain entirely how and 
why policy change (in minority rights) realises in case of low-level dissatisfaction at the 
domestic-level. For instance, despite changing preferences of domestic political elite in 
Bulgaria in 2000s, the minority reforms remained on the agenda as major legal texts were 
adopted during the candidacy process. Similarly, data suggest that, in the Croatian and 
Montenegrin cases, the EU conditionality emerged as equally important factor as degree 
of domestic dissatisfaction. Therefore, two-level model merges ‘lesson-drawing’ with 
external conditionality to provide a comprehensive conceptual framework.      
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6.4. Avenues for further research 
There are two main avenues to further improve the present research. First, this 
dissertation, while focusing on domestic factors and double moderation between minority 
and majority elites in particular, does not explore the attitudes of minority and majority 
members to assess the degree of their dissatisfaction and the ways in which they informed 
the preferences of political elites on both sides. The analysis of the Bulgarian and 
Croatian cases demonstrates that the ruling elites on majority and minority sides 
challenged conventional political tendencies at the popular level. However, more research 
is required to reveal why and how some political leaders utilise critical junctures to 
introduce major policy changes, whereas some others stick to status quo. The post-1990s 
developments in Bulgaria and Croatia are good cases in point to demonstrate diverging 
preferences of majority actors. The Bulgarian ruling elite, led by Zhelev, for instance, 
adopted a minority-friendly approach and framed new policies as an opportunity to 
facilitate rapprochement with the European institutions. However, the Croatian majority 
elite at the time, led by Tudjman, pursued different set of policies that excluded Serb 
minority and distanced Croatia from the EU. Even though the difference in the degree of 
domestic dissatisfaction explains the diverging policy path in two post-conflict polities in 
1990s, more research is needed to assess why this difference took place at the agency-
level.     
Second, two-level model sketched out in this dissertation needs to be applied to 
other cases and policy areas to explore when and how domestic factors act as a facilitator 
of Europeanisation, rather than posing an impediment as conceptualised in hierarchical 
approaches. The empirical findings demonstrate that mechanisms of Europeanisation 
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differ across cases and policy areas. The recent developments in the European member 
states such as Poland and Hungary also suggest that de-Europeanisation has replaced 
patterns of compliance in the several fields – especially in terms of rule of law, 
democratisation, and freedom of speech.501 The overall democratic regression in Central 
and Eastern Europe and illiberal minority policies have already been well documented in 
the scholarly literature.502 The Croatian and Bulgarian cases, in this context, reflect a 
different pattern. Despite certain problems associated with corruption and quality of 
democracy in both cases, post-membership institutional lock in Croatia and Bulgaria 
appears to be more resilient than fellow Central and East European states, which can be 
observed in the realm of minority rights regime as well. The future research may shed 
light on this intriguing puzzle to reveal the factors affecting the resilience of minority-
friendly regimes in recent member and candidate countries despite increasing illiberalism 
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Total number of interviews is 51. 
• 13 of them are third party observers (informed observers of Bulgarian politics and 
majority-minority relations in Bulgaria such as scholars, journalists, pundits). 
• 22 of them are representatives of Turkish minority. This sample includes the top 
political figures of the MRF, Turkish minority’s political party, and the people 
who are subject to forced migration during 1989 and returned back to Bulgaria 
thereafter. 
• 16 of them include the political and bureaucratic elite in Bulgaria. The sample 
consists of political representatives of major parties, the bureaucratic figures who 
represented Bulgaria in minority rights issue and the EU officials. 
 
























Total number of interviews I conducted in Croatia is 18. 
• 10 of them are third party observers (informed observers of Croatian politics and 
majority-minority relations in Croatia such as scholars, journalists, pundits). 
• 5 of them are representatives of minority groups in Croatia. 
• 3 of them include the political and bureaucratic elite in Croatia. The sample 
consists of political representatives of major parties, the bureaucratic figures who 
represented Croatia in minority rights issue and the EU officials. 
 





























Total number of interviews I conducted in Montenegro is 16. 
• 6 of them are third party observers (informed observers of Montenegrin politics 
and majority-minority relations in Montenegro such as scholars, journalists, 
pundits). 
• 4 of them are representatives of minority groups in Montenegro. 
• 6 of them include the political and bureaucratic elite in Montenegro. The sample 
consists of political representatives of major parties, the bureaucratic figures who 
represent Montenegro in minority rights issue and the EU officials. 
 






















Appendix 2. Interview Questions 
 
Bulgaria: 
1. The Bulgarian ethnic model is shown as an example of peaceful coexistence. 
What made Bulgarians achieved the current image? In your view, what are the 
positives and negatives of the Bulgarian ethnic model?  
2. What do you think about the “national revival process” (vazroditelen protses)? 
3. What are the reasons Turks and new Bulgarian elites have cooperated after 
communism? Sub-question: What are the factors that deterred a violent conflict 
between ethnic Bulgarians and Turks in the final years of the Communist regime? 
4. How did the EU membership process affect the relationship between Bulgarian 
and Turkish communities and the minority issues? 
5. What was the role of the EU during negotiations in terms of improving minority 
rights in Bulgaria? Sub-question: what was your approach to the EU’s demands 
in this realm? 
6. What do you think are the main remaining problems in the protection of minority 
rights? Sub-question: Do you observe a slowdown in reform process after 
membership? 
7. Was there domestic demand for the reformation of minority rights policies in 
Bulgarian elites and public during the EU membership process?  
8. What is the role of political leaders (both Bulgarian and minority leaders) in the 
relationship between Bulgarian and Turkish communities?  
a. During the transition period in early 1990s 
b. During EU membership process in the late 1990s and 2000s?  
9. If the EU factor did not play its role and domestic/local leaders did not act the 
way they did on both sides, would it have been possible to ensure peaceful 
transformation and coexistence in Bulgaria? 
 
Croatia: 
1. How do you define major characteristics of inter-ethnic relations in Croatia? Sub-
question: What do you think about the impact of war on majority-minority 
relations? 
2. Can you tell us more about the treatment of minorities in Croatia and the 
historical evolution of minority rights policies? 
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3. What do you think about the current state of Serb (and Muslim) minority in the 
country? Sub-question: What are the major problems in the protection of minority 
rights? 
4. How did the EU membership process affect the majority and minority relations? 
Sub-question: What was the role of the EU in general? 
5. What was the role of the EU during negotiations in improving minority rights in 
Croatia? Sub-questions: Did the EU insistently ask for the improvement of 
minority rights in Croatia? Was this an important issue during the negotiations 
process? 
6. What was Croatian policy makers’ approach to the EU’s demands in this realm? 
Sub-question: Were they reactive or accommodative; and why? 
7. Was there domestic demand for the reformation of minority rights policies among 
Serb (and Muslim) minority elites and public during the EU membership process? 
Sub-question: What can you say about the domestic ownership of democratisation 
reforms on both sides (majority and minority)? What is the situation today; is 
demand still strong or are both sides satisfied? 
8. What is the role of political leaders (both majority and minority leaders) in 
bilateral relations between Croat and Serb communities?  
a. During the transition period in early post-war era? 
b. During EU membership process in 2000s?  
9. If the EU factor did not play its role and domestic/local leaders did not act the 
way they did on both sides, would it have been possible to ensure peaceful 
coexistence in Croatia? 
 
Montenegro:  
1. How do you define the major characteristics of inter-ethnic relations in 
Montenegro? Sub-question: What do you think about the impact of war on 
majority-minority relations? 
2. Can you tell us more about the treatment of minorities in Montenegro and the 
historical evolution of minority rights policies? 
3. Why and how important is the EU membership for Montenegro? 
4. What do you think about the current state of Bosniak and Albanian minorities in 
the country? Sub-question: What are the major problems in terms of the 
protection of minority rights? 
5. How does the EU membership process affect the majority and minority relations 
in Montenegro? 
6. How do you account for the role of the EU during negotiations in improving 
minority rights protection in Montenegro? Sub-question: Does the EU insistently 
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ask for the improvement of minority rights in Montenegro? Is this an important 
issue during the negotiations process? How much progress have you made 
concerning Chapter 23? 
7. What is Montenegrin policy makers’ approach to the EU’s demands in the 
minority rights issues? Sub-question: Are they reactive or accommodative; and 
why? 
8. Is there domestic demand for the reformation of minority rights policies among 
Bosniak and Albanian minority elites and communities? Sub-question: What can 
you say about the domestic ownership of democratisation reforms on both sides 
(majority and minority)? Is demand strong or are both sides satisfied? 
9. What is the role of political leaders (both majority and minority leaders) on the 
















Appendix 3. Notes on Table 5.1. 
* The former Yugoslavia had signed and ratified the Convention on 15 April 1966 and 2 October 1967, 
respectively.  
** The Directive was adopted, unanimously, by the Member States in 2000. It had to be transposed into 
national law by 19 July 2003 by the 15 "old" Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands; Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom), by 
1 May 2004 by the 10 "new" Member States (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia), and by 1 January 2007 for Romania & Bulgaria and by 1 
July 2013 for Croatia. 
*** The Law on Amendment is adopted by the Montenegrin Parliament and fully in line with 
recommendations of Council of Europe Venice Commission. (Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Montenegro, no. 031/06 of 12.05.2006, 051/06 of 04.08.2006, 038/07 of 22.06.2007, Official Gazette of 
Montenegro, no. 002/11 of 12.01.2011, 008/11 of 04.02.2011, 031/17 of 12.05.2017). Montenegro also 
adopted Strategic framework for minority policy in Montenegro which is a ten-year "Strategy for Minority 
Policy" adopted on 3 July 2008. 
 
Note 1: Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No.005 - Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - Declarations in force as of today Status as of 31/08/2018 
Croatia  
Reservation contained in the instrument of ratification, deposited on 5 November 1997 - Or. 
Cro./Engl. 
 
In accordance with Article 64 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms [Article 57 since the entry into force of the Protocol No 11], the Republic of Croatia does hereby 
make the following reservation in respect of the right to a public hearing as guaranteed by Article 6, 
paragraph 1, of the Convention: 
 
The Republic of Croatia cannot guarantee the right to a public hearing before the Administrative Court in 
cases in which it decides on the legality of individual acts of administrative authorities. In such cases the 
Administrative Court in principle decides in closed session. 
 
The relevant provision of the Croatian law referred to above is Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Law on 
Administrative Disputes, which reads as follows: "In administrative disputes the Administrative Court 
decides in closed session." 
  
Period covered: 05/11/1997 - 
 
Note 2: Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No.005 - Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - Declarations in force as of today Status as of 31/08/2018 
Montenegro  
 
Declaration contained in a Note Verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and 
Montenegro, deposited with the instrument of ratification on 3 March 2004 - Or. Engl. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro makes the following statement in accordance 
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with Article 57, paragraph 2, of the Convention, to supplement the information contained in the instrument 
of ratification deposited by Serbia and Montenegro on 3 March 2004. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro has the honour to refer to the following 
reservation contained in the instrument of ratification: 
 
“While affirming its willingness fully to guarantee the rights enshrined in Articles 5 and 6 of the 
Convention, Serbia and Montenegro declares that the provisions of Article 5, paragraph 1[.c] and Article 6, 
paragraphs 1 and 3, shall be without prejudice to the application of Articles 75 to 321 of the Law on Minor 
Offences of the Republic of Serbia (Službeni glasnik Socijalisticke Republike Srbije, No. 44/89; Službeni 
glasnik Republike Srbije, Nos. 21/90, 11/92, 6/93, 20/93, 53/93, 67/93, 28/94, 16/97, 37/97, 36/98, 44/98, 
65/2001) and Articles 61 to 225 of the Law on Minor Offences of the Republic of Montenegro (Službeni 
list Republike Crne Gore, Nos. 25/94, 29/94, 38/96, 48/99) that regulate proceedings before magistrates' 
courts.” 
 
The relevant provisions of the laws referred to in this reservation regulate the following matters: 
 
- Proceedings before the magistrates’ courts, including rights of the accused, rules of evidence and legal 
remedies (Articles 75 to 89 and 118 to 321 of the Law on Minor Offences of the Republic of Serbia and 
Articles 61 to 67 and 97 to 225 of the Law on Minor Offences of the Republic of Montenegro), and 
- Establishment and organization of the magistrates’ courts (Articles 68 to 96 of the Law on Minor 
Offences of the Republic of Montenegro. and Articles 89a to 115 of the Law on Minor Offences of the 
Republic of Serbia); and measures for securing the presence of the accused (Articles 183 to 192 of the Law 
on Minor Offences of the Republic of Serbia). 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro wishes to inform the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe that Serbia and Montenegro shall withdraw the reservations contained in its instrument 
of ratification as soon as the legislation mentioned therein has been brought into conformity with the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
 
[Note by the Secretariat: The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided on its 994thbis 
meeting that the Republic of Montenegro is to be considered a Party to this treaty with effect from 6 June 
2006.]  
Period covered: 06/06/2006 -  
Articles concerned : 57 
 
Reservation contained in the instrument of ratification deposited on 3 March 2004 - Or. Engl. - At 
the same time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro handed over to the 
Secretary General a Note Verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro 
containing a brief statement of the laws concerned - Or. Engl. (See Declaration under Article 57) 
 
While affirming its willingness fully to guarantee the rights enshrined in Articles 5 and 6 of the 
Convention, Serbia and Montenegro declares that the provisions of Article 5, paragraph 1[.c] and Article 6, 
paragraphs 1 and 3, shall be without prejudice to the application of Articles 75 to 321 of the Law on Minor 
Offences of the Republic of Serbia (Službeni glasnik Socijalisticke Republike Srbije, No. 44/89; Službeni 
glasnik Republike Srbije, Nos. 21/90, 11/92, 6/93, 20/93, 53/93, 67/93, 28/94, 16/97, 37/97, 36/98, 44/98, 
65/2001) and Articles 61 to 225 of the Law on Minor Offences of the Republic of Montenegro (Službeni 





[Note by the Secretariat: The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided on its 994thbis 
meeting that the Republic of Montenegro is to be considered a Party to this treaty with effect from 6 June 
2006.]  
 
Period covered: 06/06/2006 -  
Articles concerned: 5, 6 
 
Reservation contained in the instrument of ratification deposited by the state union of Serbia and 
Montenegro, on 3 March 2004 - Or. Engl. 
  
Serbia and Montenegro declares that the right to a public hearing enshrined in Article 6, paragraph 1, of the 
Convention shall be without prejudice to the application of the principle that courts in Serbia do not, as a 
rule, hold public hearings when deciding in administrative disputes. The said rule is contained in Article 32 
of the Law on Administrative Disputes (Službeni list Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, No. 46/96) of the 
Republic of Serbia. 
 
[Note by the Secretariat: The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided on its 994thbis 
meeting that the Republic of Montenegro is to be considered a Party to this treaty with effect from 6 June 
2006.]  
 
Period covered: 06/06/2006 -  
Articles concerned: 6 
 
Note 3: 
Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No.157 - Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities - Declarations in force as of today Status as of 31/08/2018 
Declaration contained in the instrument of ratification deposited on 7 May 1999 - Or. Eng./Bulg.  
 
Confirming its adherence to the values of the Council of Europe and the desire for the integration of 
Bulgaria into the European structures, committed to the policy of protection of human rights and tolerance 
to persons belonging to minorities, and their full integration into Bulgarian society, the National Assembly 
of the Republic of Bulgaria declares that the ratification and implementation of the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities do not imply any right to engage in any activity violating the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the unitary Bulgarian State, its internal and international security.  
Period covered: 01/09/1999 – 
 
See the full list of declarations: 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/157/declarations?p_auth=OcreRxG4  
 
Note 4: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (UN) 
Declarations and Reservations 
Bulgaria (20) 
 
The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria considers that the provisions of article 17, paragraph 
1, and article 18, paragraph 1, of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, the effect of which is to prevent sovereign States from becoming Parties to the Convention, 
are of a discriminatory nature. The Convention, in accordance with the principle of the sovereign equality 
of States, should be open for accession by all States without any discrimination whatsoever. 
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(20) On 24 June 1992, the Government of Bulgaria notified the Secretary-General its decision to withdraw 
the reservation to article 22 made upon signature and confirmed upon ratification. For the text of the 
reservation, see United Nations, Treaty Series , vol. 60, p. 270. 
 
Declarations recognizing the competence of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(34) 12 May 1993 
 
"The Republic of Bulgaria declares that it recognizes the competence of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination to receive and consider communications from individuals or groups of individuals 
within its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by the Republic of Bulgaria of any of the rights 
set forth in this Convention." 
 
(34) The first ten declarations recognizing the competence of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination took effect on 3 December 1982, date of the deposit of the tenth declaration, according to 
article 14, paragraph 1 of the Convention. 
 
Note 5: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (UN) 
 
Declarations recognizing the competence of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 34 
Montenegro 
Confirmed upon succession: 
        
“By affirming its commitment to establish the principles of the rule of law and promote and protect human 
rights, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recognizes the competence of the Committee 
on the elimination of Racial Discrimination to receive and consider complaints submitted by individuals 
and groups alleging violations of rights guaranteed under the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia determines 
the competence of the Federal Constitutional Court to accept and consider, within its domestic legal 
system, the complaints submitted by individuals and groups under the State jurisdiction, alleging to have 
been victims of rights violations under the Convention, and who have exhausted all available legal means 




Note 6: Declaration contained in the instrument of ratification deposited on 4 July 2008 - Or. Engl. 
 
In accordance with Article 12 of the Convention, the Republic of Croatia designates the Ministry of Justice 
of the Republic of Croatia as a central authority to receive requests for mutual assistance in connection with 
the matters covered by the Convention.  
 
 
Note 7: 5 Declaration contained in the instrument of ratification deposited on 19 March 2010 - Or. 
Engl. 
 
In accordance with Article 12 of the Convention, Montenegro declares that the central authority for 
receiving requests for mutual assistance, within the scope of this Convention, is the Ministry of Justice of 
Montenegro. 
 
